Dean v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2021
• Docket Number: No. 82416,82416
• Citation: 495 P.3d 526 (Table)
• Parties: Kyron DEAN, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Michael Villani, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

495 P.3d 526 (Table)

Kyron DEAN, Petitioner,

v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Michael Villani, District Judge, Respondents,andThe State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.

No. 82416

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2021

Clark County Public Defender

Attorney General/Carson City

Clark County District Attorney

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas

ORDER DENYING PETITION

Hardesty, C.J.

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying a motion to suppress.

In October 2014, petitioner Kyron Dean was arrested and charged with robbery and booked into the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) where at some point the State took a sample of his DNA pursuant to NRS 176.09123(1)(b), which requires that the State collect a DNA sample from all detainees charged with a felony. Dean's robbery charge was later dismissed without prejudice in July 2015.

In May 2017, officers from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) responded to a home break-in and theft. During the investigation, officers collected swabs of blood from the crime scene and subsequently conducted a search in the State's DNA and the national CODIS databases. The search in the national database resulted in a match with Dean's DNA profile, obtained when he was charged with robbery in 2014. Based on this result, officers obtained a search warrant to collect a second DNA sample from Dean to confirm the match. The LVMPD forensics laboratory reported that Dean's second DNA sample matched the blood from the crime scene.

The State indicted Dean on charges of grand larceny, burglary, and invasion of the home. Dean filed a motion to suppress evidence. Dean argued that the State's retention of his DNA profile was unlawful because the State failed to notify him of his right to expunge his DNA profile following the dismissal of his 2014 robbery charge. At the hearing on his motion, Julie Marschner, a forensic lab employee from the LVMPD DNA lab, testified that the DNA expungement forms are provided in the DNA kits that the State provides to all of the booking agencies that do DNA collections and that it "direct[s them] to put those in the inmate's belongings." Dean did not testify or provide an affidavit or declaration stating expressly that the State did not provide him an expungement form.

The district court denied Dean's motion after finding that the State did not provide him with an expungement form but that the State was only required to provide the form under any one of the three circumstances outlined in NRS 176.09165(2). Thus, because Dean did not make a written request to the Central Repository for the destruction of his biological specimen, one of the three circumstances under NRS 176.09165(2), the district court denied his motion. Dean filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus in this court requesting that we order the district court to grant his motion to suppress the DNA evidence linking him to the 2017 burglary.

We will issue a traditional writ of mandamus if the petitioner shows that (1) he or she is legally entitled to the act the writ seeks to enforce, (2) the district court is under a "legal duty" to perform the act sought, and (3) there is no other adequate legal remedy available besides having the writ granted. Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court , 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194, 1196 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Where a district court is entrusted with discretion on an issue, the petitioner's burden to demonstrate a clear legal right to a particular course of action by that court is substantial. ..." Id. "Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, this court does not typically employ it where ordinary means, already afforded by law, permit the correction of alleged errors." Id. at 1197.

Alternatively, we will "grant[ advisory] mandamus relief where a petitioner present[s] ‘legal issues of statewide importance requiring clarification, and [its] decision ... [will] promote[ ] judicial economy and administration by assisting other jurists, parties, and lawyers.’ " Id. at 1198 (quoting MDC Rests., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 134 Nev. 315, 319, 419 P.3d 148, 152 (2018) ). "A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted, and whether to consider a writ of mandamus is ultimately within this court's discretion." Cameron v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 214, 216, 445 P.3d 843, 844 (2019) (citation omitted).

We conclude that Dean fails to meet the requirements for a traditional writ of mandamus. Although the district court summarily found that the State did not provide Dean with the expungement form, that finding is unsupported by the record. See State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 485, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013) (providing that we review a district court's factual findings "for clear error"). The State presented evidence to demonstrate that it is the detention center's policy to provide all released detainees with the expungement form, and Dean failed to prove otherwise. See One 1970 Chevrolet Motor Vehicle v . Cty. of Nye , 90 Nev. 31,...