Davise v. Target Corp.
| Decision Date | 09 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-420 |
| Parties | PAULA DAVISE, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Appearances:
For Plaintiff:
Paula Davise
PRO SE
For Defendant:
Anjanette Cabrera
Hema Chatlani
Littler Mendelson, P.C.
Table of Contents
A. Standard of Review on a Motion to Dismiss....................................................................3
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Paula Davise, pro se, sues her employer, Target Corporation, for: (1) discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; (3) violation of at-will employment; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
II. Facts
Plaintiff is an at at-will employee at Target. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 1, 12. In 2008, she and her former team leader, Bridgette McCloud, were involved in a personal dispute. Plaintiff rented a room in her apartment to McCloud's niece; the niece moved out after the "rental situation . . . went sour." See Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 9. This upset McCloud, who used her position at Target to manipulate plaintiff's time schedules. Id., ¶ 13. McCloud's sister, who is not a Target employee, physically threatened plaintiff at the workplace. Id., ¶ 9.
In addition to the dispute with the McCloud family, plaintiff has received unjustified write-ups from her current team leader. Id., ¶ 11. Plaintiff requested a hearing from Target's Human Resources Department to challenge these reports, but her request was denied. Id., ¶ 15-16.
Plaintiff seeks relief because: (1) she was subject to harassment; (2) disciplinary actions were brought against her for no legitimate reason; (3) she was not granted a hearing by defendant; and (4) her health has suffered as a result. Id., ¶ 5, 9, 16, 18.
III. Law
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, well-pleaded facts are accepted as true and considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1974); see also Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). To withstand a Rule 12(b) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Whether a complaint states a plausible claim to relief "is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2013).
A pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Edwards v. New York State Unified Court Sys., 2012 WL 6101984 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012). The submissions of a pro se litigant should be interpreted liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.2006). Nevertheless, even a pro se complaint will be dismissed for failing to meet minimum pleading standards. Crawford v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 887806 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011).
To establish a prima facie case of statutorily proscribed discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was within the protected category; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003).
An adverse employment action is a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment." Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2001). To be materially adverse, it must be "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Resources Administration, 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004).
To prevail on a claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that the conduct was based on a protected category. See Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). A plaintiff must also establish that: (1) "the harassment was 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,'" and (2) "a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer." Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997); see Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (1998); Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1992).
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must allege: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or reckless disregard of a substantialprobability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress." Harrington v. Pinkerton's Inc., 39 F. App'x 655, 656 (2d Cir. 2002). The conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1999).
In New York, at-will employment may be terminated by either party at any time for any lawful reason. See Baron v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 271 F.3d 81, 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Murphy v. Am. Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305 (1983)). Wrongful discharge is not a cause of action in New York. See Trakis v. Manhattanville Coll., 51 A.D.3d 778, 780-1 (2d Dep't 2008) ( ).
There is no constitutionally protected property interest in at-will employment. See Baron, 271 F.3d at 89; Traki, 51 A.D.3d at 781 (2008).
IV. Application of Law to Facts
Plaintiff does not allege that that she was subject to a hostile work environment because of her membership in a protected category. Rather, her complaint is based on a personal dispute with her supervisor. The claim for a hostile work environment is dismissed. See, e.g., Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) ().
Absent is any allegation that defendant acted for a discriminatory reason. No claim is made under any constitutional provision or federal statute. See, e.g., Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106 (2d. Cir. 2007) (). In addition, a change to plaintiff's work schedule is not a materially adverse employment action. See Aspilaire v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 612 F.Supp.2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Target's alleged actions—changing plaintiff's schedule, filing disciplinary letters, and denying a hearing—do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct in context. See Ortiz v. Standard & Poor's, 2011 WL 4056901 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011) (); Meadows v. Planet Aid, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 83, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) () (citing Murphy v. Am. Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 298 (1983)). There are no grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleges...
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