Dawson v. Entek Intern.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 08-6151-AA. |
| Citation | 662 F.Supp.2d 1277 |
| Parties | Shane DAWSON, Plaintiff, v. ENTEK INTERNATIONAL, a Delaware LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
James S. Davis, Lafky & Lafky, Salem, OR, for plaintiff.
Dennis E. Westlind, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, OR, for defendant.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and Or.Rev.Stat. § 659A. Defendant also moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is granted in its entirety and this case is dismissed.
Plaintiff was employed at defendant Entek International (Entek) as a temporary employee from April 13, 2007, to May 22, 2007. Plaintiff, a male, worked on the production line with 24 other employees, all of whom were also male. Plaintiff is a homosexual and believes that he does not exhibit traits of masculinity but also does not appear effeminate. (Pl.'s Dep. 187:13-20, 191:24-192:11.) Throughout plaintiff's employment, comments were made by his co-workers, Josh Dobbs, Jeremy Seibert, and Troy Guzon regarding plaintiff's sexual orientation. (Pl.'s Dep. 60:4-21, 67:12-15.) Specifically, they called plaintiff a "fag," "homo," "Tinker Bell," and "queer". (Pl.'s Dep. 75:12-17; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff's co-workers knew of plaintiff's sexual orientation because plaintiff, his partner, Josh Dobbs, and a former coworker, Travis Etherton, were patrons at the same bar. (Pl.'s Dep. 58:22-25.) On May 19, 2007, after about a week and a half of being subjected to these comments, plaintiff felt stressed and decided to take the day off. (Pl.'s Dep. 90:13-17.) On May 19, 2007, plaintiff was scheduled to work a 12-hour shift beginning at 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day. Plaintiff called Entek 30 minutes prior to the start of his shift and spoke to an employee who worked in the laboratory. He informed this employee that he would not work his scheduled shift; plaintiff does not recall this employee's name. (Pl.'s Dep. 87:21-88:9.) Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not comply with Entek's call in procedure for unscheduled absences, which requires that employees call one hour prior to the start of their shift and report their absence to a supervisor or designee. (Pl.'s Dep. 88:14-89:3.) This procedure is to ensure that supervisors can make proper staffing adjustments as the absence of two employees could shut down an entire production line. (Campbell Decl. ¶ 5.) Entek's Absence Report indicated that plaintiff did not show up for his shift and did not call in his absence.
On May 21, 2007, shortly before 8:00 a.m., Oakley Elliott (Elliott), Safety Manager and acting supervisor at the time of plaintiff's absence, approached Margaret Campbell (Campbell), Human Resources (HR) Director, and informed Campbell that plaintiff did not show up for his shift and did not call in his absence. Elliott suggested that plaintiff's employment be terminated and Campbell agreed. Both Campbell and Elliott informed Rob Shimmin (Shimmin), Plant Manager, of plaintiff's "no call/no show" and Shimmin agreed that plaintiff's employment should be terminated. On or around this time, plaintiff was meeting with Susan Monarch (Monarch), HR assistant, to inform her of the comments made by his co-workers. Monarch took notes of the complaint and the people involved and forwarded the information to Campbell.
On May 22, 2007, plaintiff met with Elliott and Campbell who informed him that his employment was terminated due to his "no call/no show" violation. That same violation prompted the termination of two other employees. (Campbell Decl. ¶ 11.)
On May 24, 2007, Campbell began investigating plaintiff's complaint by meeting with the employees whom plaintiff indicated had used the offensive language. Campbell informed those employees that their behavior was unacceptable and notified their supervisors and members of the management group. Although plaintiff was no longer employed at Entek, Campbell continued to check in with the employees' supervisors to ensure that they were no longer using offensive language. Entek also sent out newsletters discussing discrimination and performed training on fair and equal treatment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a mater of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The materiality of a fact is determined by the substantive law on the issue. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). The authenticity of a dispute is determined by whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The nonmoving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Special rules of construction apply to evaluating summary judgment motions: 1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and 2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. In employment discrimination cases, the requirements to obtain summary judgment against a plaintiff's prima facie case are rigorous. Garner v. Motorola, Inc., 95 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1075 (D.Ariz.2000) ().
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice or "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Because the Oregon Revised Statutes § 659A.030 was modeled after Title VII, plaintiff's state and federal gender discrimination claims can be analyzed together.
To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment based on gender, plaintiff must offer evidence that raises an inference of discrimination; that is where the actions of the employer, "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). This may be accomplished by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); or by offering direct or circumstantial evidence of employer's discriminatory intent. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2006).
To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he performed his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class. Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1028 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). The degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case "is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994).
Once a prima facie case has been established by the plaintiff, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a "legitimate, non discriminatory reason for the challenged action." Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2000). Plaintiff contends that Oregon courts do not require this burden shifting approach for state claims. Nevertheless, it is maintained for assessing Oregon employment discrimination claims brought in federal court. "The standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Oregon law is identical to that used in federal law." Tyson v. Or. Anesthesiology Group, P.C., No. 03-1192, 2008 WL 2371420, at *6 (D.Or. June 6, 2008) (quoting Snead v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Insurance Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888, 122 S.Ct. 201, 151 L.Ed.2d 142 (2001)).
Once the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then produce evidence that the employer's reason is pretextual. "To satisfy that burden, and survive summary judgment, [plaintiff] must produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude either: that the alleged reason for [plaintiff's] discharge was false, or...
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