Deal v. Bowman
| Decision Date | 01 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 96,868.,96,868. |
| Citation | 188 P.3d 941 |
| Parties | Bradley C. DEAL, Appellant, v. Alan W. BOWMAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Michael C. Helbert, of Law Offices of Helbert & Allemang, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Craig Kennedy, of Johnson, Kennedy, Dahl & Willis, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.
This is a personal injury action arising from a collision at a controlled intersection. Trial evidence indicated that the defendant stopped at the stop sign and looked both directions before entering the intersection but nevertheless collided with the plaintiff's car, which he did not see due to glare from the sun. In the district court, the jury found no fault/negligence by either party for the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Deal v. Bowman, No. 96,868, 167 P.3d 387, 2007 WL 2768037, unpublished opinion filed September 21, 2007. We granted the defendant's petition for review, reverse the Court of Appeals, and affirm the district court.
On September 17, 2002, Bradley Deal was traveling eastbound on Main Street in Council Grove at approximately 5:50 p.m. Alan Bowman, who was traveling south on Adams Street, approached the intersection of Main and Adams. The traffic traveling on Main Street was not required to stop at this intersection but vehicles on Adams Street had stop signs. After stopping and looking both directions, Bowman pulled into the intersection, where he collided with Deal's vehicle, injuring Deal.
Deal filed a negligence action against Bowman. Both parties agreed that Deal bore no fault for the accident. The questions to be determined at trial were whether Bowman was at fault and, if so, what damages should be awarded.
Because Deal had no recollection of the accident due to his injuries, Bowman provided the only testimony as to how the accident happened. Bowman testified that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign and looked both directions. He then pulled into the intersection and collided with Deal's vehicle, injuring Deal. Bowman testified that he did not see Deal's car because the sun hindered his vision when he looked west. On direct examination, the following exchange took place between Bowman and his attorney:
Deal's counsel conducted the following discussion with Bowman during cross-examination:
Police Officer Tom Furman, who arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred and filed the police report on the incident, also testified. According to Furman, Bowman told the officer immediately after the accident occurred that "he stopped at the stop sign and he looked, and due to the sun blinding him ... he did not see the vehicle coming." Furman also testified that when he looked "to the west" after Bowman had provided his explanation, the officer noticed that "the sun was very blinding that day."
At the close of evidence, Deal moved for a directed verdict—i.e., for judgment as a matter of law, on the issue of Bowman's negligence/liability. The district court denied his motion, concluding that there was evidence that Bowman had stopped and had carefully looked both directions and that the only reason he did not see Deal was due to the sun. The case was given to the jury, which found that neither party was at fault for the accident.
Deal moved for a new trial on the issue of negligence/liability, arguing that the evidence conclusively indicated that Bowman had been negligent. The court denied the motion, relying primarily on Diaz v. Duke, 206 Kan. 650, 652, 482 P.2d 48 (1971), where this court reversed a directed verdict on the issue of liability in a negligence action when "it could have found that on account of being suddenly blinded by the sun, [the driver] did not negligently operate his automobile."
Deal appealed the district court's denial of both his motions. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion. Deal, slip op. at 11. Although the majority recognized that determinations of negligence are normally left to the trier of fact, the court held that Bowman's actions in this case constituted negligence as a matter of law. Slip op. at 10-11. The court therefore held that the district court erred when it denied Deal's motion for judgment as a matter of law, reversed the district court, and remanded the case for a determination of Deal's damages. Slip op. at 11.
The majority reasoned that "Kansas courts have long recognized the general rule that a motorist must correlate his ability to stop his vehicle within the distance objects can be seen ahead." Slip op. at 6. Recognizing the "blinding light rule" in Diaz, the majority explained that there is a distinction in Kansas case law between facts that involve a "sudden, unexpected, or surprising" change in conditions and situations as in the present case that involve "a constant condition which diminishes a motorist's ability to see." Slip op. at 7, 10. The majority found that otherwise-negligent acts are not excused where conditions are constant. Slip op. at 10.
Because "reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion that the sunlight which impaired Bowman's vision was not a sudden, unexpected, or surprising condition ... [or] that Bowman drove into the intersection knowing ... that his vision was impaired by the sun," the majority held that Bowman was negligent as a matter of law. Slip op. at 10-11.
Judge Elliott dissented, stating he could not "join the majority without substituting [his] judgment for that of the trial judge." Slip op. at 12 (Elliott, J., dissenting). Judge Elliott noted that the district court determined that Bowman's testimony that the blinding sunlight prevented him from seeing Deal's vehicle was sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury. Because Judge Elliott could not "fault" the district court's ruling, he explained that he would affirm the judgment in favor of Bowman. Slip op. at 12 (Elliott, J., dissenting).
Bowman filed a petition for review, claiming that the Court of Appeals opinion applied the incorrect legal standard, as the law requires drivers to exercise ordinary care, not to be "perfect." Bowman argued that the Court of Appeals majority substituted its opinion for that of the trial court and jury, both of which found that there was evidence in the record demonstrating that Bowman acted reasonably under the circumstances. Deal filed a response, claiming that the Court of Appeals majority correctly found that the blinding light rule "was never intended to provide the basis for a motorist to use the sun as a legal excuse to blindly continue driving or to enter into an intersection, road, or highway without knowing what was in his path."
The question before us is whether Bowman's action of pulling into the intersection, after stopping, while aware that his vision was hindered by the glare from the western sun constitutes negligence as a matter of law. This question is resolved by considering whether there were facts in the record from which a jury could determine that Bowman exercised ordinary care when entering the intersection. For reasons set forth in this opinion, this court, like the district court, concludes that Bowman's testimony raised a factual question concerning the reasonableness of his actions and thus agrees with the decision to submit the question of negligence/liability to the jury.
When considering a motion for a directed verdict, now a motion for judgment as a matter of law under K.S.A. 60-250, the district court must " " Wilkinson v. Shoney's, Inc., 269 Kan. 194, 202, 4 P.3d 1149 (2000) . Where no evidence is presented on a particular issue or the evidence presented is undisputed and is such that the minds of reasonable persons may not draw differing inferences and arrive at opposing conclusions, the matter becomes a question of law for the court's determination. See K.S.A. 60-250; Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 578, 665 P.2d 743 (1983). Appellate courts apply a similar analysis when reviewing the grant or denial of such a motion. See Wilkinson, 269 Kan. at 202, 4 P.3d 1149.
In a personal injury action based upon negligence, the plaintiff must prove "the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, injury, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury suffered." Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, Syl. ¶ 1, 861 P.2d 768 (1993). The general rule is that "[w]hether a duty exists is a...
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