Day v. Interstate Life & Acc. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1931
• Citation: 42 S.W.2d 208,163 Tenn. 190
• Parties: DAY v. INTERSTATE LIFE & ACCIDENT CO.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

42 S.W.2d 208

163 Tenn. 190

DAY v. INTERSTATE LIFE & ACCIDENT CO.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 10, 1931

Error to Circuit Court, Hamilton County; Oscar Yarnell, Judge.

Suit by Viva Franklin Day against the Interstate Life & Accident Company. To review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration and dismissing the suit, the plaintiff brings error.

Reversed and cause remanded.

H. H B. Mack and F. C. Fricks, both of Chattanooga, for plaintiff in error.

Finlay & Campbell, of Chattanooga, for defendant in error.

MCKINNEY J.

The policy upon which this suit is based is an ordinary life policy for $2,500, but provides that in case the insured dies from accidental injuries the insurer will pay the named beneficiary double that amount. The company has paid $2,500 but denies liability on the double indemnity feature of the policy. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the declaration and dismissed the suit.

The declaration alleges that the death of insured occurred in the following manner:

"That he with others were in one of the rooms or departments of the J. W. Bell Milling Company, at Spartenburg, South Carolina. That they were attending their usual duties, and without warning, he and they were attacked by one T. Earl Robertson, who had suddenly become insane, mad or irresponsible, and who with an ax or other sharp instrument did then and there strike, wound, injure and kill four people, including the husband of plaintiff, by hitting them on the head, neck or body, with said ax or other sharp instrument. That the attack was uncalled for, and was unexpected, and without fault on the part of plaintiff's husband, and that said husband died a few minutes afterwards as a direct result of his aforementioned injuries."

The double indemnity provision of the policy contains the following paragraph: "This agreement to pay double the amount insured in event of death as above recited will be of no effect in case of death by homicide or self-destruction whether sane or insane." The phrase "whether sane or insane" qualifies the word "self-destruction" only, and not the word "homicide."

Assuming that Robertson was insane, which the demurrer admits, we are of the opinion that the company is liable, and the trial court should have permitted the case to be heard upon the merits.

[3] While counsel for the company insist that the word "homicide" be given its broad meaning, viz., the killing...