Day v. Case Credit Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-3090.,04-3090. |
| Citation | 427 F.3d 1148 |
| Parties | Raymond DAY; Boren Holtoff; Mike Moreland; Junior Burdan; Pat Roberts; Steve Ross, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CASE CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Chuck S. Gibson II, argued, Dermott, Arkansas, for appellant.
Roger McNeil, argued, Jonesboro, Arkansas, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Day, Boren Holthoff, Mike Moreland, and Steve Ross (farmers)1 appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims against Case Credit Corporation (Case) and granting judgment in favor of Case. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the farmers, Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir.1997) (summary judgment standard), show the following. The farmers are former customers of Ron Kaufman, the owner and operator of Southeast Implements, Inc. (Southeast), a Case International Harvester equipment dealership. Between 1996 and 1998, they agreed to purchase or lease various items of farm equipment from Southeast. In each instance, the farmers and Kaufman orally negotiated the terms of the purchases/leases, and Kaufman then prepared written purchase agreements for each transaction, assigning his rights thereunder to Case. Case, in turn, after approving the assignments and agreeing to finance the purchases/leases, paid Kaufman for the equipment and looked to the farmers, as putative debtors, for payment. The written purchase agreements, however, were prepared and assigned without the farmers' knowledge and did not reflect the terms of the oral contracts. For example, most of the oral contracts involved leases of farm equipment, while the written contracts represented them as outright sales. Additionally, Kaufman inflated the purchase/lease prices and forged the farmers' signatures, thereby obtaining thousands of dollars in overpayments from Case. In several instances, Kaufman assigned Case forged purchase agreements purporting to cover equipment the farmers never possessed or agreed to purchase.
In addition to forging purchase contracts, Kaufman forged customer signatures on applications for Case credit cards and shop expense financing accounts. This deception facilitated Kaufman's original fraud by providing a source of funding for repairs and warranty work he agreed to provide as part of the oral contracts. When the farmers brought equipment in for covered repairs or warranty work, Kaufman charged the cost to one of the fraudulent credit cards or shop expense accounts and obtained reimbursement from Case.
Kaufman hid his fraudulent activities by giving Case a dummy mailbox address for the farmers. Monthly statements and other correspondence from Case to the farmers was delivered to the bogus post office box and retrieved by Kaufman. Occasionally, dunning correspondence from Case made it to the farmers, who turned it over to Southeast. In each instance, Kaufman assured them he would look into the matter and the problem appeared to resolve.
Eventually, the scheme foundered. When Case became aware of Kaufman's fraud it sent representatives to meet with the individual farmers. After verifying the farmers were in possession of equipment covered by the forged purchased agreements, the representatives demanded they sign "Account Verification" forms. Each verification form contained a description of the equipment, an account number, and a purchase/lease price based on information lifted from the forged contracts. When the farmers refused to sign because the purchase/lease prices were overstated, they were assured the forms would only be used to confirm possession of the equipment. Later, however, Case attempted to enforce the terms of the forged contracts, relying in part on the Account Verifications. According to the farmers, they offered to meet the terms of their oral agreements with Kaufman, but Case refused, insisting they comply with the fraudulent terms reflected in the forged contracts. The farmers allege Case was fully aware Kaufman had falsified the written purchase agreements and compounded his fraud by using the Account Verifications in an attempt to force their acceptance of the fraudulent terms.
Attempts to resolve the disputes proved fruitless and the farmers filed suit against Case and Southeast in Arkansas state court. The farmers failed to effect service of process on Southeast and the action against Case was later removed to federal district court. In their complaint, the farmers sought declaratory relief, asking the district court to determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the purchases/leases of farm equipment. The farmers also alleged, based on an agency relationship with Kaufman, Case breached the purchase/lease agreements and was liable for invasion of privacy, fraud, and misrepresentation. Case denied the allegations and counter claimed demanding payment for the amounts due or alternatively for possession of the equipment and any deficiency owing after its sale.
Case moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of agency, arguing Kaufman's wrongful acts could not be imputed because Case's only relationship with him was as an independent financing entity. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment. It further concluded all of the farmers' claims were dependent upon a finding of agency and dismissed their entire complaint with prejudice. Case next moved for summary judgment on its counter claim, arguing the farmers were contractually bound to pay for the equipment. The district court granted summary judgment, finding the farmers orally agreed to purchase/lease equipment from Kaufman and admitted they possessed the equipment which had been financed by Case. Accordingly, the district court reformed the forged purchase agreements to reflect the payment terms agreed to in the oral contracts and enforced them against the farmers. Alternatively, the district court held the farmers were liable under a theory of unjust enrichment for the value of the benefits they had received from using the equipment. Finally, Case moved for summary judgment on damages, arguing the farmers were obligated to pay damages according to the payment terms set forth in the oral agreements with Kaufman. The district court found the payment terms under the oral agreements undisputed and awarded damages equal to the farmers' contractual obligations thereunder.
On appeal, the farmers argue the district court erred by 1) finding there was no agency relationship between Kaufman and Case, 2) dismissing their contract claims, and 3) granting summary judgment to Case based on its contract claims.
This diversity action is governed by Arkansas state substantive law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). We review the district court's grant of summary judgment and its application of state law de novo. Lerohl v. Friends of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 488 (8th Cir.2003); Reimer v. City of Crookston, 326 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir.2003).
The farmers first argue the district court erred when it concluded Kaufman was not acting as Case's agent. We disagree.
In Arkansas, the burden of proving an agency relationship rests with the party asserting its existence. B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Best Refrigerated Express, Inc., 265 Ark. 519, 579 S.W.2d 608, 610 (1979). In Evans v. White, 284 Ark. 376, 682 S.W.2d 733, 734 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court held the two essential elements of an agency relationship are 1) an agent must have the authority to act for the principal, and 2) the agent must act on the principal's behalf and be subject to the principal's control. See also Taylor v. Gill, 326 Ark. 1040, 934 S.W.2d 919, 921 (1996) ().
The farmers argue Kaufman's wrongful acts should be imputed to Case because he was acting as its agent when he negotiated the oral agreements and when he drafted the forged contracts. To support their argument, the farmers seize upon language in the Retail Financing Agreement between Case and Kaufman authorizing him to collect payments from customers on behalf of Case for equipment it financed. According to the farmers, this limited grant of authority implies Kaufman was authorized to act on Case's behalf generally. We decline the invitation to expand this limited grant of authority beyond its express terms. We note, as did the district court, the Wholesale Financing Agreement between Case and Kaufman expressly disavows any intent to grant Kaufman such broad authority or to create an agency relationship. Because there is no evidence Kaufman was authorized by Case to enter into contracts on its behalf or that Kaufman's activities were controlled by Case, we affirm the district court's holding.2
The farmers next argue the district court erred by granting Case summary judgment on its contract claims. We agree.
Defining the precise contours of Case's contract theory has proven an elusive task, made all the more difficult by its indecision about which contracts it hopes to enforce. Case concedes it was not a party to the oral agreements between the farmers and Kaufman, but argues it is an assignee or third party beneficiary "of the purchase/lease agreements . . . made orally with Southeast which arose from the written retail installment contracts." This argument suggests Case hopes to enforce the oral agreements. Conversely, however, Case argues the district court properly enforced the forged contracts after reforming them to reflect the terms of the oral agreements. We need not resolve this apparent inconsistency. Because Case cannot enforce the forged purchase agreements or oral agreements — or some amalgam of the two — we reject its contract theory of...
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