Dawson v. Wright

• Decision Date: 18 September 1935
• Docket Number: No. 30.,30.
• Citation: 181 S.E. 264,208 N. C. 418
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: DAWSON. v. WRIGHT.

181 S.E. 264

208 N. C. 418

DAWSON.

v.WRIGHT.

No. 30.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 18, 1935.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pasquotank County; Cranmer, Judge.

Action by Braxton B. Dawson against Willis S. Wright. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Civil action to recover for alleged breach of "credit memorandum."

On September 14, 1933, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant a wrecked Chev-rolet car and took in exchange credit memorandum which was to be allowed as a credit or reduction "on the list price or prevailing price of $200.00 on a two-ton Dodge truck (short wheel base) or either $135.00 on a Plymouth four-door sedan. It being optional with the holder of this Credit Memorandum which car or truck he or she wishes to buy."

Thereafter, the plaintiff transferred said credit memorandum to his brother, W. C. Dawson, who presented it as a cash item in an exchange of automobiles with the defendant. The defendant declined to honor the memorandum, contending that it was only to be used in the purchase of a new car or truck; and that such was the understanding of the parties at the time of its issuance. Objection; overruled; exception.

This action is to recover damages for defendant's failure or refusal to honor the credit memorandum under the circumstances of its tender.

From a verdict for defendant, the plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.

McMullan & McMullan, of Elizabeth City, for appellant.

M. B. Simpson, of Elizabeth City, for appellee.

STACY, Chief Justice.

The appeal presents the single question whether reversible error was committed in allowing the defendant to state in his oral testimony, over objection, that it was a part of the understanding between the parties that the credit memorandum was to be used and allowed only in the purchase of a new car or truck.

That parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument is so well established in the law of evidence as to be well-nigh axiomatic. Carlton v. Oil Co., 206 N. C. 117, 172 S. E. 883; Coral Gables v. Ayres (N. C.) 181 S. E. 263, this day decided. On the other hand, it is equally well established that where a contract is not one which the law requires to be in writing, and a part of it is written and a part is not, evidence of the unwritten part, if it does not contradict the writing, is admissible for the purpose of rounding out the agreement or establishing the contract in its entirety. Henderson v. Forrest, 184 N. C. 230, 114 S....