Dean Jr. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 26 June 2001
• Docket Number: WD58470
• Citation: 55 S.W.3d 851
• Parties: State of Missouri, Plaintiff, Jack Price Dean, Jr., Respondent v. Quentin Wilson, Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, Appellant. WD58470 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

State of Missouri, Plaintiff, Jack Price Dean, Jr., Respondent v Quentin Wilson, Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, Appellant

WD58470

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

06/26/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Platte County, Hon. Gary Dean Witt

Counsel for Appellant: Anemarie D. Mura

Counsel for Respondent: Jeffrey D. Eastman

Opinion Summary: The Department of Revenue appeals the court's order granting expungement of records pursuant to section 577.054 RSMo 1994, as well as expungement of records of "any and all administrative action taken by the Director of Revenue."

REVERSED.

Division holds: Section 577.054 does not authorize expungement of records of administrative actions taken by the Director of Revenue. The trial court erred in directing such expungement. The judgment is reversed to the extent that it directs the expungement of recordations of administrative actions.

James M. Smart, Jr., Judge

This case involves an action to expunge records under section 577.054, RSMo 1994. The trial court in this case entered a judgment ordering expungement from the records of all information related to the arrest and guilty plea of Mr. Jack Price Dean, Jr., for driving while intoxicated in 1987, including records of "any and all administrative action taken by the Director of Revenue." The Director appeals.

Factual Background

On December 9, 1987, Dean was arrested for, and pleaded guilty to, driving while intoxicated. The Director of Revenue subsequently suspended Dean's driving privileges on the basis that he was driving with a blood alcohol level of at least .13%. Twelve years later, on December 17, 1999, Dean filed an application with the circuit court seeking expungement of the records relating to the incident under section 577.054, RSMo. Section 577.054 provides a method whereby an individual who has maintained a record free of alcohol-related driving offenses for a period of ten years or more may, with certain restrictions, obtain an order expunging "from all official records all recordations of his arrest, plea, trial or conviction." The effect of the order, according to the statute, shall be "to restore such person to the status he occupied prior to such arrest, plea or conviction and as if such event had never taken place." A person is limited to one expungement pursuant to section 577.054.

On February 14, 2000, the trial court entered its judgment ordering the expungement of the arrest and conviction records relating to Dean's DWI charge, and also ordering the expungement of the records of the Director of Revenue relating to the administrative suspension imposed pursuant to the arrest. The Director appeals from that judgment.

The Director raises one point on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in the order of expungement because section 577.054 relates only to the expungement of arrest and criminal records and does not authorize the expungement of records of administrative actions. We begin by considering the text of the statute:

After a period of not less than ten years, an individual who has pleaded guilty or has been convicted for a first alcohol-related driving offense which is a misdemeanor or a county or city ordinance violation and which is not a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and who since such date has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense may apply to the court in which he pled guilty or was sentenced for an order to expunge from all official records all recordations of his arrest, plea, trial or conviction. If the court determines, after hearing, that such person has not been convicted of any alcohol-related driving offense in the ten years prior to the date of the application for expungement, and has no other alcohol-related enforcement contacts as defined in section 302.525, RSMo, during that ten-year period, the court shall enter an order of expungement. The effect of such order shall be to restore such person to the status he occupied prior to such arrest, plea or conviction and as if such event had never taken place. No person as to whom such order has been entered shall be held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty of perjury or otherwise giving a false statement by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrest, plea, trial, conviction or expungement in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose whatsoever and no such inquiry shall be made for information relating to an expungement under this section. A person shall only be entitled to one expungement pursuant to this section. Nothing contained in this section shall prevent the director from maintaining such records as to ensure that an individual receives only one expungement pursuant to this section for the purpose of informing the proper authorities of the contents of any record maintained pursuant to this section.

Section 577.054. The Director argues that this statute, by its clear terms, deals only with records of arrests, pleas, trials and convictions. The Director notes that there is no reference in the statutory language to administrative actions taken by the Director of Revenue pursuant to sections 302.500 to 302.525. The Director also argues that because there is a specific statute, section 302.545 RSMo 1998 Cum. Supp., dealing with expungement of records of administrative actions, that statute is the exclusive remedy for the removal of such records. Section 302.545 provides that an underage offender whose driving privilege was suspended or revoked administratively is to receive expungement, with certain limitations, of "all official records and all recordations maintained by the Department of Revenue of such suspension or revocation." The expungement of the administrative record is to take place two years after the suspension or revocation occurred, or when the person attains the age of twenty-one, whichever date first occurs.²

The Director suggests that because section 302.545 provides for expungement of records in a very specific, limited instance, the General Assembly must have intended not to allow anyone else the benefit of expungement of records of administrative discipline, no matter how many years of exemplary driving have intervened. The Director argues that while section 577.054 will allow the criminal records to be expunged after ten years of exemplary driving, the General Assembly evidently wanted the Director to be able to maintain indefinitely all records of all administrative actions in all cases except those addressed by section 302.545.

The Director relies on Director of Revenue v. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) and McNally v. St. Louis County Police Dept., 17 S.W.3d 614 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000), both of which support the Director's position. In Klenke, the applicant brought an expungement action under section 577.054 in 1997. Mr. Klenke had pleaded guilty twelve years earlier in municipal court to driving while intoxicated. Since his plea, Mr. Klenke's record had been clear of alcohol-related offenses. Ultimately, the court held that Klenke, although entitled to expungement of the criminal records, was not entitled to expungement of records of his administrative discipline. In that decision, the court relied upon McNally, which was decided while the Klenke appeal was pending. Klenke, 29 S.W.3d at 393 fn. 3.

The McNally court noted that the statute by its express terms referred only to official records of an individual's "arrest, plea, trial or conviction." McNally, 17 S.W.3d at 616. The court also noted that the legislature specifically addressed the expungement of administrative records of a certain category of individuals in section 302.545. Citing Greenbrier Hills v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. banc 1996) the court noted that "[w]hen the same subject matter is addressed in general terms in one statute and in specific terms in another, the more specific controls over the more general." McNally, 17 S.W.3d at 616. Because section 302.545 applies only to persons who incurred administrative actions under the age of 21 who meet certain conditions, the court believed that construction of the statute was governed by the proposition that when a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned. Id. (citing Greenbrier Hills, 935 S.W.2d at 38, quoting Gilloti v. Hamm-Singer Corp., 396 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo. 1965).³ Thus, according to the court, section 302.545 excludes the prospect of expungement of the Director's records for persons who do not fall within the age range provided in the statute. Id. at 617. Accordingly, the court held that "there is no statutory basis to authorize expungement of petitioner's administrative suspension." Id.

The respondent, Jack Price Dean, does not agree. Dean launches an attack on the analysis in these cases, arguing that they are misguided in their approach to interpretation of the statutes. Dean argues that McNally went astray when it misinterpreted dictum from Ford v. Director of Revenue, 11 S.W.3d 106, 110 (Mo. App. 2000). Dean argues that it is erroneous to conclude that Ford interpreted section 577.054 as precluding expungement of administrative records. Dean argues that the court in Ford was simply commenting on the fact that relief under section 577.054 was not available in Ford because ten years had not elapsed since the arrest and suspension. The court in Ford stated as follows:

It is significant, in this regard, that the legislature had enacted statutes concerning expungement of records concerning arrests and alcohol related enforcement contacts, and none of those legislative enactments would entitle respondent to the relief granted by the trial court. See section 610.112., RSMo Cum. Supp 1998; 302.545 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998; and 577.054 RSMo 1994. ^{. 4} . .

Ford, 11 S.W.3d at 110. The...