Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ.

• Citation: 259 F.Supp.2d 687
• Decision Date: 04 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1:01-CV-295.,1:01-CV-295.
• Parties: Maureen DEAL and Phillip Deal, on behalf of Zachary DEAL, an infant child with a disability, Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

259 F.Supp.2d 687

Maureen DEAL and Phillip Deal, on behalf of Zachary DEAL, an infant child with a disability, Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 1:01-CV-295.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Southern Division.

March 4, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Theodore R. Kern, Knoxville, Gary Mayerson, New York, NY, for Plaintiff or Petitioner.

Charles L. Weatherly, Kathleen A. Sullivan, Thomas W. Dickson, Weatherly Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant or Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EDGAR, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs Maureen and Phillip Deal are the parents of Zachary Deal ("Zachary"), a child diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.¹ Zachary and his parents reside in Hamilton County, Tennessee, and Zachary attended public school in the Hamilton County school system. Maureen and Phillip Deal (the "Deals") bring this action on behalf of Zachary under the Individuals With Disabilities Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400—1420. The case comes before this Court on appeal from a decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 § (i)(2). The ALJ ordered defendant Hamilton County Department of Eduction ("HCDE") to reimburse the Deals for expenses they incurred after May 11, 1998, in private treatment for Zachary outside of the public school system. The ALJ declined to order the HCDE to reimburse the Deals for certain other expenses. Plaintiffs and HCDE seek judicial review of the decision rendered by the ALJ on August 20, 2001.

I. Statutory Framework

The purpose of the IDEA is to guarantee children with disabilities access to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1); See N.L. ex tel. Mrs. C. v. Knox County Schools, 315 F.3d 688, 689 (6th Cir.2003); Burilovich v. Board of Educ. of Lincoln, 208 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir.2000). FAPE is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) as meaning special education and related services that (a) are provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, without charge; (b) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (c) include an "appropriate" preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (d) are provided in conformity with the individual education program required under 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

The statutory framework of the IDEA is summarized in Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City School Dist, 238 F.3d 755, 762-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 950, 121 S.Ct. 2593, 150 L.Ed.2d 752 (2001). In exchange for federal funding, the IDEA requires the State of Tennessee and HCDE to identify, locate, and evaluate all children residing in Hamilton County who are disabled and in need of special education and related services. HCDE must develop a curriculum specially tailored to the unique needs of each disabled child by means of an individualized education plan ("IEP"). Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181-82, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) Enable, 238 F.3d at 762-63; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(2) and 1414(a)(5). The development and implementation of the IEP are the "cornerstones" of the IDEA. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); Tennessee Dept. of Mental Health v. Paul B., 88 F.3d 1466, 1471 (6th Cir.1996).

The Deals object to the IEPs that HCDE devised for Zachary. The IDEA provides a review process through which parents who disagree with the appropriateness of an IEP can seek relief. The review process begins with a complaint by the parents to HCDE, followed by an impartial due process hearing before an ALJ from the Tennessee Department of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Any party aggrieved by the result of the administrative hearing and the ALJ's decision may bring a civil action in federal district court to obtain judicial review pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Enable, 238 F.3d at 763.

During the course of the IDEA review process, the parents and the school district are required to continue the then-current educational placement of the child as set forth in the current IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1415CJ). If the parents opt not to comply with the "stay-put" provision, they are not necessarily barred from recovering the costs of private educational placement for the disabled child. Parents, such as the Deals, who elect to remove their child from the current educational placement provided in the IEP prior to completion of the IDEA review process, and who pay for appropriate specialized education, may seek retroactive reimbursement from the public school district. School Committee of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985); Enable, 238 F.3d at 763, 770-71.

However, the Deals are entitled to such retroactive reimbursement only if a federal court determines both (1) that the disabled child's placement by the school district violated the IDEA (i.e., that the child was deprived of FAPE), and (2) that the private placement selected by the parents was appropriate. Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993); Enable, 238 F.3d at 763, 770; Wise v. Ohio Dept. of Educ, 80 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir.(1996). Parents who unilaterally remove their child from public school contrary to the then-current IEP, and prior to completion of the IDEA review process, do so at their own financial risk. Florence County, 510 U.S. at 15, 114 S.Ct. 361; Burlington, All U.S. at 373-74, 105 S.Ct. 1996; Enable, 238 F.3d at 763; Wise, 80 F.3d at 184; Doe v. Board of Educ. of Tullahoma City Schools, 9 F.3d 455, 460-61 (6th Cir.1993). The Deals bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEPS developed for Zachary failed to provide him with a FAPE. Enable, 238 F.3d at 768; Tullahoma City Schools, 9 F.3d at 458. If they do not meet this burden, the Deals are not entitled to reimbursement for the costs incurred by their educating Zachary privately. Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 572.

II. Standard of Review

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(2)(B) provides that the Court shall receive the records of the administrative proceeding and shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party. See Knable, 238 F.3d at 763-64. On January 23-24, 2003, the Court held a hearing and received additional evidence at the request of HCDE. In accordance with § 1415 § (i)(1)(2)(B), this Court has reviewed the complete record consisting of the administrative record and the additional evidence presented at the hearing on January 23-24, 2003.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) provides that the Court, "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEP devised by HCDE for Zachary was inappropriate and failed to provide Zachary with FAPE. Knable, 238 F.3d at 768; Dong v. Board of Educ. of Rochester Community Schools, 197 F.3d 793, 799-800 (6th Cir.1999); Renner v. Board of Educ. of Pub. Schools of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 1999); Tullahoma City Schools, 9 F.3d at 458; Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1469 (6th Cir.1990).

The Court reviews both the procedural and substantive matters under a modified de novo standard of review. In reviewing the ALJ's decision under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), the Court makes an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence contained in the complete record, while giving due weight to the ALJ's findings of fact. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Knox County Schools, 315 F.3d at 692; Knable, 238 at 764; Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 565; Renner, 185 F.3d at 641; Tucker by Tucker v. Calloway County Bd. of Educ, 136 F.3d 495, 501-03 (6th Cir.1998); Tullahoma City Schools, 9 F.3d at 458. In explaining the concept of "due weight" under the IDEA, .the Sixth Circuit has said that courts cannot simply adopt the ALJ's findings of fact without an independent examination of the evidence. Knable, 238 F.3d at 764; Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 565-66; Dong, 197 F.3d at 799; Metropolitan Bd. of Public Educ. v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir.1999); Peck By Peck v. Lansing School Dist, 148 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1998).

In Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 566, the Sixth Circuit explains that the weight due varies depending on whether the Court is reviewing procedural or substantive matters and whether educational expertise is essential to the administrative findings. This Court reviews an IEP for procedural compliance but harmless technical deviations from the IDEA procedural safeguards do not render an IEP invalid and do not constitute a denial of FAPE. Knable, 238 F.3d at 764-65; Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 566; Dong, 197 F.3d at 800. Furthermore, if the Court finds that the State of Tennessee and HCDE have met the procedural requirements of the IDEA, then greater deference is afforded to their educational decisions. Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 566; Dong, 197 F.3d at 800; Tucker, 136 F.3d at 502; Roncker On Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.1983).

With regard to substantive issues, the "preponderance of the evidence" language in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) is not an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notion of sound educational policy for those of the public school authorities. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Knable, 238 F.3d at 764; Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 566; Renner, 185 F.3d at 641; Tucker, 136 F.3d at 505; Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ, 918 F.2d 618, 624 (6th Cir.1990). In assuring that the requirements of the IDEA have been met, this Court must be careful to avoid imposing its view of preferable educational methods upon HCDE and the State of Tennessee. "The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded to a handicapped...