Day v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY

• Decision Date: 12 August 1958
• Docket Number: No. 12462.,12462.
• Citation: 258 F.2d 62
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
• Parties: George M. DAY, Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Charles A. De Priest, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.

258 F.2d 62 (1958)

George M. DAY, Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Charles A. De Priest, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 12462.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued April 1, 1958.

Decided August 12, 1958.

Certiorari Granted November 10, 1958.

James M. Davis, Jr., Mount Holly, N. J. (Powell & Davis, Mount Holly, N. J., John A. Matthews, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellant.

F. Morse Archer, Jr., Camden, N. J. (John P. Hauch, Jr., Archer, Greiner, Hunter & Read, Camden, N. J., John B. Prizer, Richard N. Clattenburg, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges and LAYTON, District Judge.

Certiorari Granted November 10, 1958. See 79 S.Ct. 124.

KALODNER, Circuit Judge.

The substituted plaintiff appeals from an Order entered against him in the District Court dismissing the complaint originally filed by his decedent.

Details of the action, proceedings, and contentions of the parties are set forth in prior opinions of the District Court and this Court¹ as well as in 155 F. Supp. 695, which immediately preceded this appeal.

Briefly stated, Charles A. DePriest commenced this action for damages against the defendant railroad asserting that pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, and during his employment by the defendant railroad as a locomotive engineer, he was entitled to compensation greater than that actually paid to him. The complaint recited that DePriest had processed his claim through the defendant's organization, but did not proceed to the National Railroad Adjustment Board because he retired and severed his employment relationship. Although defendant's answer denied that DePriest's claim was administratively rejected by its general manager, it admitted that he was an employee in the period involved and averred that he relinquished all rights to return to service and had applied for his annuity.

Following our dismissal, for want of appellate jurisdiction, of the prior appeal of the decedent, 243 F.2d 485, the plaintiff moved to modify the stay order entered by the District Court. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. In support of the motion, defendant attached certified copies of three Awards made by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, in independent matters, all involving interpretation of the contract here involved with respect to the same issue. These Awards denied relief to the claimants; they were entered by the Board shortly before we rendered our decision on the prior appeal.

The District Court determined that the issue involved was one of interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement; that the question of interpretation was exclusively for the National Railroad Adjustment Board and that its finding was final and binding upon the plaintiff, 155 F.Supp. 695. Although the Opinion of the District Court proceeded upon an inquiry into the binding effect of the aforementioned Awards, which would presuppose jurisdiction, the Order actually entered dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.

The questions now presented for disposition are whether the cause was within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and, if it was, whether the plaintiff is barred by the Awards submitted in support of defendant's motion.

We are of the opinion that the District Court was not without jurisdiction in the premises and that, at this stage of the action, it does not appear that the plaintiff is or should be barred from further proceedings.

There is no dispute here that the requirements of an ordinary diversity action are met. If the District Court is deprived of jurisdiction, that must appear from the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185, c. 691, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 151 et seq.

The term "employee" is defined in Section 1 Fifth of the Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 151 Fifth, to include "every person in the service of a carrier (subject to its continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner or rendition of his service) who performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. * * *" Further, Section 3 First (i) of the Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 153 First (i), grants to the National Railroad Adjustment Board jurisdiction to hold hearings, make findings, and enter awards in all disputes between carriers and their employees "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. * * *"

In this statutory framework, the United States Supreme Court permitted an employee who claimed to have been wrongfully discharged to maintain an action at law without resort to the Adjustment Board even though a question of interpreting a bargaining agreement was presented. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1941, 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089. The Court there said at page 634 of 312 U.S., at page 756 of 61 S.Ct.:

"We find nothing in that Railway Labor Act which purports to take away from the courts the jurisdiction to determine a controversy over a wrongful discharge or to make an administrative finding a prerequisite to filing a suit in court."

In Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 1950, 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795, the railroad, having a dispute with two unions concerning the scope of their respective agreements, commenced an action for declaratory judgment, praying for an interpretation of both agreements. The Supreme Court emphasized the declared purpose of the Railway Labor Act, and noted that settlement of the dispute "would have prospective as well as retrospective importance to both the railroad and its employees, since the interpretation accepted would govern future relations of those parties." 339 U.S. at page 242, 70 S.Ct. at page 579. Accordingly, it held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Adjustment Board was exclusive, and that the courts were without power to adjudicate such a dispute.

As to the Moore decision, the Court pointed out:

"Moore was discharged by the railroad. He could have challenged the validity of his discharge before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad\'s action in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for breach of contract. As we held there, the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A common-law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board has power to provide, and does not involve questions of future relations between the railroad and its other employees. If a court in handling such a case must consider some provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, its interpretation would of course have no binding effect on future interpretations by the Board." 339 U.S. at page 244, 70 S.Ct. at page 580.

In the light of these decisions, the courts have consistently drawn a distinction between those cases in which the employee, having been discharged, accepts his discharge, and those in which he seeks a judicial interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and enforcement of his employment rights in such manner as to affect future relations between the railroad and other employees. For example, see Newman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 3 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 560; Switchmen's Union of North America v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 10 Cir., 1954, 209 F.2d 419, certiorari denied 347 U.S. 989, 74 S.Ct. 852, 98 L.Ed. 1123; Alabaugh v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 861, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 839, 76 S.Ct. 77, 100 L.Ed. 748; Majors v. Thompson, 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 449.

The Railway Labor Act relates to disputes between employees and carriers. Its broad purposes are set forth in the Slocum decision:

"The first declared purpose of the Railway Labor Act is `To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein.\' * * * This purpose extends both to disputes concerning the making of collective agreements and to grievances arising under existing agreements. * * * The plan of the Act is to provide administrative methods for settling disputes before they reach acute stages that might be provocative of strikes. Carriers are therefore required to negotiate with bargaining representatives of the employees. * * * The Act also sets up machinery for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjustment of disputes, to be invoked if negotiations fail.

"In this case the dispute concerned interpretation of an existing bargaining agreement. Its settlement would have prospective as well as retrospective importance to both the railroad and its employees, since the interpretation accepted would govern future relations of those parties. This type of grievance has long been considered a potent cause of friction leading to strikes. It was to prevent such friction that the May 20 1926 Act provided for creation of various Adjustment Boards * * *. But

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