Day v. Clark

• Decision Date: 10 March 1930
• Docket Number: Civil 2858
• Citation: 285 P. 682,36 Ariz. 353
• Parties: EDNA CLARK DAY, Appellant, v. MARIE M. CLARK, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

285 P. 682

36 Ariz. 353

EDNA CLARK DAY, Appellant, v. MARIE M. CLARK, Appellee

Civil No. 2858

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 10, 1930

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Apache. Andrew S. Gibbons, Judge. Affirmed.

Mr John L. Sweeney and Mr. P. A. Sawyer, for Appellant.

Mr Levi S. Udall, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, C. J.

On the ninth day of June, 1923, the Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, a corporation, hereinafter called the insurer issued its policy in the sum of $1,000 to Leonard M. Clark, hereinafter called deceased, by the terms of which Edna Clark Day, his then wife, hereinafter called appellant, was named as beneficiary. Deceased and appellant lived together as husband and wife until October 29th, 1927, at which time they were divorced. He thereafter married Marie M. Clark, hereinafter called appellee, who was his wife at the time of his death on January 17th, 1928. No effort was made during his lifetime to change the beneficiary under said policy. Appellee brought suit against appellant and the insurer, claiming the proceeds of said policy and setting up the facts as above stated. The insurer answered by an interpleader alleging it had no interest in the matter other than to pay the thousand dollars into court, and asked that the court determine who was entitled to said money, and that it be discharged from further liability. On April 26th, appellant and appellee entered into a stipulation of facts which set forth in substance the matters above recited, and on these facts the court rendered judgment against the appellant and in favor of appellee, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

There are four assignments of error which raise two questions of law: First, did the divorce of deceased and appellant divest her of her right to take the proceeds of said policy, notwithstanding her designation as beneficiary was never changed? Second, if she were so disqualified, can anyone except the insurer raise the question? The by-laws of the insurer provided that all contracts of insurance should be made with reference to the laws of the state wherein the insurer's head office was located, regardless of the place of residence of its members, and were to be controlled by the laws of such state. It is admitted the head office of the insurer was located in the state of Indiana, and that the contract of insurance by its terms was to be governed by the laws of that state. That law, so far as applicable to the point in question, reads as follows:

"The payment of death benefits shall be confined to wife, husband, fiancee, relative by blood to the fourth degree, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepchildren by legal adoption, or to a person or persons dependent upon the member: Provided, That if after the issuance of the original certificate the member shall become dependent upon an incorporated charitable institution, he shall have the privilege with the consent of the society, to make such institution his beneficiary. Within the above restrictions each member shall have the right to designate his beneficiary, and from time to time, have the same changed in accordance with the laws, rules or regulations of the society, and no beneficiary shall have or obtain any vested interest in the said benefit until the same has become due and payable upon the death of the said member: Provided, That any society may, by its laws, limit the scope of beneficiaries within the above classes." Burns' Ann. St. Supp. Ind. 1921, p. 574.

The Arizona statute on the same subject is in almost precisely the same language. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the provision "the payment of death benefits shall be confined to wife" is satisfied if at the time of the naming of the beneficiary she came within that category, and that her ceasing later to be the wife of deceased does not destroy her right to recover on the policy. In support of such position, counsel for appellant cites the cases of Sheehan v. Journeymen Butchers' P. & Ben. Assn., 142 Cal. 489, 76 P. 238; Courtois v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 135 Cal. 552, 87 Am. St. Rep. 137, 67 P. 970; Walden v. McCollum, 172 Ark. 291, 288 S.W. 386; White v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 124 Iowa 293, 104 Am. St. Rep. 323, 2 Ann. Cas. 350, 66 L.R.A. 164, 99 N.W. 1071. Counsel for appellee, on the other hand, urges that in all the states from which the cases cited by counsel for appellant are taken, the statute provided only for a limitation of the relationship of the beneficiary at the time when the certificate was issued and did not limit payment, as in the case of the Indiana statute, to those who occupied such relation at the time of death. The case of Smith v. Travelers' Protective Assn., 319 Mo. 1120, 6 S.W.2d 870, reviews the authorities and points out the difference between cases where the statute or by-law regulating the relationship of the beneficiary refers to the issuance of the certificate, and where it limits the payment of death benefits. Under the first situation, it is very generally held that if the beneficiary is properly qualified when the policy issues, he need not be so at the time of death. Curtois v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., supra; White v. Brotherhood of American Yoemen, supra; Overhiser v. Overhiser, 14 Colo.App. 1, 59 P. 75; Brown v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 208 Pa. 101, 57 A. 176; Snyder v. Supreme Ruler of the Fraternal Mystic Circle, 122 Tenn. 248, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 209, 122 S.W. 981. Under the second provision, the relationship at death fixes the rights of the beneficiary. Tyler v. Odd-Fellows' Mut. Relief Assn., 145 Mass. 134, 13 N.E. 360; Bush v. Modern Woodmen of America, 182 Iowa 515, 152 N.W. 31, 162 N.W. 59; Giffen v. Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W., 99 Neb. 589, L.R.A. 1916D 1168, 157 N.W. 113; Thomas v. Locomotive Engineers' Mutual L. & Acc. Ins. Assn., 191 Iowa 1152, 15 A.L.R. 1240, 183 N.W. 628.

The last-cited case discusses the precise question at issue collating the authorities, and holds that where the statute confines the payment of death...