Dean v. Beckstrom
| Decision Date | 27 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-129-DLB-EBA |
| Parties | PHILLIP DEAN PETITIONER v. GARY BECKSTROM, Warden RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (R&R) (Doc. # 16), wherein he recommends that Petitioner Phillip Dean's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied. Petitioner timely filed objections to the Magistrate's R&R. (Doc. # 17). Respondent having filed no response, and the time for submitting such response having expired, the R&R and Petitioner's objections thereto are ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner's objections are overruled, and the R&R is adopted as the opinion of the Court.
On October 18, 2007, the Kenton County Circuit Court convicted Dean on charges of assault and intimidating a witness. (Doc. # 16 at 1-3). Dean did not appeal his conviction directly, but instead filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. (Id.) His motion was denied on March 12, 2009, and Dean never appealed this ruling. Thereafter, he moved the trial court to amend or correct his sentence pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR). (Id.) This motion was also denied. Dean appealed, but the Kentucky Courtof Appeals affirmed on November 11, 2011. Finally, Dean sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, and was denied yet again on August 15, 2012. (Id.)
On July 22, 2013, Dean filed the instant § 2254 petition, asserting the following four grounds for relief: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, (2) he could not have formed the requisite intent for first-degree assault because he was voluntarily intoxicated when the offense was committed, (3) it was an abuse of discretion to allow him to plead guilty to first-degree assault because the statutory elements of that offense are not supported by the facts, and (4) he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to apprise him of the elements of first-degree assault. (Doc. # 6 at 2-5).
For purposes of § 2254, procedural default occurs where a prisoner is barred from pursuing his claim any further under state law at the time his habeas petition is filed. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). In Kentucky, a motion filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42(3). Thus, a state prisoner is typically limited to one motion under RCr 11.42, and unless he can show cause and actual prejudice, he risks procedural default by failing to raise all claims for relief in state court, or through the state's ordinary appellate process. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006).
In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that grounds 1, 2 and 4 were procedurally defaulted because Dean failed to raise any of these claims in his RCr 11.42 motion; failed to appeal the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion; and never filed a direct appeal from his original judgment. (Doc. #16 at 8-9). Moreover, Dean's subsequent motion under CR 60.02was found not affect this outcome. (Doc. #16 at 9). Though grounds 1, 2 and 4 were included in his CR 60.02 motion, the Magistrate Judge saw no evidence suggesting these claims were unknown to Dean when the RCr 11.42 motion was filed. (Id.) And a claim that is omitted from a RCr 11.42 motion can only thereafter be brought under CR 60.02 if the errors involved were "unknown and could not have been known to the party by the exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court." See Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
As for ground 3, Dean insists that the statutory elements of first-degree assault are not supported by the facts because he did not use a "deadly weapon" and never manifested an "extreme indifference to the value of human life." (Doc. # 6 at 4). However, in his R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that such matters rested entirely upon state law, and were therefore improper for federal review, noting the United State Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." (Doc. # 16 at 10); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)).
Objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement." Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). "The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious." Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Poorly drafted objections, general objections, or objections that require a judge's interpretation are ineffective and insufficient to preservethe right of appeal. Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1991).
While Dean's objections to the R&R are sufficiently specific, they are without merit nonetheless. First, under the heading ...
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