Day v. City of Lawrence

• Decision Date: 08 January 1897
• Citation: 45 N.E. 751,167 Mass. 371
• Parties: DAY v. CITY OF LAWRENCE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

167 Mass. 371

45 N.E. 751

DAY v. CITY OF LAWRENCE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 8, 1897

COUNSEL

Chas A. De Courcy and Walter Coulson, for plaintiff.

Chas U. Bell, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER J.

The plaintiff sues to recover the amount of taxes which he has paid, assessed upon household furniture which he contends was exempt, under the provisions of Pub.St. c. 11, § 5, cl. 6 which enact that "the following property and polls shall be exempt from taxation: *** Sixth. The wearing apparel and farming utensils of every person; his household furniture not exceeding one thousand dollars in value; and the necessary tools, not exceeding three hundred dollars in value, of a mechanic." An exemption of this character is constitutional. Such exemptions have long existed, and it is too late to question the power of the legislature to make them. See Minot v. Winthrop, 12 Mass. 113, 38 N.E. 512. The exemption of the kinds of property dealt with in the clause is a very old feature of our scheme of taxation. Looking to the first annual tax act passed after the adoption of the constitution (St.1780, c. 13), the assessors are directed to assess the inhabitants "according to the proportion and value of their whole personal estate, *** excepting household furniture, wearing apparel, farming utensils, and the tools of mechanics." These were kinds of property which every taxpayer might have, and the complete exemption of which would have little effect upon the incidence of the whole tax, but would leave it substantially equal and proportionate; and the exemption was granted notwithstanding two of the classes of property--farming utensils and mechanics' tools--were used in getting a living.

The limitation of the exemption of household furniture to an amount less than $1,000 in value was first made in the annual tax act of June 12, 1829, and that in respect of mechanics' tools by St.1865, c. 206; and the exemption has remained unlimited in respect to wearing apparel and farming utensils. See Rev.St. c. 7, § 5, cl. 4; Gen.St. c 11, § 5, cl 6; Pub.St. c. 11, § 5, cl. 6. The changes indicate no departure from the general theory of the exemption, but tend to make its operation more equal in changed conditions of society. The uniform exemption of all wearing apparel, notwithstanding the great diversity between taxpayers in respect of their ownership of it, points to another consideration which the legislature would not lose sight of in dealing with the question of exempting household furniture, namely, that minute inquiries by officials into personal and domestic affairs are vexatious and unprofitable, and to be avoided. The statute gives the exemption explicitly in plain terms to "every person," and the only qualification written in the statute is that of value. Every person's household furniture not exceeding $1,000 in value is declared to be exempt. The words "household furniture" have been long in use in our tax acts, in statutes concerning attachments and executions, in testamentary writings, and in common speech. The only room for construction in arriving at the meaning of the statute is in ascertaining the sense to be given to these words....