Dean v. American Legion of Honor
| Decision Date | 24 May 1892 |
| Citation | 156 Mass. 435,31 N.E. 1 |
| Parties | DEAN v. AMERICAN LEGION OF HONOR. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Maxwell & Hudson, for plaintiff.
John Haskell Butler, for defendant.
The defendant in this case admits its liability to pay the sum of $3,000 under the benefit certificate declared on, but contends that its payment should be made to the beneficiary named in the certificate, or to the administrator de bonis non of the intestate, appointed by the probate court in Maine, and asks that the beneficiary and the administrator de bonis non be summoned into court, and made parties to the action, so that their rights may be determined under St.1886 c. 281. The application of the defendant was denied in the superior court, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
The question before us is whether the suit should be brought by the administrator or the beneficiary, when, by the terms of a certificate of this kind, payment is to be made to a designated beneficiary. If the beneficiary is the proper party to bring the suit, we cannot, upon the facts presented in this case, and without hearing him, decide that the designation is invalid, and that the beneficiary named in the certificate is not entitled to the fund. The plaintiff contends that Flynn v. Association, 152 Mass. 288 25 N.E. 716, in which it was held by a majority of the court that the suit should be brought by the administrator, is decisive of this case; but, while it is an authority in favor of the plaintiff, the case at bar differs from it, and, in view of recent declarations of the legislature, calls for careful consideration. In the first place, the certificate in the former case was under seal, and considerable stress was laid on that fact in the opinion. The certificate now before us recites a sealing by the supreme commander, but no seal was ever impressed upon it or affixed to it. A fac simile of the seal of the corporation was printed upon it, apparently as a part of the printed blank designed to be used by the officers in making contracts. It is held in this commonwealth that such an imprint on a paper does not make the contract written on it a sealed instrument, even though a sealing is recited. Pub.St. c. 3, § 3, cl. 19; Bates v. Railroad Co., 10 Allen, 251; Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen, 381. By St.1885, c. 183, § 5, in reference to policies or certificates of insurance on the assessment plan, payable on a contingency, it is provided that, "upon the occurrence of such contingency, unless the contract shall have been avoided by fraud or by breach of its conditions, the corporation shall be obligated to the beneficiary for such payment at the time and to the amount specified in the policy or certificate, and this indebtedness shall be a lien upon all the property, effects, and bills receivable of the corporation," etc. Here is a statute creating a liability of the corporation directly to the beneficiary in this class of cases, and the legislature evidently intended that this liability should be enforceable at law by the beneficiary without the intervention of an administrator of the deceased member. It could hardly be contended that a beneficiary cannot maintain an action to enforce an obligation, which by statute is made absolute in his favor, growing out of his relation to the corporation through the certificate of membership in which he is named a beneficiary. This statute, however, does not directly apply to the case before us, because by its terms it is inapplicable "to organizations which conduct their business as fraternal societies on a lodge system," and because the provision quoted is made to apply only to policies issued after the passage of the act. St.1885, c. 183, §§ 1, 5. But in most of its features it is almost the same as the amended statute under which the defendant is doing business, and in this particular there is every reason to think that it was intended to accomplish the same result in the same way.
The certificate under which the plaintiff claims was issued under Pub.St. c. 115, § 8, which was repealed by St.1888, c. 429. This statute was not enacted until after the death of the certificate holder in Flynn v. Association, ubi supra, and therefore it was not considered in that case. The last part of section 8 of the last-mentioned statute is as follows "Such corporation may also provide in its by-laws for the payment from time to time of a fixed sum by each member, to be paid to the beneficiaries of deceased members, in such amount and manner as shall be fixed by said by-laws and written in the benefit certificate issued to said member, and payable to the husband, wife, children, relatives of, or persons dependent upon, such member," etc. Section 9 provides that "any such corporation may hold at any one time, as a death fund belonging to the beneficiaries of anticipated deceased members,...
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