Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., s. 20752
| Decision Date | 11 February 1960 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 20752,20763,s. 20752 |
| Citation | 215 Ga. 700,113 S.E.2d 129 |
| Parties | Ralph L. DAWSON v. ALTAMAHA LAND COMPANY et al. SAVANNAH RIVER LUMBER COMPANY v. ALTAMAHA LAND COMPANY et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. For the reasons stated in the opinion the court did not err in overruling the demurrers of the defendants to the petition.
2. The order making Ralph L. Dawson a party defendant to the action is without error.
3. The court did not err in the exercise of its equitable powers in restraining the original defendant from further pursuing the statutory processioning proceeding brought by it in Long County, Georgia, while the instant case was pending in the Superior Court of Chatham County.
Perry Brannen, savannah, J. T. Grice, Glennville, for plaintiff in error.
Bennett, Pedrick & Bennett, Blalock & Blalock, Waycross, Bouhan, Lawrence Williams, Levy & McAlpin, Morris & Morris, Savannah, for defendant in error.
Morris & Morris, Basil Morris, Archibald L. Morris, Savannah, for plaintiff in error.
Bouhan, Lawrence, Williams, Levy & McAlpin, Alex A. Lawrence, Brannen, Clark & Hester, Savannah, Bennett, Pedrick & Bennett, Blalock & Blalock, Waycross, J. T. Grice, Glennville, for defendant in error.
Altamaha Land Company on July 15, 1957 brought suit in the Superior Court of Chatham County against Savannah River Lumber Company, a corporation having its principal office in Chatham County. The petition alleged: that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and is in possession of certain described lands in Long County, Georgia, (a description of the lands and abstract of title showing that petitioner has had a written record chain of title to said lands for more than forty years prior to bringing the suit being set out in the petition); that these lands were primarily held and devoted to the purposes of propagating, protecting, and conserving game and fish, for the pleasure of its members, the lands being peculiarly suited to these purposes; that the defendant owns the lands southwardly and adjoining the lands of the petitioner; that the defendant disputes the petitioner's boundary line, and has caused a survey to be made that erroneously shows such line (a copy of said survey being attached to the petition); and that the defendant, acting through its agents, servants, and associates, has put 'No Trespassing' signs on the petitioner's property, has hunted and fished thereon, and sold and leased hunting and fishing privileges to others, has seized boat landings belonging to the petitioner, has cut timber from the land, has interfered with the petitioner's enjoyment of the land, and has depleted the game and fish, and prevented their propagation and increase. The petition further alleged that the timber cut was of varying sizes; and that it is impossible to calculate the damages sustained, the trespasses being continuous from day to day. The prayers were for an injunction against the continuing trespasses and interferences with the petitioner's use and enjoyment of its land; for a judgment declaring the petitioner's rights in and to certain lakes or sloughs which may be included partly on the lands of the plaintiff and partly on the lands of the defendant, and enjoining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's rights therein; and for a judgment for $10,000 or other sum for the value of the timber removed from said land by the defendant.
The petition was amended by the plaintiff on January 10, 1958, by an amendment in the nature of an ancillary bill in equity, praying that the defendant be restrained from further pursuing a statutory processioning proceeding instituted by it in Long County, Georgia, for the purpose of marking the disputed boundary line between the lands of the plaintiff and those of the defendant, said action being initiated subsequently to the filing of the instant suit in Chatham County. The trial court by an order of January 10, 1958, temporarily restrained the defendant as prayed, and by order of January 22, 1958, kept the restraining order in full force and effect until further order of the court.
A second amendment was filed on February 6, 1958, for the purpose of making Ralph L. Dawson, a resident of Long County, Georgia, a party defendant to the suit. It was therein alleged that Dawson was an associate of and joint tortfeasor with the original defendant in the acts of trespass against the plaintiff's land; and that, subsequently to the bringing of the pending suit, he had purportedly purchased the lands described in the petition from the original defendant with actual knowledge that said lands were involved in the pending action. The court issued a rule nisi against Dawson and on June 9, 1958, overruled his objections to the joinder, and ordered him made a party defendant with sufficient time as provided by law to file his demurrers, pleas and answers to the action.
The defendants, in separate bills of exceptions, have assigned error on the judgments of the trial court overruling their demurrers to the petition; and on the order joining the defendant Dawson as a party defendant to the action. The original defendant further assigns error on the orders restraining it from further pursuing the processioning proceeding in Long County. The assignments of error and contentions of the parties are substantially the same, and will be considered together in one opinion.
1. The defendants' general demurrers attack the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Chatham County to entertain the present suit. It is their contention that the court erred in overruling their general demurrers, for the reason that the petition shows on its face that the court is without jurisdiction of the cause in that this is a case respecting title to land located in Long County, and under Art. 6, Sec. 14, Par. 2 of the Constitution of 1945 (Code, Ann., § 2-4902), the action must be brought in the county where the land is located. The defendant Dawson also contends that since he is a resident of Long County, the Superior Court of Chatham County does not have jurisdiction over him.
While the instant petition is predicated upon the ownership by the plaintiff of certain described lands upon which the defendants allegedly committed acts of trespass, and of necessity requires the ascertainment and establishment of the boundary line in controversy, looking to the facts alleged by the plaintiff and the nature and...
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Henderson v. Fisher
...and, "[t]herefore, this case does not come within this Court's title to land jurisdiction"); see also Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co. , 215 Ga. 700, 703 (1), 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960) ("[L]ooking to the facts alleged by the plaintiff and the nature and character of the relief sought, we are of the ......
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...line, which a court of equity, under the alleged circumstances of this case, has a right to adjudicate." Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 703(1), 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960). 4). Georgia Power asserts that if this action is essentially equitable in nature, venue lies in Putnam County pur......
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...not a suit to establish title in a court of equity. Payne v. Terhune, 212 Ga. 169, 170, 91 S.E.2d 348 (1956); Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700, 703, 113 S.E.2d 129 (1960). Therefore venue was not in Crisp County, but in Dougherty County, and the motion to transfer should have been g......