Dayton Valley Investors v. Union Pacific R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2:08-CV-127-ECR-RJJ.,2:08-CV-127-ECR-RJJ.
• Citation: 664 F.Supp.2d 1174
• Parties: DAYTON VALLEY INVESTORS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, d/b/a/ Lakemont Homes, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. Union Pacific Railroad Company, Counterclaimant, v. Dayton Valley Investors, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, d/b/a/ Lakemont Homes, Counterdefendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

664 F.Supp.2d 1174

DAYTON VALLEY INVESTORS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, d/b/a/ Lakemont Homes, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Counterclaimant, v. Dayton Valley Investors, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, d/b/a/ Lakemont Homes, Counterdefendant.

No. 2:08-CV-127-ECR-RJJ.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

October 6, 2009.

Douglas D. Gerrard, Sheldon A. Herbert, Gerrard, Cox & Larsen, Henderson, NV, for Plaintiff, Counterdefendant.

Miranda M. Du, Debbie Leonard, McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, Reno, NV, for Defendant, Counterclaimant. Amended Order¹

EDWARD C. REED, JR., District Judge.

This diversity case involves a dispute over ownership of a strip of land located in Lyon County, Nevada. Plaintiff and Counterdefendant Dayton Valley Investors, LLC ("Dayton Valley") claims ownership of the disputed property in fee simple, acquired either by deed or, in the alternative, by adverse possession. Dayton Valley alleges that Defendant and Counterclaimant Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific") owned only an easement in the disputed property, which it has since abandoned. Union Pacific, however, also claims a fee interest the disputed property. Both parties seek a declaratory judgment quieting title in the disputed property. Union Pacific also seeks damages for trespass.

Now before the Court are Union Pacific's motion for partial summary judgment ("MPSJ") (#26), and Dayton Valley's counter-motion for summary judgment ("MSJ") (#37).² Concurrently with its counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37), Dayton Valley filed a motion (# 36) requesting leave to exceed the page limit.³ Also pending is Union Pacific's motion to strike (# 41), which seeks to strike Dayton Valley's counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37) on the basis that it was not timely filed in accordance with the scheduling order (# 21) for this case. Dayton Valley has filed a counter-motion (# 47) to amend the scheduling order.

These motions are ripe, and we now rule on them.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The disputed property is part of a 400 foot wide strip of land located in Section 17 of Township 16 North, Range 22 East ("Section 17") in Lyon County, Nevada. This strip of land is identified as a separate parcel, "APN 016-361-11," by the Lyon County Assessor. A golf course, the Dayton Valley Golf Course, encroaches on the southwest portion of the parcel, and a residential subdivision, Quail Ridge, encroaches on the northeast portion. The remainder of APN 016-361-11, which is vacant land, constitutes the property at issue in this action.⁴

Dayton Valley's Complaint (# 1) was filed on January 30, 2008. Dayton Valley alleges that Union Pacific's predecessor in interest, the Central Pacific Railway Company ("Central Pacific"), owned the disputed property, as well other land in Section 17, until July 12, 1927. On that date, Central Pacific executed a deed conveying its interest in land located in Section 17 to a Mr. D.P. Randall, who is a predecessor in interest to Dayton Valley. This deed contained certain language, which will be examined in more detail below, "excepting and reserving" from the conveyance a strip of land, part of which is the disputed property. Dayton Valley alleges that this language reserved for Central Pacific an easement in the disputed property for use of the property as a railroad right of way. This easement, Dayton Valley alleges, was formally abandoned by Central Pacific's successor, Southern Pacific Railroad, in 1934, terminating the easement and leaving Dayton Valley with an unencumbered fee interest in the disputed property.

In the alternative, Dayton Valley argues that its predecessors in interest acquired a fee interest in the disputed property through adverse possession. Dayton Valley asserts that the adverse possession began in 1984, continuing through the present.⁵ Thus, Dayton Valley argues, any interest Union Pacific might otherwise have retained has been extinguished.

Union Pacific's Answer and Counterclaim (# 10) was filed on April 8, 2008, and then amended (#15) on April 21, 2008. Union Pacific interprets the language in the Randall Deed as reserving for Central Pacific an interest in fee simple, not an easement, in the disputed property. This fee interest, Union Pacific argues, was never abandoned or otherwise alienated, and passed to Union Pacific as the successor in interest to Central Pacific. Additionally, Union Pacific argues Dayton Valley's adverse possession claim is defeated by Union Pacific's payment of certain taxes on the disputed property, and that moreover Dayton Valley has failed to establish the elements of adverse possession. Further, Union Pacific seeks monetary damages for trespass against Dayton Valley arising from Dayton Valley's activities on the disputed property.

