Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 16 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1816,87-1816 |
| Citation | 528 So.2d 432,13 Fla. L. Weekly 1422 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1422 Roger H. DEAN, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. MOD PROPERTIES, LTD., etc., Appellee/Cross Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Dykes C. Everett of Winderweedle, Haines, Ward & Woodman, P.A., Winter Park, for appellant-cross appellee.
Joseph E. Foster of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, for appellee/cross appellant.
Appellee, MOD Properties, Inc., was the owner of a trapezoidal shaped parcel of land fronting about 400 feet on the east side of Highway 17 and 92 and running back east about 852-984 feet when, in 1974, it executed to the City of Sanford a "Road Right-of-Way Easement" eighty feet wide, described by metes and bounds, running from the highway easterly through the parcel of land. The document is titled an easement and expressly provides that the described land was conveyed "for the full purpose of road right-of-way," stating:
The Grantor does hereby dedicate the herein above described property for public road right-of-way purposes to The City of Sanford, general public, however, reserving at all times to MOD Properties, Ltd., a Florida Limited Partnership, its successors or assigns the reversion or reversions thereof whenever said road right-of-way shall be abandoned or discontinued by law.
The City of Sanford never opened, improved, or otherwise used this right-of-way easement.
In 1984, appellee MOD conveyed to Donald J. Bales by warranty deed the entire parcel "less and except the following described easement," (emphasis added) specifically describing the land described in the easement given the City of Sanford. In a similar manner, Donald J. Bales and wife conveyed to Horne Properties, Inc., which company on January 15, 1985, in like manner conveyed to appellant Roger H. Dean.
In September 1985, the City of Sanford by ordinance formally expressed its intention to abandon the road right-of-way in question. The City may have in fact abandoned the easement prior to the ordinance. In September, 1985, appellant Dean constructed a car dealership on said parcel, much of the improvements being in the area described in the easement to the City of Sanford.
Appellee MOD sued appellant Dean for possession of the land described in the right-of-way, alleging in effect that MOD had reserved to itself the eighty foot strip from its conveyance to Bales and that by virtue of the reservation language in its conveyance to the City and the City's abandonment, MOD was the owner in fee of said eighty foot strip of land.
The trial court found (1) that the City of Sanford had, not by ordinance but in fact, abandoned the easement which abandonment caused the fee simple title to the eighty foot strip to revert to appellee MOD and not to appellant Dean as adjoining land owner; (2) that MOD owned the fee simple title to the eighty foot strip; and (3) that appellant Dean constructed his improvements in the belief that he owned the eighty foot strip, which constituted an equitable basis for ordering MOD to convey the strip to Dean for its fair market value which the court found to be $128,000. Accordingly, the trial court entered a money judgment in favor of MOD and against Dean for $128,000 and ordered MOD to convey the eighty foot strip to Dean. Both parties appeal.
Ownership of land, or an ownership interest in land, constitutes an "estate" as distinguished from an easement, which is the right in one other than the owner of the land to use land for some particular purpose or purposes. An easement, or right to use land not owned, is more in the nature of a claim or encumbrance against the title to the land than it is in the nature of title to, or an estate in, the land itself. Land, an estate in which is being created or conveyed, is often legally described by metes and bounds, and, likewise, the area of land the use of which is being created, granted, or reserved as an easement is often described by metes and bounds. Similarly, the same words of limitation generally used to create or convey an estate in land, although not necessarily required, are commonly used to create or convey an easement. The owner of land...
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