Davisson v. Commissioner of Revenue

• Decision Date: 07 November 1984
• Citation: 470 N.E.2d 413,18 Mass.App.Ct. 748
• Parties: Richard L. DAVISSON et al., 1 executors, v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 413

470 N.E.2d 413

18 Mass.App.Ct. 748

Richard L. DAVISSON et al., ¹ executors, v. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Norfolk.

Argued Sept. 11, 1984.

Decided Nov. 7, 1984.

Christine Way, Stow (Robert J. McGee, Boston, with her), for plaintiffs.

Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and Linda M. Irvin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Com'r of Revenue, submitted a brief.

Before GREANEY, C.J., and GRANT and FINE, JJ.

FINE, Justice.

The only question in this case is whether a decedent's interests in certain oil and gas properties located in Texas and New Mexico are taxable as part of his estate under the Massachusetts estate tax. G.L. c. 65C, §§ 1, et seq. A probate judge ruled that they were not, and the Commissioner of Revenue has appealed. ² The answer to the question turns on whether the particular property interests held by the decedent on the date of his death represented "real and tangible personal property having an actual situs outside the Commonwealth," G.L. c. 65C, § 1(f ), inserted by St.1975, c. 684, § 74. Our research indicates that the application of the Massachusetts estate tax to this particular type of asset has not previously been dealt with in an appellate decision.

When the decedent died on January 13, 1980, a domiciliary of Massachusetts, he owned three separate interests in oil and gas "leases." "Lease" is a term used loosely in the oil and gas industry to designate a variety of relationships between investors and landowners. (1) He had a "royalty interest" in an oil and gas lease relating to land in New Mexico. Under the terms of this lease he was designated as one of two "lessors" who were entitled to receive one-eighth of the oil produced or, at the lessee's option, one-eighth of the proceeds of the sale of the oil produced, and one-eighth of the proceeds of the sale of gas produced. (2) He had a "working interest" in an oil and gas lease relating to land in Texas, which interest he obtained by assignment from the lessee. Under the terms of this lease, the lessee, in exchange for payment of rents and royalties to the lessor, was entitled to explore, develop, and operate the land for the purpose, essentially, of producing oil, gas, and other minerals. (3) And he had an "overriding royalty interest" in an oil and gas lease, also relating to land in Texas, which interest he obtained by assignment from an overriding royalty interest holder under the original oil and gas lease. The decedent's "working interest" and "overriding royalty interest" are each set forth in a "division order" specifying the nature of the interest and the fractional share.

The three underlying leases are form documents, similar in content. They all "grant, lease and let exclusively," and the New Mexico lease also "demises," the land described for the purpose of exploration and production of oil and gas. Each is for a five-year term and "thereafter" so long as minerals are produced. Royalties accrue to the lessor as a fractional share of production, the lessee having the option to purchase that share at market price. Lessors and lessees have full rights of assignment. A lessee may surrender or abandon the lease, whereupon the interest in all minerals reverts to the lessor. Except to the extent of the rights of a lessor to royalties, the lessee owns the minerals produced. The lessee has the right to make reasonable use of the surface to the extent necessary to obtain the oil and gas.

The difference between an "overriding royalty interest" and a "working interest" is that payments to one holding an "overriding royalty interest" are determined without deducting production costs, whereas one who has a "working interest" assumes an obligation to pay production costs. None of the parties makes an issue of the differences among the three types of ownership involved. Although the documentation in the record of the chain of title with regard to the decedent's overriding royalty interest is incomplete, there is no basis for speculation that successive assignments gave assignees something less than the original lessee's interest in the particular fractional share transferred. ³ There is nothing in the record to indicate that either of the States in which the minerals are located is seeking to impose an estate tax on these interests.

For purposes of the Massachusetts estate tax (which replaced the inheritance tax for persons dying on or after January 1, 1976) "gross estate" is defined as

"the federal gross estate, whether or not a federal estate tax return is required to be filed, less the value of real and tangible personal property having an actual situs outside the Commonwealth." G.L. c. 65C, § 1(f ), inserted by St.1975, c. 684, § 74. ⁴

The Federal gross estate, in turn, is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 2031(a) (1976) as the "value ... of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." Thus, real property or tangible personal property located outside of Massachusetts is excluded from a person's Massachusetts gross estate, whereas intangible personal property, regardless of its location, is included.

