Davison v. Garfield, 42756.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42756.,42756.
• Parties: DAVISON et al. v. GARFIELD, Judge.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

219 Iowa 1258

257 N.W. 432

DAVISON et al.

v.GARFIELD, Judge.

No. 42756.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 4, 1934.

Certiorari to District Court, Des Moines County; T. G. Garfield, Judge.

Proceedings in certiorari to review the action of the Des Moines district court in overruling motions to dismiss eleven indictments pending in said court against petitioners herein. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Writ annulled in part and sustained in part.

Arthur Springer, of Wapello, and S. W. Livingston, of Washington, Iowa, for plaintiffs.

D. N. Johnson, of Wapello, and J. V. Gray, of Mt. Pleasant, for respondent.

CLAUSSEN, Justice.

Ten indictments against petitioners were returned into court by the grand jury of Louisa county at the January, 1933, term of the Louisa district court. These cases were transferred to Des Moines county for trial. One of such cases was tried. A verdict of guilty returned in the case was set aside on July 17, 1933, and a new trial ordered.

It appears that upon the indictments being returned, the defendants named therein gave bond.

Terms of the district court of Des Moines county were opened on September 18, 1933, November 6, 1933, and January 8, 1934. All such terms were in due time adjourned sine die. At such terms juries were in attendance. An April, 1934, term was also held.

It is not necessary to note the progress of the case between the time of the return of the indictments and July 17, 1933, the date when a new trial was granted in the case which was tried, further than to state that at no time was application for postponement of trial made by either defendant.

At the April term, 1934, motions were made by the defendants named in the indictments, who are petitioners herein, that the indictments be dismissed because more than three terms of court had intervened since the indictments were returned, without disposition being made of the cases.

These motions were overruled by the court, and thereupon this proceeding was begun to secure a review of the orders overruling the motions to dismiss.

The question presented for determination involves the construction of the provisions found in sections 14024 and 14025 of the Code of 1931, which are as follows:

“14024. Delay in Trial. If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next regular term of the court in which the indictment is triable after the same is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.

14025. Discharge on Undertaking. If the defendant be not indicted or tried as above provided, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the prosecution continued from term to term, and discharge the defendant from custody on his own undertaking, or on the undertaking of bail for his appearance to answer the charge at the time to which the same is continued, but no continuance under this section shall be extended beyond the following three terms of the court.”

Reading the two sections together, it appears that if an indictment against a defendant has not been brought to trial before the end of the next regular term after the term at which it was found, or the trial has not been postponed upon application of the defendant, the court must dismiss the indictment unless good cause to the contrary is shown. If, however, such good cause is shown, the court may continue the case, but not beyond three terms of court. The effect of the sections is to segregate cases which have been postponed on defendant's application and those which have been brought to trial, from cases which have not been postponed on defendant's application and those which have not been brought to trial. Clearly, cases which have been postponed on defendant's application and those brought to trial are not subject to dismissal under the provisions of section 14024. It seems equally clear that such cases are not subject to the provisions of section 14025, for that section gives the court power to continue cases which have not been brought to trial and cases which have not been postponed on defendant's application, which are not subject to dismissal under section 14024 on account of good cause to the contrary being shown, if sufficient reason is shown for delay in trial.

[1][2] Courts have inherent power to continue business which remains incomplete at the expiration of the term. It is usually said that such incompleted business goes over to the next term as a matter of course. See 13 C. J., p. 129, § 13. It is provided by Code, § 10793, that upon final adjournment of court all business not otherwise disposed of at the term shall stand continued. See State v. Enke, 85 Iowa, 35, 51 N. W. 1146. Under such authorization and power, indictments, the trial of which has been postponed on defendant's application, and such as have been brought to trial and yet are not disposed of on account of mistrial or other cause, stand continued on final adjournment of the court.

The Constitution (article 1, § 10) gives to one accused of a crime the right to a speedy trial. Subject to such rights of continuance as the statute (Code, § 13843) gives, such cases stand for trial upon demand of either the defendant or the state. It is generally recognized that this situation complies with the constitutional guaranty of the right to a speedy trial. State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa, 613, 198 N. W. 37, 199 N. W. 369;City of Creston v. Nye, 74 Iowa, 369, 37 N. W. 777;State v. Enke, 85 Iowa, 35, 51 N. W. 1146; and see 16 C. J., p. 443, § 800, where authorities from many jurisdictions are collected. The statute does not give a defendant the right to have such case dismissed because it is not called up for trial by the state. Neither is dismissal required in such situation by the Constitution. The right to speedy trial is not denied. Trial may be had upon demand by the defendant, unless statutory grounds for continuance...