Dawson Cnty. v. McNamar

• Decision Date: 18 March 1880
• Citation: 4 N.W. 991,10 Neb. 276
• Parties: DAWSON COUNTY v. MCNAMAR
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

10 Neb. 276

4 N.W. 991

DAWSON COUNTY

v.MCNAMAR

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed March 18, 1880.

Error from Dawson county.

C. J. Dilworth, for plaintiff.

C. W. McNamar, for defendant.

LAKE J.

This is a proceeding in error to reverse the judgment of the district court for Dawson county. To the petition in error the defendant in error has formally answered, denying the errors assigned by the plaintiffs, and alleging others of which he complains, and for which relief is prayed. This answer is in the nature of a cross-petition in error, and will be so treated.

The action below was brought by the defendant in error, with the view of obtaining a perpetual injunction against the collection of taxes levied to meet certain bonded indebtedness of said county as it was to fall due, and which was incurred as follows, viz.: $50,000 in bridge bonds, issued January 1, 1873; $30,000 in court-house bonds, issued July 1, 1873; and $20,000 in funding bonds, issued February 1, 1874.

In view of all the circumstances, the object sought by this action does not commend itself to the conscience of a court of equity. If accomplished it would amount, practically, to a repudiation of the public indebtedness represented by these bonds, for which the people of Dawson county--the plaintiff below with the rest--have voluntarily received and are now in the enjoyment of the fruits. Fortunately, however, for the good name and reputation of the county hereafter, financially, there is nothing in the record requiring or even authorizing the court to pronounce against the validity of either these three classes of bonds, to provide for which the taxes in question were levied.

As to the bridge bonds, the only objection urged is that the act under which they, in terms, purport to have been issued is unconstitutional. They contain the recital that they were “issued for building a bridge across the Platte river near Plumb Creek station, in the county of Dawson, and state of Nebraska, under and in pursuance of an act of the legislature of the state of Nebraska, entitled ‘An act to enable counties, cities, and precincts to borrow money on their bonds, or to issue bonds to aid in the construction of works of internal improvements in this state, and to legalize bonds already issued for such purposes. Approved February 16, 1869.’ Also of an act amendatory of sections 2 and 5 of said act, approved March 3, 1870.”

That all steps preliminary to the issue of these bonds, required by statute, were duly taken is not questioned; but it is urged against the constitutionality of the acts referred to that they embrace more than one subject, which was expressly prohibited by the provision in section 19, art. 2, of the constitution of 1867, which declared that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” If this premise, that more than one distinct subject was included, were true, the conclusion contended for, that the acts are void, would be irresistible. Questions depending upon the validity of these acts have frequently arisen, but we have no recollection that this objection to them was ever raised until now. Hollenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377;White v. The City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505;Reineman v. The C. C. & B. H. R. Co. 7 Neb. 310; State v. Thosen, 9 Neb. 458.

While, in particular cases, there might be serious doubts as to the power of the legislature to validate that which was before invalid, we have none as to the constitutionality of its exercise in the manner of this enactment when properly applied. And this is the whole of the objection. It is insisted that the words of the title above quoted which we have italicized, and under which section 8 of the original act is included, refer to a different subject from those which go before. But, suppose that, instead of this title, it had been “An act relative to aiding works of internal improvement by counties, cities and precincts,” can there be any doubt that it would have covered every provision of these acts? What was the object to be accomplished by this legislation? Was it anything more than the authorization of municipal aid to such improvements? And was not the legalizing of acts by which such aid had been already undertaken, to the extent that it could be done, quite as germane to that subject as are those provisions directing particularly what steps must be taken to accomplish it in the future? After due consideration we fail to discover any merit in this objection, and must hold that, as to the bridge bonds, there was no error in the judgment of the district court.

But that court held both the court-house and funding bonds to be void, and enjoined so much of the levy complained of as was based thereon. Upon just what grounds the court so held does not appear; but, premising they were those urged by the defendant in error in this court, the ruling cannot be sustained. The court-house bonds also purport to have been issued under the before mentioned internal improvement acts, which, even if held to be constitutional, it is claimed by the defendant in error do not authorize this sort of county indebtedness. And this, we think, is the proper view to be taken of these statutes. The...