The property in question has, in varying degrees, aspects of personalty and realty as well as tangibility and intangibility. On the one hand, like securities, the interests entitle the owner to receive monetary payments. On the other hand, they clearly relate to physical substances in the ground which are tangible and usually regarded as parts of the land.

The question to be determined is whether the Massachusetts Legislature intended to include within the categories of real property or tangible personal property any or all of the mineral interests owned by the decedent at the time of his death or whether, on the other hand, such interests were intended to be classified as intangible personal property. To make the determination called for, we must first look to Massachusetts opinions preceding the insertion of G.L. c. 65C because, presumably, the Legislature was aware of earlier appellate decisions when it made the distinctions in issue in this case. See Page v. Commissioner of Revenue, 389 Mass. 388, 392, 450 N.E.2d 590 (1983). Thus, it is of significance that Massachusetts has consistently recognized that mineral rights may be severed from the remainder of land by reservation or grant, leaving an estate in the minerals which is separate and distinct from the soil in which they lie. See Adams v. Briggs Iron Co., 7 Cush. 361, 366, 367 (1851); Chester Emery Co. v. Lucas, 112 Mass. 424 (1873); Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 303, 305 (1903). A right to take minerals from land--something less than a fee interest in the minerals--has generally been included within the category of profits a prendre which are viewed as real estate. ⁵ See State Tax Commission v. Wheatland, 343 Mass. 650, 180 N.E.2d 340 (1962), holding that for purposes of the Massachusetts income tax then in effect ⁶ payments to an owner for out-of-State timber rights were derived from profits a prendre, analogous to the right to receive rent payments, and not taxable because they represented interests in real estate. Accord State Tax Commission v. Fine, 356 Mass. 51, 247 N.E.2d 701 (1969), dealing specifically with the right to receive royalties based on mineral deposits located in Minnesota. See also Gray v. Handy, 349 Mass. 438, 208 N.E.2d 829 (1965).

Although not conclusive as to the intent of the Massachusetts Legislature, it is of some significance that the courts in Texas and New Mexico, where the minerals are located, as well as most courts elsewhere in the country and most commentators, would also classify the kind of mineral rights with which we are concerned as something other than intangible personal property. ⁷

Classifying the decedent's royalty interest as an interest in real estate presents little difficulty. The royalty interest represents outright ownership of a fractional portion of the minerals in the ground. Although they also represent interests in the mineral deposits in the ground, the overriding royalty and working interests are different from the royalty interest in that they are carved out of the lessee's interest in the minerals. Notwithstanding the terminology used, the lessees' interests are indistinguishable from profits a prendre and should be treated as such. Under the Massachusetts appellate decisions prior to enactment of the Massachusetts estate tax, of which the Legislature was presumably aware (see Page v. Commissioner of Revenue, supra ), profits a prendre were regarded as realty. Even considering them as ordinary leaseholds, however, a lessee's interest would not have been classified as an intangible interest in personal property. See Moulton v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N.E. 297 (1922), holding that for purposes of the Massachusetts income tax provisions then in effect, income from the sale of a lessee's interest in the leasehold was not income derived from an intangible interest in personal property. Moreover, in general, "tax laws are to be strictly construed. The right to tax is not to be implied, but must be plainly conferred. Doubts are resolved in favor of the taxpayer." DeBlois v. Commissioner of Corporation & Taxation, 276 Mass. 437, 438-439, 177 N.E. 566 (1931). State Tax Commission v. Wheatland, supra 343 Mass. at 653, 180 N.E.2d 340. Moulton v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, supra 243 Mass. at 130, 137 N.E. 297.

In summary, based upon Massachusetts precedent, authority in other jurisdictions, and the principle of strict construction of statutes dealing with taxation, the conclusion is compelling that the Legislature intended to exclude from the definition of gross estate royalty interests, overriding royalty interests and working interests in out-of-State mineral deposits. We need not decide whether a legislative change expanding the definition to include any such interests would be consistent with Federal due process.

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