Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-207,96-207
• Parties: 12 IER Cases 1184 Conney L. DAVIS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. WYOMING MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1246

934 P.2d 1246

12 IER Cases 1184

Conney L. DAVIS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. WYOMING MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 96-207.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 18, 1997.

Mark W. Gifford of Gifford & Bonner, Casper, for appellant.

Mark L. Carman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

When appellee Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. (WMC) of Casper, without warning or reason terminated the employment of appellant Conney Davis (Davis), a surgical technologist, Davis sued WMC for wrongful termination, asserting claims of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The district court ruled that WMC's written disclaimers as a matter of law defeated Davis' claim of job security and granted WMC's motion for summary judgment. Davis appeals.

We affirm the ruling of the district court.

Davis presents one issue for our review:

Do the materials submitted to the district court on Appellee's motion for summary judgment show the existence of any genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of Appellant's employment?

WMC states the issues to be:

Was the trial court correct in finding that the Appellant was an employee at-will and remained so until the point in time she was discharged from her employment?

Was the trial court correct in ruling that the Appellant did not establish a cause of action for promissory estoppel?

FACTS

In order to earn her applied science degree in surgical technology from Central Wyoming College in Riverton, Davis served a 600-hour internship without pay at WMC. At the end of that internship, Davis was urged to apply for and was offered one of three surgical technologist positions at WMC. On April 5, 1995, Davis completed a WMC job application form that included an at-will employment disclaimer. On April 17, 1995, she completed a WMC job offer detail agreement which she contends obligated her to work for WMC for a minimum of one year and obligated WMC to employ her for at least one year as long as she performed satisfactorily. According to Davis, demand for surgical technologists is high around the country and her employment options outside of Casper were numerous, but she accepted WMC's offer because it included job security. Davis began working for WMC one week later. WMC earlier had offered Davis relocation assistance of $500.00 and, shortly after she moved, Davis accepted the money and signed an agreement committing to work one year. Davis attended a WMC new employee orientation meeting and was given an employee handbook containing a disclaimer. She was required to sign a separate sheet acknowledging receipt of the handbook and which detailed a disclaimer. In July of 1995, three months after beginning her employment, her supervisor evaluated Davis' performance and suggested areas of improvement. Davis received feedback one month later that she had improved and should continue her improvement.

Davis purchased a home on a contract which required she reside there for a minimum of two years and began extensive remodeling to the residence. On October 13, 1995, WMC terminated her employment. When Davis asked for a reason, WMC replied it did not have to give her a reason for the termination. Because WMC is the only employer of surgical technologists in Casper, Davis is now forced to take jobs outside her professional field at lower pay.

Davis filed suit for breach of contract and promissory estoppel alleging WMC had engaged in a course of conduct which created an understanding that she had job security. The district court ruled that the disclaimers were sufficient as a matter of law to prevent WMC's conduct from implying an employment contract containing a job security provision or creating a claim for promissory estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to WMC and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Under Wyoming law, it is well-settled that employment for an indefinite time is presumed to be a contract for at-will employment which either party can terminate at any time for any or no reason. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo.1985). A subsequent express contract or an implied in fact contract can defeat the at-will presumption. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo.1994); Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo.1994). Generally, it is a systematic discipline procedure or other language in an employee handbook implying termination may be for cause only which will defeat the rebuttable presumption that employment is at will. Lincoln, 867 P.2d at 703.

In this case, Davis concedes the effectiveness of the disclaimers issued to and acknowledged by her. She contends, however, that WMC's course of dealing with her negated the effect of these disclaimers and created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had an implied contract for employment security. Relying upon McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 990-991 (Wyo.1991) (McDonald II), she claims that WMC's course of dealing included the following manifestations of assent to an employment relationship which could be terminated only for cause: 1) the job offer detail agreement, 2) the relocation expense assistance agreement, and 3) the verbal assurances she received as part of her performance evaluations.

In determining whether WMC has made objective manifestations of assent to an employment contract containing a job security provision, our analysis must figure in the effect of the disclaimers, the provisions of the documents issued to Davis, and WMC's course of dealing with Davis. McDonald II, 820 P.2d at 990; 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:13, at 283 (3d ed. 1992) (It should make no difference whether the statements are contained in a handbook, a policy, or some other form). We hold that the job offer detail agreement and the relocation expense assistance agreement did not require a disclaimer because they did not supply terms for an implied in fact contract. We also hold that the performance evaluations conducted according to the handbook were validly disclaimed by WMC causing any reliance by Davis on her supervisor's verbal representations during the performance evaluations to be unreasonable as a matter of law. Based upon our recent decision in Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706 (Wyo.1996) (Loghry II), we hold the disclaimers are effective against Davis' claim of promissory estoppel.

Standard of Review

Our review of a grant of summary judgment is the same as the district court. The movant has the burden of clearly demonstrating that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Loghry II, 927 P.2d at 709. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Clark v. Industrial Co. of Steamboat Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 627 (Wyo.1991). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Id.

Agreements

Davis contends that the job offer detail agreement caused her to understand that she had a contract for at least one year or more. She states it contained the following:

1. Offered a full-time position as an OR tech, to work shifts.

2. Offered pay of $8.60 per hour, with annual income of $17,880 based upon 2080 hours per year.

3. Indication that the director of surgical services had approved the offer.

4. Offered $500.00 relocation assistance which she initially declined.

5. Statement that she would not receive a signing bonus.

6. Dates to obtain a physical examination and begin employment.

7. Date to attend new employee orientation.

8. This language immediately above the signatures of the "HR/Recruitment" representative and Davis stated:

"Signing hereunder signifies your acceptance of the above stated information and serves as a binding agreement between New Employee and Wyoming Medical Center."

"[A] person does not have tenure in employment unless such tenure is established by statute or by contract or by rules and regulations pursuant to statute or by rules and regulations having the force of a contract." Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704 (Wyo.1985). This agreement set forth the hours of work, pay scale, and dates for a physical examination, beginning employment and attending orientation. Limited to these subjects, the language that this is "a binding agreement" must be interpreted as giving Davis an enforceable agreement to receive employment for a specific position at a specific rate of pay and begin her employment on a certain date. It is our general rule that a hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 282 (Wyo.1985). The agreement did not address employment for a definite period or contain any language changing WMC's unfettered right to discharge at any time and without cause. Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d at 707. No ambiguity is presented which requires reversal of the summary judgment.

Our analysis and conclusion regarding the effect of the relocation assistance agreement are the same. It states in relevant part:

I, Conney L. Davis, ... (Participant), ... have accepted $500.00 from the hospital ..., to assist in financing Participant's move to Casper, Wyoming.

Participant agrees to work no less than 2080 hours in consideration of this assistance.... Participant agrees that if employment terminates for any reason other...