Rhoten v. Dickson

• Decision Date: 29 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 98,837.,98,837.
• Parties: Danielle RHOTEN, as an Individual and as Heir-at-Law of Xavier Rhoten (Deceased), Appellant, v. Bruce DICKSON, IV, Defendant, and Frank Pase, as an Individual and an Employee of Topeka, Kansas, and The City of Topeka, Kansas, as the Principal and Employer of Frank Pase, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

223 P.3d 786

Danielle RHOTEN, as an Individual and as Heir-at-Law of Xavier Rhoten (Deceased), Appellant, v. Bruce DICKSON, IV, Defendant, and Frank Pase, as an Individual and an Employee of Topeka, Kansas, and The City of Topeka, Kansas, as the Principal and Employer of Frank Pase, Appellees.

No. 98,837.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

January 29, 2010.

Keith Renner, of Renner Law Office, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

David R. Cooper, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, of Topeka, argued the cause, Teresa L. Watson, of the same firm, and Deanne Watts Hay, of Parker & Hay, LLP, of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

This appeal asks whether the doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bar plaintiff's negligence and negligence per se claims in state court against the City of Topeka and one of its police officers after those same claims were dismissed without prejudice in federal court. We hold these claims are barred and decline plaintiff's invitation to overrule Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 263 Kan. 388, 949 P.2d 602 (1997), cert. denied 525 U.S. 831, 119 S.Ct. 84, 142 L.Ed.2d 66 (1998), which found claim preclusion barred plaintiff's claims under parallel circumstances.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This controversy arises from an intersection collision between a pickup truck driven by defendant Bruce Dickson, IV, and a van in which plaintiff Danielle Rhoten was a passenger. Rhoten sustained serious injuries and a miscarriage 2 weeks before her due date. Defendant Frank Pase was working at the time of the accident as a police officer for the City of Topeka. The material facts are not in dispute.

Pase was on duty, driving an unmarked patrol car, on the evening of February 5, 2004. Several inches of snow had fallen with accumulations of up to 10 inches. The road in places was wet, slushy, or slick when Pase noticed Dickson's truck about one block ahead weaving in and out of traffic and making quick lane changes. The officer also noticed a dark-colored car closely following the pickup as it maneuvered around traffic. Pase accelerated from approximately 35 m.p.h. to about 55 m.p.h., intending to stop the pickup.

Pase's unmarked patrol car was equipped with a rear-facing red and blue flashing light mounted on the vehicle's interior rear window, a red and blue flashing strobe light on the passenger sun visor, "wig-wag" headlights, a siren, and a chrome spotlight mounted on the front driver's side windshield pillar. Pase intended to activate his lights and siren when he got closer to the pickup, but he did not do so prior to the collision nor did he notify his dispatcher that he was in pursuit of the vehicles.

Both the pickup and the dark-colored car preceded Pase southbound onto the Topeka Boulevard bridge. The bridge inclines as one proceeds southbound and rises to a crest, after which there is a flat expanse across the river. Pase accelerated to 65 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone as he approached the bridge's crest and reached the flat expanse, but Pase could not see Dickson's pickup. The dark-colored car following the pickup reduced its speed, discontinued passing, and moved into the right lane. Pase passed it and other vehicles in his attempt to locate the pickup which by then was out of sight over the bridge's southern crest.

As Pase approached the bridge's south end, he spotted the pickup, approximately 2 blocks ahead. The officer then saw the pickup accelerate and drive through several green lights before it collided with a van traveling the opposite direction. The van was attempting to turn onto a cross street. Pase was still about 2 blocks from the collision, still attempting to follow the pickup. When Pase arrived at the accident scene, he told Dickson he clocked his speed and was "following and/or chasing" him. Pase also commented to another person at the scene that the officer had "been trying to catch this guy since North Topeka." Plaintiff was a passenger in the van.

