Day v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 19 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 19-01091-PHX-JAT (JFM),CV 19-01091-PHX-JAT (JFM) |
| Parties | Terry Dean Day, Plaintiff, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Plaintiff Terry Dean Day, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis in Buckeye, Arizona, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond (Doc. 43), and he opposes the Motion. (Doc. 44.)
The Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss.
On screening of Plaintiff's single-count Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against Defendants former Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles L. Ryan, ASPC-Lewis Deputy Warden Roan, ASPC-Lewis Lt. Arnott, and ADC Correctional Officer (CO) Jhiremy Rabadan and directed these Defendants to answer the claim. (Doc. 11.)
. . . .
Dismissal of a complaint, or any claim within it, for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may be based on either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory' or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In determining whether a complaint states a claim under this standard, the allegations in the complaint are taken as true and the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Where the plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, the court must "construe the pleadings liberally and [] afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
As a general rule, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court looks only to the face of the complaint and documents attached thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). If a court considers evidence outside the pleading, it must convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may, however, consider documents incorporated by reference in the complaint or matters of judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summaryjudgment. Id.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants1 argue that Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims against them should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations and because, per the Settlement Agreement in a prior action before this Court, Day v. Ryan, CV 17-00774-PHX-JAT (JFM), Plaintiff already released this claim.
When the statute of limitations forms the basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion can be granted if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint, and "the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980); see also TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). Although courts will not normally look beyond the pleadings in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001), a "court may consider material that the plaintiff properly submitted as part of the complaint or, even if not physically attached to the complaint, material that is not contended to be inauthentic and that is necessarily relied upon by the plaintiff's complaint." Id. The court may also consider matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed.l Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include its own statute of limitations. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (1999). Therefore, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury claims in the forum state, "along with the forum state's law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law." Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191,1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two years. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. "If the defendant establishes a prima facie case that the statute was applicable, the burden of going forward shifts to the plaintiff to show its claims fall within a recognized exception to the statute." Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, 927 P.2d 796, 799 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Although the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims is borrowed from state law, federal law continues to govern when a § 1983 claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. Under federal law, a claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991; Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner plaintiff pursues the mandatory exhaustion process. Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018).
Defendants argue that, based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff began to complain about the lack of clean clothing and bedding underlying his claim by filing Inmate Letters about this issue on August 30, 2016. (Doc. 24 at 4; see Doc. 1 at 4-5.) From this, they argue that Plaintiff had knowledge of his injury, whereby his claim began to accrue, at the very least, by August 30, 2016. (Doc. 24 at 4.) They further argue that Plaintiff was therefore required to file his Complaint by August 30, 2018, and because he did not do so until February 19, 2019, more than five months later, his claim is barred under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 and should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 4-5.)
Defendants have made a prima facie showing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's claim; they fail, however, to discuss or point to any allegations in the Complaint to show when Plaintiff pursued his available administrative remedies via the prison grievance process, during which time the statute was tolled. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff began to file Inmate Letters regarding his lack of laundry services on or about August 30, 2016, and he received a response to his final grievance appeal from Defendant Ryan in "early February" 2017. (Doc. 1 at 5.) TheDocket reflects that Plaintiff filed this action on February 15, 2019. (Doc. 1.) Read with the required liberality, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the allegations in the complaint permit finding that the statute was tolled from at least August 30, 2016 until February 15, 2017. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682. It is therefore not clear from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff's claim, filed on February 15, 2019, was untimely.
Plaintiff also argues in his Response that his claim is not time-barred because, even after he filed his final Grievance Appeal, he continued to suffer from the same violations and health risks he made known to Defendants up to the time he was finally provided laundry service on or about July 1, 2017. (Doc. 36 at 3.) He thereby maintains that, at the very least, he has a timely claim for the violations that occurred between February 15, 2017 and July 1, 2017. Defendants Ryan and Rabadan argue in their Reply that no such claims can lie against them because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about their involvement in his laundry deprivations after February 15, 2017. (Doc. 38 at 2.) Defendant Arnott likewise argues that Plaintiff makes no allegations that involve him after February 15, 2017. (Doc. 42 at 2.) Defendants further argue that, to the extent Plaintiff relies on the "continuing violation" theory to make his claim timely, this theory does not apply where a plaintiff merely suffers the continuing effects of wrongful conduct but there are "no continuing acts." (Doc. 38 at 2-3; Doc. 42 at 1-2; Doc. 45 at 1-2.) See Reiss v. Ariz. Dep't of Safety, No. CV-18-00029-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL 6067258, at *7 (D. Ariz. November 18, 2018.) (citing Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013); see also Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1987) () (citation omitted).
Defendants' arguments regarding their lack of involvement in Plaintiff's laundry deprivation after Plaintiff completed the administrative...
To continue reading
Request your trial