Dean v. Olibas

• Decision Date: 19 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-4245,96-4245
• Citation: 129 F.3d 1001
• Parties: Michael Wayne DEAN, Appellee, v. Pascual Q. OLIBAS, doing business as Freedom Bail Bonds, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1001

129 F.3d 1001

Michael Wayne DEAN, Appellee, v. Pascual Q. OLIBAS, doing business as Freedom Bail Bonds, Appellant.

No. 96-4245.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 11, 1997.

Decided Nov. 19, 1997.

Michael D. Peek, Texarkana, TX, argued, for Appellant.

Gregory C. Sandefur, Texarkana, TX, argued, for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge ¹, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

A man was arrested for driving while intoxicated in Ward County, Texas, on February 12, 1994. He convinced the police that he was Michael Wayne Dean. He also convinced a bail bonding company operated by the defendant, Pascual Olibas. The company posted a $1,500 bond to secure "Michael Dean's" release from jail. Regrettably, the man turned out not to be who he claimed.

The man was probably Michael Dean's brother, Lee Dean Jr. He failed to appear in court at his hearing on the DWI charge. Ward County then instituted proceedings against Olibas to collect on the $1,500 bond, prompting Olibas to begin searching for Michael Dean. Michael Dean, the plaintiff in this case, contends that at some point in his search Olibas learned that he was not the man who had been arrested for the DWI. Olibas denies this. In any event, Olibas eventually located Dean in Arkansas and filed an Affidavit of Intention to Surrender Accused, naming Dean as the accused, with an Arkansas court. The Arkansas police then arrested Dean pursuant to a warrant that was based on Olibas's affidavit. The charges against Dean were later dismissed.

Dean subsequently brought this suit against Olibas for causing his arrest, claiming malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and violation of his civil rights. Dean filed suit in Arkansas state court, and the case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. It was tried before a jury, which found Olibas liable on each of the three claims and awarded Dean $5,000 in compensatory damages and $70,000 in punitive damages. The District Court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's determinations and also awarded Dean $18,556.25 in attorney fees and $1,011.17 in costs. Olibas now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Olibas's first contention is that the District Court incorrectly denied his motion to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Olibas, a citizen of Texas, maintains that the District Court in Arkansas had no jurisdiction over him because he had insufficient contacts with that state. We review rulings on questions of personal jurisdiction de novo. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), in a diversity action a federal district court has personal jurisdiction to the same extent as a state court of the state in which it sits (unless some other federal rule applies, but none does here). The jurisdiction of Arkansas courts is governed by the Arkansas long-arm statute, which, at the time Dean filed his claim, ² stated that "[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person ... as to a (cause of action) (claim for relief) arising from the person's: (a) Transacting any business in this state." Ark.Code Ann. § 16-4-101(C)(1)(a) (Michie 1994). The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the purpose of this provision "is to permit Arkansas courts to exercise the maximum in personam jurisdiction allowable by due process." Szalay v. Handcock, 307 Ark. 232, 819 S.W.2d 684, 686 (1991). Accordingly, we must determine whether jurisdiction over Olibas was consistent with due process.

Due process requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is met where "the defendant has purposely directed its activities at forum residents, and the litigation results from injuries arising out of, or relating to, those activities." Burlington Indus., 97 F.3d at 1103; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). In this case, Olibas purposely directed his activities at Michael Dean and Arkansas in several ways. He made numerous phone calls to Arkansas while trying to locate Dean. He made a personal visit to Arkansas in his attempt to track Dean down. Most important, Olibas submitted to an Arkansas court an Affidavit of Intention to Surrender Accused that requested Dean's arrest. This led directly to Dean's arrest, which led directly to the present litigation. In sum, Olibas intentionally made many contacts with Arkansas in his pursuit of Dean, and those contacts caused this lawsuit. The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over him.

Olibas next argues that the District Court wrongly denied his motion for judgment as a matter of law on each of the three claims. We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking Co., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir.1996). A party should be granted judgment as a matter of law only if no reasonable jury could find against him. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). We will address each claim in turn.

Malicious Prosecution: Under Arkansas law, a plaintiff claiming to have suffered malicious prosecution must prove: "(1) a proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (4) malice on the part of the defendant; and (5) damages." Harmon v. Carco Carriage Corp., 320 Ark. 322, 895 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1995). Olibas contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim because no reasonable jury could find that he lacked probable cause to initiate proceedings against Dean. He asserts that he unquestionably had probable cause because charges were pending against Michael Dean and a warrant had been issued for his arrest. To assess the merit of Olibas's argument, we must examine the meaning of probable cause under Arkansas law.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas defines probable cause as "a state of facts or credible information which would induce an ordinarily cautious person to believe that the accused is guilty of the crimes charged." Id. That court has explained that ordinary caution is "a standard of reasonableness which presents an issue for the jury when the proof is in dispute or subject to different interpretations." Cox v. McLaughlin, 315 Ark. 338, 867 S.W.2d 460, 464 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case the jury reasonably could have found that an ordinarily cautious person in Olibas's position would have thought that Michael Dean was not guilty. Indeed, the jury reasonably could have found that Olibas actually knew that Dean was innocent. Dean's father testified that Olibas told him Dean was not the man he sought. Dean's stepmother testified that Olibas told her exactly the same thing. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the jury acted reasonably in finding that Olibas did not have probable cause to arrest Dean. The judgment of liability for malicious prosecution is affirmed.

False Imprisonment: False imprisonment is "the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another consisting of detention without sufficient legal authority." Headrick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark. 433, 738 S.W.2d 418, 420 (1987). Olibas argues that he is shielded from liability for false imprisonment because Dean was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant. His position is supported by Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that " '[o]ne who instigates or participates in a lawful arrest, as for example an arrest made under a properly issued warrant by an officer charged with the duty of enforcing it, may become liable for malicious prosecution, ... or for abuse of process, ... but he is not liable for false imprisonment.' " Id. (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A cmt. b (1965)). ³ This principle applies even where the person instigating the arrest does so maliciously. See Campbell v. Hyde, 92 Ark. 128, 122 S.W. 99, 101 (1909). Because Dean was arrested pursuant to a properly issued warrant, Olibas is not liable for false imprisonment for causing his arrest. The judgment on this claim is reversed.

Violation of Civil Rights: The Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 provides that a person who, acting under color of law, deprives another of rights secured by the Arkansas Constitution shall be liable to the person whose rights he violates. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-123-105(a) (Michie Supp.1995). Olibas contends that he was not acting under color of law when he filed the affidavit that led to Dean's arrest. The Arkansas Civil Rights Act states that a court applying it may look to federal decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "which decisions and act shall have persuasive authority only." Ark.Code Ann. § 16-123-105(c). No Arkansas court has yet construed the Arkansas act, so we shall be persuaded by federal law.

To occur under color of law, conduct causing the deprivation of a civil right must be "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753-54, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for analyzing whether conduct fits that description. We first must ask "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority," and if so we then determine if "the private party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2082-83, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). In this case the...