While at school on December 13, 2010, Plaintiff N.B. ("N.B."), a student enrolled in the Demopolis City School District ("DCSD"), physically assaulted one of his teachers and his school's principal. (Doc. 20-2 at 32, 35-36). N.B. was subsequently charged with a violation of the DCSD's Student Code of Conduct and suspended. The case was turned over to juvenile authorities.
On December 15, 2010, N.B.'s legal guardian, L.K., filed a complaint requesting a due process hearing pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415, alleging that Defendant Demopolis City Board of Education ("the Board") had violated N.B.'s rights under the Individualswith Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("IDEA"). (Doc. 20-7 at 102). A hearing was conducted over a period of five non-consecutive days from June 20, 2011, through September 28, 2011. (Doc. 20-8 at 9). On December 14, 2011, the presiding hearing officer issued his decision, finding that the Board provided N.B. with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and that the Board complied with the requirements of IDEA in the development of N.B.'s individualized education program (IEP).
On January 10, 2012, N.B., by and through L.K.,1 filed the present Complaint pursuant to § 1415(g), appealing the hearing officer's decision. (Doc. 1). N.B. requests that the Court reverse the hearing officer's decision and find in N.B.'s favor on all issues. N.B. seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as all relief sought at the hearing, "compensatory education/and or []education services," attorneys' fees, and costs. (Id. at 7-8).
In arguing that he is entitled to the relief sought, N.B. alleges that the Board: 1) "has failed to appropriately evaluate NB and find NB eligible for services in an appropriate disability category with appropriate individual education plans and services in those areas of disability" (Id. at 3, ¶ 10); 2) "has failed to provide, or otherwise assure that NB has been provided with an appropriate educational program that would allow him the opportunity to gain [social] skills" (Id., ¶ 11); 3) "has failed to develop an IEP for NB that addresses his disabilities, and unique needs and characteristics" (Id. at 5, ¶ 18); 4) "has failed to comprehensively evaluate NB as required [and] has further denied NB a free, appropriate public education, as NB's IEPsfailed to meet IDEA's basic requirements" (Id., ¶ 21); and 5) "failed to provide related services, to-wit, a board certified behavior analyst and/or related mental health services to assist in the development and implementation of a behavior intervention plan" (Id., ¶ 22). Such failures "deprived [N.B.] of comprehensive evaluations, a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, related serves [sic] and assistive technology, in violation of [IDEA]." (Id. at 6, ¶ 29).
The Board filed the present motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2012 (Doc. 19), and it is now ripe for consideration. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).
"The IDEA . . . represents an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children . . . The IDEA achieves its goals by guaranteeing students with disabilities a Free and Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") . . . The services and placement needed by each child with a disability to receive a FAPE must be based on the child's unique needs and not on the child's disability . . . To provide a child with a FAPE, the School Board formulates an IEP [("individualized education program")] during a meeting between the student's parents and school officials." M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1094-95 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). "Should parents elect to challenge an IEP, they are entitled to a due process hearing before an ALJ [("administrative law judge")]." Id. at 1096 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6)(A) & 1415(a)-(o); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(b)). For a party who does not prevail with the ALJ,
[t]he IDEA authorizes an "aggrieved" party to bring an action in federal court challenging the ALJ 's final decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Although the federal action is an independent civil action and not merely a review of a state administrative decision, the Supreme Court has determined that federalcourts must still give "due weight" to the ALJ's determinations. See [Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. ]Rowley, 458 U.S. [176, ]206, 102 S. Ct. [3034, ]3051[ (1982)]; Loren F.[ v. Atlanta Independent Sch. Sys.], 349 F.3d [1309, ]1314[ (11th Cir. 2003)]. "To that end, administrative factfindings are considered to be prima facie correct, and if a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why." Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1314 n.5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The district court answers the same two-part inquiry as [the ALJ]: namely, whether the School Board followed the IDEA's procedural requirement and whether the proposed IEP was sufficient to provide the child with a FAPE. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690; Loren F., 349 F.3d at 1312. "A 'yes' answer to both questions ends judicial review." Loren F. 349 F.3d at 1312; seeRowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S. Ct. at 3051 ("If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.").
However, should the district court determine either that the School Board failed to follow the IDEA's procedural requirements or that the IEP was not reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive education benefits, it "shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(1); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) ("[A] court or a hearing officer may require [the School Board] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment."); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c) ("[A] court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that [private school] enrollment if ... the agency had not made FAPE available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment and ... the private placement is appropriate."). The reviewing court has broad discretion in determining what is appropriate based on the circumstances of each case. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369, 105 S. Ct. at 2002.
Id. at 1097-98 (footnotes omitted).
As the Middle District of Alabama has noted,
[t]he standard by which a district court should review an administrative decision under the IDEA is a murky one. On the one hand, the district court is to conduct a de novo review of the [administrative law judge's] findings. Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty., Fla. v. K. C., 285 F.3d 977, 981 (11th Cir. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that "the extent of the deference to be given to the administrative decision is left to the sound discretion of the district court which must consider the administrative findings but is free to accept or reject them." Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir.2000). However, an administrative decision "is entitled to due weight and the court must be careful not to substitute its judgment" for that of the hearing officer. Id.
K.I. ex rel. Jennie I. v. Montgomery Pub. Sch., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
The Eleventh Circuit has further explained that while "[c]ourts owe some judicial deference to local administrative agency judgments, see Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691-92 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (When reviewing IEPs, court keeps in mind that state and local administrative agencies are deemed to have expertise in education policy and practice), []that's typically limited to matters calling upon educational expertise. [Kings Local School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. ]Zelazny, 325 F.3d [724, ]728 [(6th Cir. 2003) ](The amount of weight due to administrative findings under the IDEA depends on whether the finding is based on educational expertise) (citing McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2003)). " Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1314 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003).
With regard to the disposition of a motion for summary judgment on IDEA claims,
Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that "the usual [Rule] 56 summary judgment principles do not apply in an IDEA case." Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, a district court's review of an IDEA appeal is " 'better described as a judgment on the record.' " Id. at 1313 (citing Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, " 'summary judgment [in IDEA cases] has been deemed appropriate even when facts are in dispute.' " Id. (citing Beth B., 282 F.3d at 496 n.2).
When a district court reviews findings and decisions made during IDEA administrative hearings, the court receives the administrative record, and renders a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence. SeeWalker Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2000).
Ms. H. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:10CV247-WHA-SRW, 2011 WL 666033, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2011) (Albritton, J.).
"The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging...