Rhoten filed her first lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against Dickson, Pase, and the City of Topeka. Rhoten v. Dickson, IV, 2006 WL 2524157 (D.Kan.2006) (unpublished opinion). She brought a substantive due process claim against Pase and the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), and supplemental state law claims for negligence and negligence per se against Pase, the City, and Dickson. Her allegations against Pase were premised upon two theories: (1) Pase's actions, i.e. speeding while pursuing Dickson; and (2) Pase's inactions, i.e. his failure to activate the car's lights and siren.

Following discovery, the federal district court granted summary judgment on the substantive due process claim in favor of Pase and the City. The court found Pase's actions were causally unrelated to plaintiff's injuries because Dickson testified in his deposition that nothing done by any car following him that night influenced the way he drove his pickup. Similarly, and on the strength of the same testimony, the court found Pase's alleged inactions to be causally unrelated, concluding Pase did not create any danger or cause plaintiff or anyone else to be any more vulnerable to any danger than otherwise would have been the case. The court held that "[b]ecause defendant Dickson's speed and other manner of driving was totally unaffected by Pase's actions or inactions, any danger posed to plaintiff by virtue of Dickson's driving already existed." Dickson, 2006 WL 2524157, at *9. These findings also terminated Rhoten's due process claim against the City because a municipality is not liable if there is no underlying constitutional violation by the officer. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155-1156 (10th Cir.2001).

Having found against plaintiff on her federal allegations, the federal district court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. In doing so, the federal court rejected an argument by Pase and the City that the court's findings regarding causation in Rhoten's substantive due process claim also were dispositive of the negligence claims. As to that point, the court said this "may or may not be so, as causation in the context of a negligence claim may differ somewhat from causation in the context of a substantive due process claim." Dickson, 2006 WL 2524157, at *12. Rhoten appealed the federal district court's summary judgment decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Rhoten v. Pase, 2007 WL 3088226 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion).

While the federal appeal was pending, Rhoten timely refiled the state law negligence and negligence per se theories in state district court against Dickson, Pase, and the City. The negligence claims alleged "defendants failed to . . . operate their vehicle in a safe and reasonable manner and in a manner designed to provide warning to other drivers and pedestrians." The negligence per se theory was brought under K.S.A. 8-1506, stating "defendants engaged in a violation of K.S.A. 8-1506 (and possibly other statutes)." But Rhoten never asserted the violation of another statute.

Pase filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6). The City filed a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. A certified copy of Rhoten's federal district court complaint, the federal district court's order, and judgment were filed with the state district court motions. Pase and the City argued Rhoten's claims were barred by the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion due to the federal district court's dismissal without prejudice.

During the course of subsequent proceedings on those motions, the state district court ordered Rhoten, Pase, and the City to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law. All parties complied, filing separate pleadings. The district court then heard oral arguments. During those arguments, Rhoten's counsel conceded that this court's Stanfield decision controlled whether claim preclusion applied, adding that if the district court strictly followed Stanfield, it would be required to grant defendants' motions.

The district court dismissed Rhoten's claims against Pase and the City for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court did not grant summary judgment because it held it was not considering evidence beyond the pleadings. The district court then certified its orders as a final judgment under K.S.A. 60-254(b), severing the litigation in this appeal from Rhoten's lawsuit against Dickson.

The district court held the claim preclusion doctrine barred Rhoten's state law claims because the federal due process claim arose from a common nucleus of operative facts, forming part of a single transaction or claim. The district court reasoned that because the federal due process claim reached final judgment in the federal court case, and the parties were identical, claim preclusion prevented the state law claims from resurfacing in another court action. Citing Stanfield, the state district court also held the federal court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence theories did not change this outcome.

The state district court also found Rhoten's state law claims against Pase and the City were barred by the issue preclusion doctrine. The court reasoned the causation question was common to both the state law claims and federal claims as to those particular defendants. It held the federal court's determination that there was no material question of fact as to causation between Pase's alleged actions or inactions and Rhoten's injuries was binding on plaintiff in state court. The district court held:

"I...