Dean v. Dean

• Decision Date: 06 April 1995
• Citation: 624 N.Y.S.2d 666,214 A.D.2d 786
• Parties: Jinnie L. DEAN, Respondent, v. Gerald DEAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 666

624 N.Y.S.2d 666

214 A.D.2d 786

Jinnie L. DEAN, Respondent, v. Gerald DEAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

April 6, 1995.

Williamson, Clune & Stevens (Robert J. Clune, of counsel), Ithaca, for appellant.

Holmberg, Galbraith, Holmberg & Orkin (Dirk A. Galbraith, of counsel), Ithaca, for respondent.

Before CARDONA, P.J., and MERCURE, WHITE, PETERS and SPAIN, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Relihan, Jr., J.) ordering, inter alia, equitable distribution of the parties' marital property, entered October 21, 1993 in Tompkins County, upon a decision of the court.

In this action for a divorce, a trial was conducted of the contested issues of equitable distribution, child support to be paid to defendant and maintenance and counsel fees to be paid to plaintiff. The essential facts, as found by Supreme Court and supported by the record, follow. The parties were married for approximately 20 years. Defendant, employed primarily as an operating engineer, had estimated total annual earnings of $48,000. Plaintiff worked two jobs, for which she earned approximately $17,500 and received a free room. The parties have two daughters, Kimberly, a full-time college student, and Danielle, a high school senior who resides with defendant. Supreme Court rendered a decision and judgment of divorce, inter alia, (1) identifying and valuing the parties' marital property and the debt attributable thereto and equally distributing the same, (2) awarding plaintiff maintenance of $400 per month for four years, (3) awarding plaintiff counsel fees of $1,000, and (4) relieving plaintiff of any child support obligation for the period commencing June 28, 1993. Defendant now appeals.

Although Supreme Court's written decision and the judgment of divorce adequately recited the essential facts underlying the controversy and identified and valued the parties' marital property and indebtedness, we agree with defendant that in resolving the parties' dispute over equitable distribution and maintenance, Supreme Court did not discharge its obligation to identify the statutory factors it relied upon and articulate the reasons for its conclusions (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d], [g]; [6][a], [b]; see also, DeSantis v. DeSantis, 205 A.D.2d 928, 613 N.Y.S.2d 737; Parks v. Parks, 159 A.D.2d 841, 552 N.Y.S.2d 987; cf., Monette v. Monette, 177 A.D.2d 802, 576 N.Y.S.2d 416). Similarly, in reaching its determination with regard to child support, Supreme Court neither applied the Child Support Standards Act (Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b] nor provided justification for any deviation therefrom (see, Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][c], [f]; Marlinghaus v. Marlinghaus, 202 A.D.2d 994, 609 N.Y.S.2d 503). In the absence of any evidence of the children's actual needs, we are precluded from fixing child support (see, Riseley v. Riseley, 208 A.D.2d 132, 136, 622 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389) and, given the interrelationship of the factors underlying awards of child support, maintenance and equitable distribution (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d][5]; [6][a][1], [6]; § 240[1-b][f] and the staleness of the record with regard to the parties' financial circumstances, it would not be advisable for us...