Mitchell v. Nye Cnty.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-00086-APG-VCF |
| Parties | KARL MITCHELL and KAYLA MITCHELL, Plaintiffs v. NYE COUNTY, NEVADA, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO EXTEND TIME; (3) DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS, TO STRIKE, AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS; AND (4) DISMISSING COUNT IX WITHOUT PREJUDICE [ECF NOS. 105, 112 113, 119, 121, 122, 126]
Karl and Kayla Mitchell sue Nye County and current or former county employees Susan Ryhal, Sharon Wehrly, and Harry Williams. The Mitchells allege the defendants violated state and federal law when the Mitchells attempted to secure permits required to house tigers in Nye County.
The parties are familiar with the facts, so I repeat them only as necessary to resolve the various pending motions. I grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment except for the defamation claim against Ryhal, which I dismiss without prejudice so the Mitchells can pursue that claim in state court if they choose. I deny all other pending motions.
The defendants request case-terminating sanctions because of the Mitchells' alleged discovery misconduct. They assert that the Mitchells lied at their depositions and that Karl Mitchell used abusive language and abandoned his deposition. The Mitchells deny that they lied or that Karl acted in bad faith during discovery.
A district court may dismiss a case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 or the court's inherent powers. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995). A terminating sanction “is very severe.” Conn Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). “Only willfulness, bad faith, and fault justify terminating sanctions.” Id. (quotation omitted). I analyze five factors to decide whether to order terminating sanctions: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 348 (quotation omitted). The fifth factor has three subparts: (1) whether the court considered lesser sanctions; (2) whether it tried those sanctions; and (3) whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of case-dispositive sanctions. Id. at 352. But these factors are not conditions precedent, and “[t]he most critical factor to be considered . . . is whether a party's discovery violations make it impossible for a court to be confident that the parties will ever have access to the true facts.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at 1097 (quotation omitted).
Dismissal with prejudice is not appropriate here. Even if the Mitchells lied at their depositions, that goes to their credibility and does not merit dismissal. Further, less severe remedies (such as a narrow reopening of discovery) are available to rectify any prejudice to the defendants caused by Karl's behavior. The Mitchells' conduct is not sufficiently severe to terminate this case without a warning and an attempt at lesser sanctions. Thus, I deny the defendants' motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 105, 113. The additional evidence and briefing the defendants seek to file would not impact my decision, so I deny their motion for leave to file those documents. ECF No. 112.
The Mitchells move for an extension of the deadline to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment. They argue they need extra time because they have a pending public records request for defendant Williams' employment records and they did not have “adequate time to collect discovery.” ECF No. 122 at 1-2. The defendants oppose because the Mitchells do not explain why the records are relevant and why they did not obtain them during discovery.
The Mitchells do not identify which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure they move under, but a party can secure a continuance of a motion for summary judgment if it “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). The party “must show that: (1) it has set forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.” Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) (simplified). “[T]he evidence sought must be more than the object of pure speculation,” and the party seeking the continuance “must state what other specific evidence it hopes to discover and the relevance of that evidence to its claims.” Id. (simplified). I also may extend a response deadline for “good cause” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1).
The Mitchells have not met Rule 56(d)'s requirements. They submitted a declaration from Karl, but he does not identify the specific facts sought nor explain why those facts are essential to oppose the summary judgment motion. Discovery was open for two and a half years and closed on August 29, 2022. ECF Nos. 37; 101 at 3. The Mitchells did not move to extend discovery before the deadline expired and they do not elaborate on their allegation that the length of discovery was inadequate. They do not clearly explain the purpose of obtaining Williams' records, nor do they explain why they did not seek them until after discovery closed.[1] I thus deny their motion under Rules 56(d) and 6(b)(1). ECF No. 122.
I grant a motion for summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it may affect the case outcome under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine when the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of explaining the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If it meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.” Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018). I view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 440-41.
The defendants timely moved for summary judgment on all the Mitchells' claims. ECF No. 119. The Mitchells moved for summary judgment after the deadline for dispositive motions, and the defendants moved to strike the Mitchells' motion as untimely. ECF Nos. 121, 126.
I have discretion to consider an untimely motion for summary judgment. See Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 969 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Dayton Valley Invs., LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 664 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1178-79 (D. Nev. 2009). But even if I consider the Mitchells' motion on the merits, the motion, supporting materials, and record do not show that the Mitchells are entitled to summary judgment on their claims. The motion mostly repeats unsupported factual allegations and does not offer any evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact entitling the Mitchells to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, I deny the Mitchells' motion for summary judgment and deny the defendants' motion to strike as moot. ECF Nos. 121, 126.
Because the Mitchells have not filed a response brief to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, I consider the motion unopposed.[2] But to the extent that the Mitchells' motion for summary judgment offers relevant arguments and evidence, I will consider that motion as an opposition to the defendants' motion. The defendants still bear the burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2013) (). But because the Mitchells did not “properly address [the defendants'] assertion of fact” by filing a response brief, I may consider asserted facts undisputed and grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials “show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
The Mitchells bring several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims because the undisputed facts show that they did not violate any of the Mitchells' federal rights.
The Mitchells assert that the defendants violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which holds that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests.” Bingham v....
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