Deal v. State
| Decision Date | 20 January 1914 |
| Docket Number | 4791. |
| Citation | 80 S.E. 537,14 Ga.App. 121 |
| Parties | DEAL v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
"All who procure, counsel, command, aid, or abet the commission of a misdemeanor are regarded by the law as principal offenders and may be indicted as such." The manager of a social club, who orders intoxicating liquors for the use of its members, and who either directly or indirectly procures counsels, commands, aids, or abets in the making of a sale of such liquors, is guilty as a principal. This is true even though such manager may not have been present when the particular sale was made, nor had knowledge of such sale until after it was consummated.
Where a number of persons each contribute money to an agent, who purchases a stock of intoxicating liquors and thereafter dispenses, upon the order of one of such persons, a quantity of the liquor in exchange for a book of coupons which had been purchased either by such person or by the person to whom the liquor was delivered, the transaction is a sale in violation of the prohibition law, notwithstanding the persons for whose benefit the liquor was purchased composed a bona fide club, organized for social and intellectual welfare, and the use of the liquor was only an incident to the main purpose of the club, and although no profit is made on the sale. And this is true whether the persons have become incorporated as a social club or whether they constitute a voluntary association of persons for mutual pleasure and benefit.
The provisions of the general tax acts of 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 35 § 2, par. 47) and 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 42, § 2, par. 17) imposing a license upon social clubs, do not authorize such organizations to engage in the sale of intoxicating liquors.
The evidence demanded the verdict, and no material error was committed.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
A "sale" is the transmutation of property from one to another in consideration of some price, and is a transfer of property in a thing for a price in money, and is the passing of title and possession of any property for money which the buyer pays or promises to pay (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6291, 6292; see, also, vol. 8, p. 7793).
Tenants in common are those who hold by several and distinct titles, but by unity of possession (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 8, p. 6908; see, also, p. 7814).
Error from Superior Court, Lowndes County; W. E. Thomas, Judge.
B. A. Deal, Jr., was convicted of an illegal sale of liquor, and brings error. Affirmed.
E. K. Wilcox, of Valdosta, and Akerman, Akerman & McManus, of Macon, for plaintiff in error.
J. A. Wilkes, Sol. Gen., of Moultrie, for the State.
The plaintiff in error was jointly indicted with three others for selling intoxicating liquor to one Register, and excepts to a judgment overruling his motion for a new trial. The evidence shows that the accused was the manager of a social club in the city of Valdosta, which had paid the tax required by section 2, par. 17, of the general tax act of 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 42), and registered with the ordinary of the county as required by the provisions of that act. The club was conducted in connection with and as a part of a fraternal order called the Valdosta Nest 1461 of the Order of Owls. The Order of Owls is a secret order having a constitution and by-laws, together with a ritual, and the local lodge is a voluntary association of persons and a subordinate branch of the order. The purpose of the organization is the advancement of its members socially, morally, intellectually, and otherwise. The local "nest" was duly organized in 1911. Its membership is limited to certain described persons, and the members are received and elected in substantially the same manner in which members are received and elected into the usual fraternal orders. In the early part of 1912 the lodge authorized the installation of a buffet, to be run in connection with the club, and circular letters were sent out to the members, requesting those who wished to enjoy the privileges of the buffet to subscribe $5, to form an amount with which to purchase a stock of intoxicating liquors. One hundred and twenty dollars was subscribed, and with this amount a stock of intoxicating liquors was purchased. Only those members who subscribed to this fund and their guests were allowed the privilege of the buffet. The scheme adopted was to sell to the members a book of coupons which could be exchanged for liquor corresponding in value to the coupons. In exchange for these coupons, liquors were dispensed either by the drink or in bulk. The liquor thus received from the common stock might be consumed in the clubrooms or disposed of in such other way as the members saw fit. The $120 subscribed as above stated was used for the purchase of the initial stock, which was replenished from time to time with funds paid for the coupon books which were received in exchange for the liquors. Register was not a member of the club, but was introduced and registered by a member as a guest, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the club.
On the occasion referred to in the indictment, Register was accompanied to the clubrooms by a member, where a coupon book was obtained by the member and delivered to Register upon the payment by him of $1.25. This book was exchanged by Register with one of the employés of the club for a quart of whisky. It does not appear clearly from the evidence whether the sum paid by Register for the coupon book exceeded the cost of the whisky and the expenses of handling. Deal, the accused, was not present, when this transaction took place, did not actively participate in it in any way, and had no knowledge of it until some time thereafter. He was the manager of the buffet, paid a salary of $25 per month by the members, and devoted only a small part of his time to the business of the club. It was his duty to purchase the liquors kept by the club, keep the stock replenished from time to time, receive all moneys paid in by the members, and keep the accounts of the buffet, and all moneys received by him were deposited in the bank to his credit as manager, and checks on the bank were drawn by him against the fund, as manager of the club. The accused knew of the system of distribution of liquors which had been put in operation by the trustees or governors of the club, and on other occasions had issued coupon books to members and received money therefor, and knew that the coupon books were being exchanged for liquors. There was something over 100 members of the club, and the evidence shows that during a period of about six or eight months the accused deposited in the bank, from the proceeds of the sale of coupon books, a sum in excess of $20,000.
1. If the transaction with Register amounted to a sale, Deal, the accused, was equally guilty with the man who actually furnished the liquor. All who participate, either as principals or accessories, in a sale of whisky are equally guilty, because in misdemeanors there are no accessories. All who participate in the sale, either directly or indirectly, are guilty as principals. It is true that the person who furnished the liquor to Register was not an employé of the accused but was employed and paid by the club. The accused was, however, a party to the transaction. He helped to put in operation the system of distribution which had been adopted by the club. He purchased the liquor and exercised a general supervision over the affairs of the buffet. He knew that transactions similar to the one with Register were taking place every day, and it was partly through his efforts that the system was kept in operation. The fact that he did not directly participate in furnishing the liquor to Register and was absent from the clubhouse at the time, and did not know that the transaction had taken place until it was completed, will not excuse him. He helped to make it possible. He supplied the liquors with knowledge that they were to be dispensed in exchange with coupon books to members and their guests; he intended the liquors to be so dispensed; and he actively aided and abetted the scheme. He was clearly an accessory and, as such, guilty as principal. Mohrman v. State, 105 Ga. 709, 32 S.E. 143, 43 L.R.A. 398, 70 Am.St.Rep. 74. As was stated by this court in the case of Loeb v. State, 6 Ga.App. 23, 64 S.E. 338;
2. Under the law of this state, it is made penal "for any person within the limits of this state to sell or barter for valuable consideration, either directly or indirectly, * * * any alcoholic, spiritous, malt, or intoxicating liquors, or intoxicating bitters, or other drinks which, if drunk to excess, will produce intoxication." Penal Code 1910, § 426. It is therefore unlawful for any person, natural or artificial, or for any association of persons, to sell intoxicating liquors, either directly or indirectly, under any circumstances, and at any place, within the limits of this state. No scheme or device, however subtle, will serve as an evasion of this statute, if the method employed in any way involves the elements of a sale. We recognize the importance of the question raised in this case, involving, as it does, the validity of a scheme put into operation by numerous social organizations in the state having for its object the distribution of intoxicating liquors to the members and their guests, upon a plan which will be equitable to all, and under which each member will pay his...
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