Dean v. Brown
Decision Date | 06 December 1935 |
Parties | Dean v. Brown. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Appeal from Mercer Circuit Court.
C.E. RANKIN for appellant.
ERROL W. DRAFFEN for appellee.
Affirming.
This equity action was filed in the Mercer circuit court by appellee and plaintiff below, Sally Brown, against the appellant and defendant below, Miller Dean, wherein plaintiff sought specific performance of a written contract entered into between the two for the sale by her to defendant of a tract of land located in Mercer county, Ky. The answer admitted the execution of the contract sought to be enforced, but resisted the relief prayed for upon the sole ground that plaintiff's tendered deed to him did not convey a perfect title because she herself did not possess it, since the one she had was pro tanto defective for the reason set out in the answer, which incorporated as a part of it the record in the case of Dean, Adm'r, v. Dean, formerly pending in the Mercer circuit court, and which was an action for the sale of the landed estate of R.W. Dean for purposes of division of the proceeds among his heirs. The court sustained plaintiff's demurrer filed to defendant's answer, and, upon his declining to plead further, judgment was rendered sustaining the prayer of plaintiff's petition for specific performance, and, complaining of it, defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The alleged defect in plaintiff's title which she obtained under the judgment in that action was thus averred in defendant's answer:
Those allegations are sustained by the record of the division action of Dean v. Dean, supra, and to which we shall hereafter refer as the "division action." The court rendered no opinion in sustaining the demurrer to the answer, and we are not informed as to the grounds upon which that ruling was based. It will be perceived that the attack made upon the judgment in the division action is a collateral one, and it is thoroughly settled in this and all other jurisdictions, so far as we are aware, that such attacks will not be sustained for mere errors of the court in rendering the judgment attacked, since they may be corrected only by appeal. Collateral attacks are sustainable, however, when it is made to appear that the court in rendering the attacked judgment did not have jurisdiction of either the subject-matter or of the person whose rights therein were so abortively adjudicated. While lack of jurisdiction, when established by the prevailing rules of practice for that purpose, subjects the judgment rendered to collateral attack, the universal rule of practice requires that the absence of jurisdiction of the court rendering the attacked judgment must affirmatively appear of record in that proceeding. It may not be established by evidence de hors the record. Differently stated, the rule is that every presumption will be indulged in favor of a judgment that is collaterally attacked, and that the alleged invalidating fact or facts are provable only by the record itself, and they must affirmatively appear therein. Steel v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 148 Ky 429, 146 S.W. 721; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 162 Ky. 683, 173 S.W. 109, L.R.A. 1917C, 171; Caudle v. Luttrell, 183 Ky. 551, 209 S.W. 497; Potter v. Webb, 186 Ky. 25, 216 S.W. 66; Leonard v....
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