Deacon v. City of Ladue
| Decision Date | 18 September 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 29369,29369 |
| Citation | 294 S.W.2d 616 |
| Parties | William T. DEACON, III (Plaintiff), Appellant, v. CITY OF LADUE, a Municipal Corporation (Defendant), Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Alfred H. Kerth, Kerth, Thies & Schreiber, Clayton, for appellant.
Forrest Boecker, Wehrle & Wehrle, Clayton, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County dismissing plaintiff's petition in equity which sought a decree declaring unconstitutional and void Ordinance No. 282 of the defendant, City of Ladue, insofar as it restricts the use of plaintiff's property. Plaintiff lodged his appeal with this Court, and, thereafter, defendant filed its motion to transfer same to the Supreme Court of Missouri. We have taken this motion for consideration with the case.
In his petition plaintiff states that he is the owner of a tract of land located within the corporate limits of the City of Ladue. This tract which is situated on the south side of Ladue Road has a frontage of 357.70 feet thereon and is adjacent and west of the Rock Island and Pacific right-of-way, being a part of Lots 5 and 6 of West Clayton, a subdivision. Plaintiff alleges that this tract has never been usable, adaptable or suitable for residential purposes, but nevertheless defendant City, by its Ordinance No. 282, has zoned it in 'District E,' which limits and restricts its use to one family dwellings requiring a minimum of 10,000 square feet of ground for each dwelling, resulting in the taking and damaging of plaintiff's property without compensation and without due process of law. Plaintiff charges that this ordinance, as it applies to his tract, bears no relation to the health, safety and welfare of the City of Ladue, and is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, void and unconstitutional; that its adoption and enforcement violates certain sections of the Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S., namely, Article I, Sections 10, 26 and 28 thereof, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff has requested defendant to re-zone his property other than for a residential use but to no avail.
Defendant City by answer denied the invalidity of the ordinance; charged that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and pleaded laches and estoppel.
The trial of this case was lengthy. The transcript contained over 800 pages and there were more than 70 exhibits. We have carefully reviewed the entire record. It would serve no useful purpose to detail the testimony of the numerous witnesses or to describe the many exhibits. A summary of the gist of that testimony and evidence as it applies to the various questions presented by this appeal is set out below.
Defendant City is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of this state as a city of the fourth class, located in St. Louis County. It was formed in 1936 by the consolidation of three villages, Deer Creek, Ladue and McKnight. In 1938, after considerable professional study of its existing and future needs, it adopted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, No. 282, which divided all of its land into seven districts. Five of these districts were restricted to single family residential use, with the following minimum land requirements per family: District A, 3 acres; District B, 1.8 acres; District C, 30,000 square feet or approximately 3/4 acre; District D, 15,000 square feet; and District E, 10,000 square feet.
In 1938 the city contained 4,532 acres, and, as a result of annexation, now contains about 5,000 acres. Of all of this acreage, only 15.22 acres is zoned for commercial use (District F). The city, with a present population of about 6,000, is located in the St. Louis metropolitan area containing some 1,600,000 inhabitants. The trend of the population has been into suburban area. Defendant City lies directly in the path of the better residential development and directly west of the central area of St. Louis City. The City of Ladue is essentially one of fine homes and excellent schools and churches.
Plaintiff's property involved on this appeal is a portion of a larger tract which prior to 1945 was owned by Sarah Greensfelder and known as Lots 5 and 6 of West Clayton. These two lots contained a total of 6.2 acres. Early in 1945, she sold this tract of land to Hugh and Mary Kehling Stevenson for $6,000. In March, 1945, the Stevensons sold it to Ralph F. Bixby, plaintiff's father-in-law, for $9,500. Bixby subdivided a portion of the tract into five lots, designated as Ladue Pointer subdivision. Bixby sold Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereof to Gayle Henderson for $10,000. Bixby built his own home on Lot 5, which lot had an estimated value of $3,500 to $4,000. Thereafter, for a consideration of $7,000, he conveyed the remainder of the tract consisting of 3.70 acres to William Deacon, Sr., who immediately reconveyed same to his son, plaintiff herein, for a stated consideration of $1.
