DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Price, 16-cv-0212 (KBJ).
Decision Date | 06 July 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 16-cv-0212 (KBJ).,16-cv-0212 (KBJ). |
Citation | 257 F.Supp.3d 91 |
Parties | DCH REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff, v. Thomas E. PRICE, in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Geoffrey M. Raux, Foley & Lardner LLP, Boston, MA, Lori Allison Rubin, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Stephen Garrett Schwei, U.S. Department of Justice, Johnny Hillary Walker, III, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
On April 13, 2016, this Court granted Defendant's uncontested motion to stay the proceedings in the instant Medicare case pending the D.C. Circuit's resolution of an appeal in Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Florida Health I "), 89 F.Supp.3d 121 (D.D.C. 2015). (See Def.'s Mot. to Stay Proceedings, ECF No. 11, at 1–2; Min. Order of Apr. 13, 2016.)1 The district court in Florida Health I had "held that 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3) bars judicial review of the Secretary's calculation of" a figure "known as ‘Factor Three,’ that is used to determine the amount of a hospital's disproportionate share payments under the federal Medicare program[,]" and Defendant here maintained that "[t]he same threshold question is present in this case[.]" (Def.'s Mot. to Stay Proceedings at 1–2.)
On July 26, 2016, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion that affirmed the district court's holding. See Florida Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs. ("Florida Health II "), 830 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Specifically, in Florida Health II , the D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1395ww(r)(3)'s "bar on judicial review of the Secretary's estimate " of a hospital's amount of uncompensated care likewise "precludes review of the underlying data " upon which the Secretary relies in reaching that estimate, because the data "are inextricably intertwined with the Secretary's estimate of uncompensated care[.]" Id. at 517, 521 (emphasis added); see also id. at 521 ( ). The D.C. Circuit further noted that "the data are the entire basis for" the Secretary's estimate of uncompensated care, and therefore, "[a] challenge to the data would eviscerate the bar on judicial review" of the Secretary's estimate. Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
For the reasons explained below, this Court concludes that the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Florida Health II compels the rejection of the instant challenge to the Secretary's estimate-generating methodology. (See Compl. ECF No. 1, at 1.) Consequently, Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint must be GRANTED, and this case must be DISMISSED. A separate Order that is consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall follow.
In its complaint, Plaintiff DCH Regional Medical Center ("DCH") "challenge[s] the methodology adopted and employed by [former] Defendant Sylvia Burwell, in her capacity as [former] Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services[,]" whereby "the calculation [the Secretary] used to determine the disproportionate share payments owed to qualifying hospitals participating in Medicare was restricted, in part, to data associated with a single provider number[.]" (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1; see also id. ( ); id. at 10 ( ).)2 However, this Court discerns no meaningful difference between the so-called methodological challenge that DCH raises in this case (see id. at 15 ( )), and the data-based challenge that the D.C. Circuit considered in Florida Health II , see 830 F.3d at 518 (). That is, both the underlying data and the methodology the Secretary employs when analyzing that data are " ‘indispensable’ and ‘integral’ to, and ‘inextricably intertwined’ with[ ] the Secretary's estimate" of each hospital's amount of uncompensated care, id. at 519, because the estimate is the figure that the Secretary generates by evaluating the underlying data in conjunction with a defined methodology. Cf. Florida Health I , 89 F.Supp.3d at 132 ( ). Thus, an argument that attempts to distinguish between data and methodology vis-à -vis the estimate is little more than an exercise in semantics, and it can fare no better than the challenge to the Secretary's choice of data that the D.C. Circuit rejected on jurisdictional grounds in Florida Health II .
To the extent that DCH attempts to reframe its challenge as a procedural objection to the general rule that led to the Secretary's estimate (see Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 15, at 13–15), this Court is unpersuaded. To be sure, "the D.C. Circuit recently stated that, where judicial review of [an agency's] decision is barred, judicial review is still appropriate over general rules leading to that decision." (Id. at 13 (citing Florida Health II , 830 F.3d at 521–22 ).) But the Florida Health II court also "clarified that judicial review is not permitted ‘when a procedure is challenged solely in order to reverse an individual ... decision’ that [a court] otherwise cannot review." Florida Health II , 830 F.3d at 521 ( )(quoting Palisades Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. Leavitt , 426 F.3d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ). And even a cursory reading of DCH's complaint reveals that its suit does just that—i.e. , its aim is not to "present[ ] a challenge to a general rule applied by the Secretary" (Pl.'s Opp'n at 15); rather, DCH "is simply trying to undo the Secretary's estimate of the hospital's uncompensated care by recasting its challenge to the Secretary's choice of [methodology] as an attack on the general rules leading to her estimate[,]" Florida Health II , 830 F.3d at 522.
Notably, DCH struggles mightily to characterize its complaint as a procedural challenge. To this end, it points to allegations in the complaint that charge the Secretary with failing to "properly consider or respond to comments during the rule-making process regarding the inherent flaw in her methodology [.]" (Compl. at 15; see also Pl.'s Opp'n at 7, 15 n.1.) But, the indisputable gravamen of DCH's complaint is that the Secretary improperly calculated the amount of uncompensated care for DCH —which merged with Northport Regional Medical Center ("Northport") on May 1, 2011 (see Compl. at 11)—by basing the agency's calculation on data associated solely with DCH, rather than data associated with both DCH and Northport. (See id. ().) And one need look no further than DCH's own request for relief to see clearly that what is at stake in this action is DCH's requested individualized recalculation of the uncompensated care figure rather than any reformulation of the agency's general rule; in fact, the complaint seeks neither invalidation of any agency rule nor a remand so that the Secretary may better explain her methodology. (See id. at 16.) Instead, the complaint requests that this Court "[v]acate the Secretary's Fiscal Year 2014 Factor 3 calculation for ...
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