Dawson v. Williams

• Citation: 273 P.2d 75,127 Cal.App.2d 38
• Parties: DAWSON et al. v. WILLIAMS et al. Civ. 20127.
• Decision Date: 04 August 1954
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 75

273 P.2d 75

127 Cal.App.2d 38

DAWSON et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.

Civ. 20127.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 4, 1954.

David E. Hinckle, Beverly Hills, for appellant.

Earl C. Broady and Rufus W. Johnson, Los Angeles, for respondents.

MOSK, Justice pro tem.

From a determination by the trial court, sitting without a jury, that plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment against both defendants on their negligence claim, the defendant Antell Smith alone appeals.

The accident out of which this controversy arose occurred on December 19, 1951, at the intersection of La Brea Avenue and Venice Boulevard in the city of Los Angeles. At this site, La Brea is a north-south thoroughfare crossing Venice, which runs east-west. Venice consists of two roadways divided by a railroad right-of-way. The northerly roadway is 33 feet wide, the railroad parkway is 72 feet wide, and the southerly roadway 90 feet wide. There were traffic signals at eight corners of this complicated intersection, although not all were visible to approaching traffic from all directions. At the time of this accident traffic was permitted to travel east and west on both the northerly and southerly Venice roadways.

Bernard Williams and two companions, all 18 years of age or under, were in an Austin automobile owned by appellant Antell Smith, the vehicle being operated by Williams with her consent. Williams approached the intersection from the west on the southerly Venice roadway and turned left into the westerly lane for northbound La Brea traffic. He crossed the center parkway. The evidence was conflicting as to whether he brought the vehicle to a stop at the southerly line of the northerly roadway, but whether he did or not, he continued across the northerly roadway.

Respondents Prentiss Dawson, driving, and his wife Elizabeth, were proceeding west on the northerly Venice roadway in their Chevrolet. Dawson saw the Austin for the first time when he was 15 feet east of the easterly curb line of La Brea and the Austin was a little over halfway across the parkway. The light signal was then green for east-west traffic, a circumstance which caused Dawson to assume the Austin would stop for the red light facing north-south traffic. It did not, however, and the Chevrolet struck the Austin about 27 feet west of the east curb line of La Brea and 10 feet south of the north curb line of Venice.

The trial court found Williams was negligent, proximately causing physical injuries to Mr. Dawson in the compensable sum of $1,800, and damage to Dawson in the amount of $90 for medical bills and $316.25 for automobile repairs. This latter sum was subsequently changed by a nunc pro tunc order to $305.06.

Appellant contends on this appeal that the evidence indicates so clearly the respondent driver was contributorily negligent that we must reverse the judgment. No issue is raised on appeal concerning the finding of negligence.

The scene of the accident in and of itself presents a difficult problem. If the divided roadway, on both halves of which traffic flowed in both directions, constituted two distinct intersections where crossed by La Brea, then the Austin unquestionably should have respected the red light for north-south traffic on La Brea, and should have stopped until a green light permitted crossing the northerly parkway. On the other hand; if this was but one intersection, the Austin having started its left turn, had a right to complete the turn regardless of the condition of the lights, subject only to the general rules governing left turns at intersections. Vehicle Code, § 551.

Respondents could make out a persuasive argument that the scene involved herein consisted of two distinct intersections. If an intersection is 'the area embraced within the prolongation of the lateral curb lines.' as defined in Vehicle Code, § 86, then the 72-foot parkway with curbs creates two intersections, a result that appears desirable from traffic safety consideration in this day of extensive use of freeways, expressways, wide parkways and separated highways.

Kienlen v. Holt, 106 Cal.App. 135, 288 P. 866, Lowenbruck v. Stiglmeier, 7 Cal.App.2d 204, 46 P.2d 251, and Cruzen v. Wilcox, 20 Cal.App.2d 728, 67 P.2d 709, all hold, however, that under these circumstances there is but one intersection. In each of those three cases the decision was based on section 23 of the old California Vehicle Act, Stats. 1929, p. 510. The definition contained in that section was substantially changed when Vehicle Code, § 86 was enacted in 1935. Nevertheless the foregoing cases were cited as authority by the court in Blanton v. Curry, 20 Cal.2d 793, 129 P.2d 1, decided in 1942, and we are bound by the now accepted and controlling determination that there is but one intersection. Any change will have to come through legislative action.

However, the evidence amply supports the finding of the trial court that Williams was negligent. In fact, on this appeal appellant does not attempt to resist that finding; she devotes her brief to a discussion of the respondent driver's contributory negligence, the purported six acts of which we shall take up seriatim.

The law is clear that if there be evidence of facts supporting an inference favorable to the judgment, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If there be any reasonable doubt as to the...