Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Eldridge, 05-87-00078-CV

Decision Date01 December 1987
Docket NumberNo. 05-87-00078-CV,05-87-00078-CV
PartiesDAYTON HUDSON CORPORATION, d/b/a Target Stores, Appellant, v. Pete ELDRIDGE, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Linda G. Moore, Charles Michael Gray, Dallas, for appellant.

Ernest E. Figari, Jr., Donald Collelouri, Andrew G. Jubinsky, Dallas, for appellee.

Before WHITHAM, STEWART and McCLUNG, JJ.

WHITHAM, Justice.

A policeman brought this action against a corporate citizen who responded to a police request for information in apprehending a suspect. The citizen-appellant, Dayton Hudson Corporation, doing business as Target Stores, appeals from a portion of a judgment rendered on the jury's verdict in favor of the policeman-appellee, Pete Eldridge. In its sixth point of error, Target contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for Eldridge against Target because Target breached no duty to Eldridge as a matter of law. We agree. Moreover, we find no merit in Eldridge's claim for indemnity. Accordingly, we reverse and render.

On November 26, 1984, at about 8:30 a.m., Officer Patrick Hussy of the Plano Police Department investigated a burglary of a motor vehicle. The victim, Ms. Hatti Price, told Hussy that her car had been burglarized while parked in front of her house and that the burglar had taken certain property, including a Texas Instruments calculator, Model No. 5040 II. Price informed Hussy that she purchased the calculator at the Target store on Parker Road in Plano and that she had intended to return it to Target because it had a broken printer. Price told Hussy that the receipt for the calculator was taped to the calculator when it was stolen. Anticipating that the thief might attempt to return her calculator to Target and having been advised by Hussy that it might be two to three days before the police could process the paperwork on her report, Price told Hussy that she would go to Target herself to report that the calculator had been stolen. At approximately 9:30 a.m. that same day, Price went to the Target store on Parker Road and spoke with Ms. Marie Shoemaker, one of the employees at the customer service desk. Price advised Shoemaker that (1) a Texas Instruments 5040 II calculator had been stolen from her car, (2) the receipt for the calculator was with it when it was stolen, and (3) she suspected the thief might try to return it. Price showed Shoemaker a cancelled check in the amount of $52.99, dated January 19, 1984, which she used to pay for the calculator and which bore her driver's license number. Attached to Price's check was a police information form she received from Hussy earlier that morning. Price also told Shoemaker that the amount of the cancelled check represented the total amount of the purchase. Price explained to Shoemaker that the receipt that was with the calculator might contain certain coding numbers, either 350/621 or 350/622, that were used in Price's business to earmark the expenditure. Upon receiving this information from Price, Shoemaker called the store's security department and spoke with Kathy Laws, the security manager. Laws was busy at the time, but she told Shoemaker to make a photocopy of the check and the police form provided by Price so that it could be posted at the customer service desk. Shoemaker did so and then wrote on the letter-size copy, "Target receipt for $52.99 will have the circled coding # 's above on it--Its for a TI 5040 II calculator." The "circled coding # 's" referred to in Shoemaker's notation (i.e., 350/622) were written on the cancelled check. Shoemaker showed this notice--consisting of the cancelled check, the police form, and her handwritten notation--to both Laws and a co-worker, Katheryn Stageberg, and then posted it between the two cash registers at the customer service desk. Later that day, Hussy also visited the Target store and spoke with Laws. Hussy told Laws that a Texas Instruments 5040 II calculator, with a receipt attached, had been stolen from a vehicle. Hussy reiterated much of the information that Price had already given to Target, including the fact that the stolen calculator had a broken printer and that the receipt would have some numbers written on the top. Hussy asked Laws to call the Plano Police Department if anyone came into the store to return the calculator.

