Dawson v. Grow.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1887 |
| Citation | 29 W.Va. 333 |
| Parties | Dawson v. Grow. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Ejectment Compensation for Improvements.
Under our statute, chap. 91, Amd. Code, a claimant, who has been evicted from land by the true owner, is not entitled to compensation for permanent improvements placed by him upon the land, when it is shown, that both the owner and such claimant derive title from the same grantor, and that at the time of the conveyance to the claimant the deed of the owner had been duly recorded in the proper county, although such claimant may not have had any actual notice of the better title, unless the owner had been guilty of fraud or laches in not notifying such claimant to desist, when he knew the improvements were being made by the claimant under a mistaken belief, that his title was good. (p. 336.)
2, Ejectment Compensation fop Improvements BONA FIDES
of Defendants. To entitle such evicted claimant to compensation for his improvements, he must be a bona fide holder or claimant of the land, and must have had reasonable grounds to believe his title good at the time he made the improvements, (p. 337.)
3. Ejectment MALA FIDES.
A case in which it is held upon the facts disclosed, that the evicted claimant is not entitled to compensation for improvements.
Walts & Camden for plaintiff in error. W. A. Qiiarrier for defendant in error.
The Glen-Elk Company, being the owner in fee of lot No. 9, in block S., in the village of Glen-Elk, near the city of Charleston, conveyed the said lot to Millard F.Dawson by deed dated June, 1884, which was duly recorded at the time in Kanawha county. The said company by deed dated November 5, 1884, conveyed this same lot to Ella M. Grow. In February, 1885, said Dawson brought his action of unlawful detainer in the Circuit Court of Kanawha county against said Grow for the possession of the lot. This action was tried by a jury and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, on which the court on March 26, 1885, entered judgment, that the plaintiff recover of the defendant said lot.
During the same term, the defendant tendered her petition to the court stating, that, while she was in the possession of said lot and holding the same under a title believed by her to be good, she made permanent improvements thereon consisting of a dwelling-house and other buildings, which cost her $298.23. To the filing of this petition Dawson objected, but the court overruled the objection and allowed the petition to be filed. Dawson afterwards demurred to the petition and tendered his answer thereto;. but the court overruled the demurrer, and upon objection to the answer rejected the same. The matters arising upon the petition were by consent submitted to the court in lieu of a jury, and the court found, that the petitioner was entitled to recover on account of the improvements in the petition mentioned $304.88, and gave judgment therefor against the said Dawson. From this judgment Dawson obtained a writ of error and supersedeas to this Court.
Among the errors assigned by the plaintiff in error are the following:
" First The court erred in allowing the defendant to file her petition for improvements in this action. It is claimed, that this was simply an action for the unlawful entry and detention of the possession of land, and that the judgment rendered therein was not a 'judgment for land, ' such as is contemplated by the statute, under which the petition purports to have been filed.
14 Second The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
u Third The court erred in giving judgment for the petitioner on the facts proved in the case."
The facts proved on the trial are all certified in the transcript before this Court; and I deem it unnecessary to consider any of the assignments of error except the third.
By the English law and the common-law of this country, the owner of land on recovering it, in an action at law was not bound to make compensation to the defendant for improvements made upon it by him, because the latter was presumed to have made them at his own risk. Improvements being considered as annexed to the freehold pass with the recovery. (2 Kent's Coin. 334). The rule of the civil law was more liberal and permitted one, who had made permanent improvements on land in his possession under the bona fide belief that he was the owner of it, to exact full compensation for the value of such improvements, less the value of the use of the land, before he could be compelled to surrender it. (Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige 404). Courts of equity first adopted this rule of the civil law and applied it in all cases, where the owner of land resorted to equity for the recovery of rents and profits and insisted upon his doing equity by paying for the bona fide possessor's ameliorations before granting such relief. The rule thus adopted was subsequently imported into the common-law courts in the equitable action of trespass on the case for mesne profits so far as to limit the recovery in such action to the excess of profits after deducting the value of the permanent improvements made on the land by the defendant in good faith and in the honest belief, that the land was his own. .
This was the full extent of the relief to bona Hole possessors of land both at law and in equity. Consequently, where the owner recovered his land in ejectment and made no claim for rents and profits, the bona Hole adverse claim-' ant, who had been ejected, could in no manner obtain any compensation for improvements made, while he was in possession of the land, however honest and reasonable his belief, that he was the owner, at the time. (Graeme v. Oullem, 23 Graft, 296).
In order to extend the equitable principle thus adopted and applied, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted sec. 7 of chap. 72 of the acts of 1831-2, which in a modified form was re-enacted in the code of 1849 as chapter 136. This statute of Virginia is the foundation of the statute now in force in this State. Our present statute is found in chap. 91 of the Amd. Code, pp. 613-14. By the first section it is provided, in effect, that any defendant against whom there has been a judgment or decree for land, may present to the court a petition stating, that he, while, holding the premises under a title believed by him to be good, made permanent improvements thereon, and praying, that he may be allowed the fair and reasonable value of the same. The next section provides for the assessment of such value by a jury, and the fourth section is as follows:
" If the jury be satisfied, that the defendant or those, under whom he claims, made on the premises, at a time when there was reason to believe the title good, under which he or they were holding the said premises, permanent and valuable improvements, they shall estimate in his favor the value of such improvements, as were so made before notice in writing of the title, under which the plaintiff claims, as they are at the time such valuation is made."
In the case before us the plaintiff, Dawson, had a valid title by deed duly recorded to the lot in question. The grantor in this deed is the same grantor, under whom, the defendant, Grow, claimed. The plaintiff's deed was on record, at the time the defendant took possession of the lot, and when she made the improvements, for which the Circuit Court has allowed to her compensation. It seems to me, that it would be extraordinary for this Court to sanction the allowance in such a case. As a general rule the owner of land, who has had his deed for the same legally recorded in the proper county, has done all he is bound to do, has given all the notice of his ownership, that diligence and prudence can require; and all persons dealing with the land do...
To continue reading
Request your trial