Dawson v. Cook, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–2877

• Decision Date: 24 February 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–2877
• Citation: 238 F.Supp.3d 712
• Parties: Gregory Lawrence DAWSON, Plaintiff, v. Eric COOK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

238 F.Supp.3d 712

Gregory Lawrence DAWSON, Plaintiff,

v.Eric COOK, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–2877

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed February 24, 2017

Gregory Lawrence Dawson, Houtzdale, PA, pro se.

Michael R. Miller, City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

Plaintiff Gregory Lawrence Dawson ("Plaintiff"), a former inmate at Curran–Fromhold Correctional Facility ("the Facility"), brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Eric Cook ("Officer Cook" or "Defendant"), a corrections officer at the Facility. Plaintiff alleges that, on September 2, 2012, during an altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment, resulting in injuries to Plaintiff's head, requiring several stiches and causing Plaintiff to permanently lose vision in his left eye. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in connection with the incident. Following the Court's March 29, 2016, denial of Defendant's first motion for summary judgment without prejudice, Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not responded to the motion.¹ For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

Plaintiff alleges that, on September 2, 2012, Officer Cook entered his cell and repeatedly punched him in the face, causing Plaintiff to fall and hit his head on a metal bunk. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 3. He alleges that Officer Cook then kicked him in the face several times. Id. Plaintiff claims that his two cellmates were present and witnessed the incident. Id. As a result of the altercation, Plaintiff alleges, he suffered a cut to the left side of his head, which required eight stitches, and also lost vision in his left eye. Id. As of May 14, 2014, the date Plaintiff filed his complaint, he still had no vision in his left eye. Id.

Plaintiff admits in his complaint that the Facility has a grievance procedure. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance regarding the incident, in which he claimed that Officer Cook used excessive force on him. See id. According to Plaintiff, he never received a response to the grievance and it was never addressed at any meetings he had with a prison official. Id. at 5. At his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he filed a grievance for the incident, but that he does not have copies of any of the documents related to his grievance. See Dawson Dep. 42:6–23, Mar. 12, 2015, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C, ECF No. 18–4.

Defendant disputes that Plaintiff submitted a grievance for the September 2, 2012 incident. See Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 6, Def.'s Mot. Ex. A, ECF No. 18–1. In support of this assertion, Defendant submits an affidavit from Patricia Powers ("Warden Powers"), the Deputy Warden of the Philadelphia Prison System. See Powers Aff., Def.'s Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 18–3.

Warden Powers has attached various documents to the affidavit, including the Philadelphia Prison System's Inmate Grievance Procedures dated July 29, 2005 ("the Policy"). See Policy, Def.'s Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 18–3. According to the Policy, an inmate may file a formal, written grievance within ten days of a qualifying incident by completing and submitting an inmate grievance form. See id. at 5. The inmate retains the bottom copy of the form as his or her receipt of filing. Id. If an inmate believes that he or she is being denied access to the grievance process—for example, because grievance forms are not available—the inmate may forward his or her grievance directly to the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Prison System. Id.

When a grievance is submitted, the Deputy Warden for Administration is responsible for reviewing the grievance and deciding whether to (1) reject the grievance and return it to the inmate, if the grievance concerns a non-grievable issue, is frivolous on its face, or is otherwise inconsistent with the inmate grievance procedures; (2) attempt to resolve the grievance him or herself; or (3) distribute the grievance to an appropriate staff member for resolution. Id. at 6. If the Deputy Warden rejects or resolves the grievance, he or she must do so within fourteen days of its receipt. If the Deputy Warden submits the grievance to a staff member to resolve, the staff member must forward the grievance form with a proposed resolution to the Deputy Warden within thirty days of receiving it. Id. After the Deputy Warden reaches a resolution, he or she will then draft a Finding of Inmate Grievance and forward it to the Warden for review. Id. The Warden will then review the recommended action of the Deputy Warden, and approve, deny, or modify it within fourteen days of receipt by noting his or her decision on the Finding of Inmate Grievance Form. Id. at 7. The Warden will then forward signed copies to the inmate. Id.

According to the Policy, if an inmate is unsatisfied with the Warden's decision, the inmate has five days after receipt of the Finding of Inmate Grievance Form to appeal the decision to the Commissioner. Id. The Policy also provides that an inmate may proceed to the next level of review if the time limit for the instant stage of review has expired. See id. at 3 ("Expiration of a time limit at any stage of the process shall entitle the grievant to move to the next level of the process, unless the grievant has agreed in writing to an extension of the time for a response.").

In addition to the Policy, Warden Powers attaches printed records from the Philadelphia Prison System's electronic system regarding Plaintiff's grievances from November 10, 2009, through November 25, 2013. ECF No. 18–3 at 4–12. Warden Powers states that she has knowledge of the information contained in the printed records, that the records were kept in the course of regular prison system activity, and that making such records is a regular practice of the Philadelphia Prison System. Powers Aff. ¶ 7. Warden Powers further states that, based on her review of the records, Plaintiff never filed a grievance relating to his alleged interaction with Officer Cook on September 2, 2012.³ Id. at ¶ 8.

According to Defendant, Plaintiff can no longer file a grievance regarding his interaction with Officer Cook, as his time limit for submitting a grievance for that incident has expired under the Policy. Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 8; see also Powers Aff. ¶ 11. Warden Powers bases this conclusion on the Policy itself, as well as printed records from the Philadelphia Prison System's electronic system regarding Plaintiff's changes in housing from May 26, 2009, through April 6, 2014. See Powers Aff. ¶ 11.

At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for attacking Officer Cook. See Dawson Dep. 32:16–33:24. Plaintiff also agreed that he was sentenced to eleven-and-a-half to twenty-three months on the assault charge, followed by two years of probation. Id. at 33:19–24.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this action on May 19, 2014, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Cook and the Philadelphia Prison System. ECF Nos. 1, 3. The Court granted in forma pauperis status on May 22, 2014, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the Philadelphia Prison System as legally frivolous in the same order. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff's complaint brings one claim of excessive force against Officer Cook and seeks $5,000,000 in damages. See Compl. at 4–5.

Defendant answered the complaint on October 24, 2014. ECF No. 7. In the answer, Defendant asserts numerous affirmative defenses, including that Plaintiff's claims are barred because he failed to comply with provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requiring exhaustion of all administrative remedies before commencing a federal suit. Answer at 4.

Defendant deposed Plaintiff, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on July 22, 2015. ECF No. 14. The Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment without prejudice on March 29, 2016, and ordered Defendant to file an amended motion for summary judgment by April 30, 2016, attaching thereto any administrative prison policy or other documents on which the motion relied, including pinpoint references to Plaintiff's deposition. ECF No. 17. The Court also ordered Plaintiff to respond to any motion for summary judgment by May 30, 2016. Id.

Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment on April 12, 2016. ECF No. 18. On June 14, 2016, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response, if any, to Defendants' second motion for summary judgment by July 5, 2016. ECF No. 19. As of today, Plaintiff has not filed a response. The Court is now ready to rule on the motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is awarded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney , 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). "A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd. , 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In undertaking this analysis, the court views all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. "After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving par...