Shortly before noon on the following day, November 27, 1984, Michael Brett Corson and his family went to the Target store on Parker Road to return a calculator they purchased at Target and to shop for Christmas gifts. Upon entering the store, Corson approached the customer service desk to return the calculator while his wife and two daughters started shopping. At the customer service desk, Stageberg assisted Corson. Corson told Stageberg that he wanted to exchange a calculator that had a defective printer, and he gave her his receipt for it, along with his driver's license. Corson's calculator was also a Texas Instruments Model No. 5040 II. The receipt Corson gave Stageberg was dated June 5, 1984, and was in the amount of $90.96. After taking the calculator and receipt from Corson, Stageberg walked to the room behind the customer service desk and called security. Stageberg spoke with Leslie Jones, one of Target's security officers, and told her that a man was returning a Model 5040 II calculator and that they were supposed to inform the police. Since Jones was unfamiliar with the notice that was posted at the customer service desk, Stageberg explained it to her and told her that Corson had a "receipt with the same numbers on top." Although Stageberg denied having ever seen the written notice that was posted at the customer service desk or having explained it to Jones, her testimony was contradicted by both Jones and Shoemaker, as well as by the incident report prepared by Jones just hours afterwards. After Jones asked Stageberg if she was sure the numbers matched, and Stageberg assured her that she had checked them, Jones called the Plano Police Department and reported that someone was trying to return a calculator that matched the one Target had been notified to watch out for.

In response to Jones' telephone call, the Plano Police Department dispatched Eldridge to the Target store. The police dispatcher advised Eldridge that a burglary suspect was returning stolen property. While Eldridge was en route to the store, Eldridge spoke with Hussy by radio, and Hussy gave him some background information about the stolen calculator. When Eldridge arrived at the store, Jones approached Eldridge, identifying herself as a Target security officer. Eldridge asked Jones what she had, and Jones identified Corson and stated that he was returning a stolen item at the customer service desk. When Eldridge asked how Jones knew it was stolen, Jones told him that Target had information from the Plano Police Department in the form of a notice of some type. Jones told Eldridge that Target had the returned calculator and receipts and that the numbers matched with the stolen calculator. Based on the information that he received from Jones, whom, as a Target security officer, he believed to be a credible person, Eldridge approached Corson, informed him that he was a suspect in a burglary, and placed him under arrest. In this connection, Eldridge testified that if Jones had told him only that Corson was returning a Texas Instruments 5040 II calculator with a broken printer, he would not have placed Corson under arrest on the basis of that information alone. After handcuffing Corson, Eldridge asked Jones if a private area was available to them, and Jones led them to the security office. Once there, Eldridge unhandcuffed Corson and asked Jones to get the calculator and receipts that they had as evidence. Jones returned with those items, and, several minutes later, Eldridge also received the notice that had been posted at the customer service desk. Eldridge compared the information on the notice with the receipt Corson had presented and concluded that they did not match up and that Corson had been misidentified as a burglary suspect by Target. Eldridge noted, among other things, that both the date and the amount of Corson's receipt were different than the cancelled check that Price had provided to Target. Eldridge released Corson from custody and informed the acting store manager of the mistake.

Corson brought this action against Eldridge and Target claiming that he was falsely imprisoned. Thereafter, Eldridge filed a cross-claim against Target, seeking indemnity and recovery of the attorney's fees that he was forced to incur in the defense of the claim asserted against him by Corson. Target likewise filed its own cross-claim against Eldridge for contribution or indemnity. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on special issues. The jury found that Target, but not Eldridge, was liable for falsely imprisoning Corson. Moreover, the jury found (1) that Target failed to convey, or failed to accurately convey, all of the relevant information it had about Corson to Eldridge; (2) that such failure was negligence; (3) that Target's negligence was the proximate cause of the arrest of Corson; and (4) that Eldridge arrested Corson solely as a natural and proximate consequence of the conduct of Target. The jury also found that Corson was entitled to actual damages in the sum of $25,000.00. The jury found that a reasonable and necessary attorneys' fee for the services rendered to Eldridge by his attorneys was (1) $20,000.00 in the trial court, (2) $10,000.00 in the event of an appeal to the Court of Appeals, and (3) $5,000.00 in the event of an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. Based on the jury's findings, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Corson and Eldridge their damages as found by the jury and denied Target any relief on its cross-claim against Eldridge.

In answer to special issue number three, the jury found that Target failed to convey all of the...

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