Martin v. Wetzel
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-00215 (Erie),1:18-cv-00215 (Erie) |
| Parties | TYRONE MARTIN, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Tyrone Martin commenced this civil rights action against multiple individuals employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) at its State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 5. Martin alleged violations of his constitutional rights stemming from corrections officers' use of force and disposal of his property on May 29, 2018. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. ECF No. 116. For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion will be granted.1
Martin's complaint alleged that the Defendants violated his civil rights during and after an incident in which prison officials removed him from his cell on May 29, 2018. ECF No. 5, pp. 2-5.See also ECF No. 99 (Martin's Pretrial Statement). Martin's complaint expressly raised several legal claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities: an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim based on the officers' conduct in removing him from his RHU cell; a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on the disposal of his property after the use of force incident; a retaliation claim based on the officers' use of force and disposal of the his property; a civil conspiracy claim; and a Sixth Amendment violation claim.2 The Court has also construed his complaint to assert the following additional claims: deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement; failure to protect him from self-harm; deliberate indifference to his serious medical need; and denial of his right of access to the courts.
Martin alleged he experienced a "mental breakdown" on May 29, and he asked Defendant Mrozek to "speak with someone from psychology," but his plea for help was ignored by both Defendant Mrozek and Defendant Kopp in retaliation for unspecified reasons. ECF No. 5, p. 2. Rather than provide aid, Defendant Kopp requested a "use of force team," which sprayed Plaintiff with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray. Id. at pp. 2-3. After being sprayed, Martin was treated by "Jane Doe (nurse)" who "acted with neglect as she only clean Plaintiff (sic) eyes and ignored Plaintiffs (sic) pleas." Id. at p. 3. Officers then threatened, handcuffed, and placed Martin on the floor while naked for an anal cavity search. Id. Martin further alleged that when the use of force team returned him to his cell, they "hit" him and "touch[ed]" him with "excessive force." Id.
Martin also alleged that on the same day, Defendants Mason, Mrozek, and Kopp removed his legal materials and personal property from his cell and failed to provide him with a "153 Form." Id. at p. 3. Defendants once again used OC spray on him, including spraying his penis with the chemical. Id. Defendants allegedly refused to allow him to decontaminate his body following thespray. Id. at 4. They gave him a paper smock and returned him to his cell without providing him with a mattress, blanket, clothes, or shoes (despite the floor being wet) from May 29, 2018, to June 5, 2018. Id. at pp. 3-4. Martin's feet became infected until he received "foot cream" on June 5, 2018. Id. at p. 4.
Martin further alleged that the "Superintendent," Sloan, Mason, Kopp, Lee, and Mrozek later disposed of his property, which had been seized during his removal from his cell, as a "retaliatory tactic." Id. at 4. Additionally, Sheesley from the Psychology department "falsified documents and records stating that on 5-29-18 she offered Plaintiff an out of cell [visit] but cctv [video] would show she never once spoke to Plaintiff (sic)." Id. at pp. 4-5. He generally alleged that the Defendants "falsify documents and steal state funding." Id. at 5. Martin seeks over 1.6 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages and litigation costs. Id. at 6.
The Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, a concise statement of material facts, and an appendix of exhibits on October 26, 2020. ECF Nos. 116-119. Martin filed his concise statement of material facts which responded to the numbered paragraphs of the Defendants' concise statement and a "Cover Letter" which generally objected to all forty-seven paragraphs of the Defendants' concise statement. ECF Nos. 126, 126-1. The Defendants' filed a reply brief. ECF No. 137. The matter is ripe for decision.
The record includes video of events from May 29, 2018, from two cameras. One is a stationary camera that captured only video (no audio) of Martin's housing unit. The second video recorded from a handheld camera that followed the actions of Martin and prison personnel on May 29. This camera includes both video and audio. The Defendants also provided the ExtraordinaryIncident Report written by SCI-Forest staff about the planned use of force to remove Martin from his cell on May 29, the records for Inmate Grievances # 740433 and # 740787, Martin's Inmate Cumulative Adjustment Records (ICAR) Notes—including notations from the Psychology Department dated May 29, 2018, and an affidavit from Lt. Colby Hollis who supervised removal of Martin from his cell. ECF No. 119. Martin provided a page of his medical records from a visit with medical staff on June 5, 2018, grievance records, papers regarding his lost property, an affidavit from himself, and other documents.3 ECF Nos. 126, 127, 130, 134.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmovingparty. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
Martin is proceeding pro se. A filing from a pro se litigant is to be "liberally construed" and a "pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89. 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 206 (1976)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Additionally, when considering a motion in a pro se plaintiff's case, a court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999). On a motion for summary judgment, however, "a pro se plaintiff is notrelieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment." Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Put another way, just because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se, he is not relieved of their "obligation under Rule 56(c) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000)); see also Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, 2012 WL 4343176, *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
Martin claims that corrections officers used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by allegedly subjecting him to an anal cavity search, hitting and touching him, and using OC spray during and following his cell extraction on May 29,...
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