At the time William Bixby owned the land, he knew it was zoned for residential usage only, and that it was suitable for only the cheaper types of houses. William Deacon, Sr., when he acquired the mentioned portion of this tract, also knew of Zoning Ordinance No. 282 as it applied thereto. Prior to entering into any contract with Bixby for its purchase, he had consulted the alderman in the ward where the property was located respecting the zoning of the land for residential purposes. He explained that he and his son were interested in acquiring the property for the purpose of erecting on a portion of it a Williamsburg style of office. He testified he was encouraged to believe that the use which he proposed for the property would be satisfactory and in the interest of the City of Ladue. He then met with the Planning Commission of the City of Ladue, was further encouraged, and thereafter on April 3, 1950, entered into a purchase contract calling for cash payment on or before July 3, 1950. On May 15, 1950, a letter in the form of an application was directed by him to the city council of defendant City requesting that the property be changed from 'E' residential to 'F' commercial under the zoning ordinance. This application also contained his offer by appropriate deed restrictions to use the Williamsburg structure only for offices; that no part of the property would be used for stores, filling stations or other retail outlets; that offstreet parking would be provided, and that the rest of the property (for this purpose divided into three lots) would be restricted to not more than three single family residences, and that all these restrictions would continue for 25 years, renewable automatically for additional ten-year periods thereafter, unless the property owner and defendant's city council agreed to terminate or change the same. This application was referred to defendant City's Planning Commission, which on June 1, 1950, filed its report with the city council, stating that in its opinion the proposed restrictions would improve and make the best use of the area; raise the residential classification of the greater portion of the property and only commercialize the Ladue Road frontage. The Commission unanimously recommended that the area be changed to an 'F' commercial district, but only after the proposed restrictions were placed on the property. A public hearing on the request was held by the Ladue City Council on June 19, 1950. Numerous citizens appeared. Some spoke in favor of the request, and others spoke against it. A written protest signed by the trustees of Pointer Lane subdivision was filed with the city clerk. Of the six members of the city council present, three voted for and three voted against the request. The Mayor refused to vote to break the tie 'for the reason it was his understanding that an application for re-zoning must be approved by three-fourths of the members of the council'. He announced that the request for re-zoning had been denied. After this action by the city council, William Deacon, Sr., on July 11, 1950, closed the deal to purchase the land and then conveyed it to plaintiff.
Evidence adduced on plaintiff's behalf disclosed that his tract was bounded on the north by Ladue Road, on the west by Black Creek, and on the east by Switch Street, which abuts the Rock Island Railroad right-of-way and a coal yard. The closest residences are located on Pointer Lane. All of the residences on Pointer Lane back up to this tract, except the residence of Ralph Bixby which fronts on Ladue Road and is bounded on the west by Pointer Lane. The tract is located in the flood plain of Black Creek. Across the street is a filling station, which was there prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance. The Grove Laboratories is located northeast of this tract and employs from 400 to 600 people. The area east of the Rock Island right-of-way on both the north and south sides of Ladue, to the west line of the city limits of Clayton, Missouri, a distance of approximately 1,000 feet, is used for industrial purposes. The City of St. Louis owns and maintains a water line easement diagonally across the northeast part of the tract. There is a ten-foot sanitary sewer easement alongside, and a storm water easement twenty-five feet wide bisecting the tract. With the exception of the front 50 feet of plaintiff's property, which had been recently filled, the property is lower than property to the west, and at times is subject to flooding by Black Creek.
An ordinance of defendant City provided that the lowest floor line in any house could not be less than eighteen inches above the high-water mark, and that there could be no basement unless the bottom of the basement windows were eighteen inches above the high-water mark.
In support of plaintiff's contention that the tract could not be used for residential purposes, testimony was adduced to show that throughout the years the property had remained...
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