On November 4, 2008, Union Pacific filed its motion for partial summary judgment (#26). Specifically, Union Pacific seeks summary judgment on Dayton Valley's claims, Union Pacific's counterclaim for declaratory judgment, as well as the issue of liability on its counterclaim for trespass. Union Pacific does not seek summary judgment on the issue of damages arising from Dayton Valley's alleged trespass. Dayton Valley opposed (#35) the motion (#26), and Union Pacific replied (# 39).

On November 11, 2008, Dayton Valley, concurrently with its opposition (# 35) to Union Pacific's motion (# 26), filed a counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37), as well as a motion (# 36) requesting leave to exceed the page limit on its both its opposition (#35) and its counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37). Union Pacific did not oppose the motion (#36) to exceed the page limit; however, it did oppose (# 42) the counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37), and Dayton Valley replied (# 45).

Additionally, Union Pacific has filed a motion to strike (#41) Dayton Valley's counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37). Union Pacific notes that the deadline for filing dispositive motions, to which the parties stipulated in the scheduling order (#21), was November 5, 2008. Thus, Union Pacific argues, Dayton Valley's counter-motion for summary judgment (#37) was untimely and should be stricken. Dayton Valley opposed (#46) Union Pacific's motion to strike (# 41), and Union Pacific replied (# 48). Also, Dayton Valley filed a counter-motion (#47) to amend the scheduling order (# 21), which Union Pacific has opposed (# 49).

II. Motion to Strike/Motion to Amend Scheduling Order⁶

Dayton Valley filed its counter-motion for summary judgment (# 37) on November 19, 2008, fourteen days after the November 5, 2008, deadline for the filing of dispositive motions set by the Scheduling Order (#21). Union Pacific argues that the counter-motion (#37) must therefore be stricken as untimely. Dayton Valley has moved (# 47) to modify the scheduling order to "accommodate" the late filing of its counter-motion (# 37).

Union Pacific insists that "motions filed outside of the deadlines established in a district court's scheduling order cannot be considered on their merits." (D.'s Motion to Strike at 4(# 41).) We disagree. The Court has "broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation," including the authority to determine "the preclusive effect of a pretrial order.", Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1985)). It is not an abuse of discretion for a court to deny or strike a motion on the basis that it is untimely filed according to the timetable set by the scheduling order. Id. at 610. Nevertheless, before the final pretrial conference the scheduling order may be modified upon a showing of "good cause and with the judge's consent." FED. R.CIV.P. 16(b)(4); see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608 (noting that the deadlines set by the scheduling order govern the action "unless modified by the court"). Indeed, our Scheduling Order (# 21) explicitly contemplates the possibility of modification: "the date for filing dispositive motions shall be no later than November 5, 2008, unless the Court otherwise orders." (Scheduling Order ¶ 4(f)(#21).) We turn, then, to the question of whether modification of the scheduling order is appropriate.

The Rule 16 "good cause" inquiry "primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment." Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Dayton Valley, however, has not attempted to show that the pretrial schedule could not reasonably have been met despite its diligence. See id. (quoting advisory committee notes to Rule 16). Rather, Dayton Valley asserts that it simply did not realize that it was appropriate to move for summary judgment until after the deadline: "Upon reviewing Union Pacific's timely filed motion for summary judgment, it became apparent to Dayton Valley that there truly are no material issues of fact in this case, and that rather than wasting judicial resources with a trial it would be appropriate to have this matter disposed of by summary judgment." (P.'s Opp. at 2(# 46).)

We will here refrain from suggesting how best to characterize such an approach to prosecuting a case; it is enough to note that "diligent" would not be an apt description. Normally, therefore, the Rule 16 inquiry would end, the scheduling order would not be modified, and the untimely motion would not be considered. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

Here, however, Dayton Valley's belated motion for summary judgment hinges on questions of law that the Court must eventually address either prior to or in the course of trial. Because resolution of these legal questions would decide many, if not all, of the disputed issues between the parties, summary judgment appears to present an appropriate and efficient method of reaching such a resolution.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "should be construed and administered to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive...