Dean v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-193,92-193 |
| Citation | 865 P.2d 601 |
| Parties | Jay M. DEAN, Sr., Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Lee E. Christian, Fort Collins, CO, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Larry M. Donovan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.
Appellant Jay Dean, Sr. appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of wrongful taking or disposing of property; one count of removing, changing, altering, or obliterating a vehicle identification number; and one count each of conspiracy to commit those same acts. Appellant, through appellate counsel, raises issues concerning the introduction of prior bad acts evidence, admission of evidence gained from allegedly improper searches, prosecutorial misconduct, admission of hearsay and irrelevant evidence, and denial of a speedy trial. In his pro se brief, appellant additionally asserts he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and the right to defend in person and by counsel.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
In his brief prepared by counsel, appellant presents these issues:
1. Did the Trial Court err in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the prior bad acts of the Appellant?
2. Was evidence gained from an illegal search and seizure improperly admitted?
3. Was Appellant denied a fair trial by numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct?
4. Was the admission of excessive hearsay and irrelevant evidence error?
5. Did the prosecution's violation of discovery orders lead to the use of evidence that should have been excluded?
6. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to dismiss on the grounds of denial of speedy trial?
Pro se, appellant raises the following additional issues:
1. Was Appellant denied effective assistance of trial counsel?
2. Was Appellant denied the right to defend in person and by counsel?
3. Did both the trial court and defense fail to advise Appellant of his constitutional rights, and fail to allow Appellant the opportunity to assert his constitutional rights?
Responding to appellant's brief prepared by counsel, the state rephrased the issues in this way:
I. Did the trial court correctly allow introduction of evidence concerning prior bad acts of the appellant?
II. Was evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure admitted into evidence against appellant?
III. Was appellant's right to a fair trial violated as a result of prosecutorial misconduct?
IV. Was appellant denied a fair trial as the result of the introduction of excessive hearsay, irrelevant evidence, and evidence produced in violation of the court's discovery order?
V. Was the appellant denied his right to a speedy trial?
The state responded to appellant's pro se brief with these issues:
I. Was appellant denied the effective assistance of trial counsel?
II. Was appellant denied the right to defend in person and by counsel?
III. Did the trial court and defense counsel fail to provide appellant the opportunity to assert his constitutional rights?
This case presents us with the alleged involvement of appellant and his son, Jay Dean, Jr., in a conspiracy to steal vehicles, alter their vehicle identification numbers (VIN's), and subsequently resell the vehicles. Three vehicles were involved: a 1989 Ford Super Duty flat bed truck; a 1988 Ford van stolen from a dealership in Fort Collins, Colorado The investigation of the alleged conspiracy began in September, 1990, following a hit and run collision involving Jay Dean, Jr. when he hit several vehicles and then crashed his 1985 F350 Ford truck into a building. After the accident, the truck was towed and impounded. The towing company owner towed the truck to his shop and then examined the truck to ascertain its ownership. He found the truck was registered to Jay Dean (no designation of Jr. or Sr.) and, due to certain characteristics of the truck, determined the truck could not be a 1985 Ford truck. He alerted the authorities of his suspicions. Close inspection revealed the truck was a 1989 Ford truck and the truck's VIN's had been altered to disguise the vehicle as a 1985 F350 Ford.
and a 1986 Ford van stolen from a Ford dealership in LaPorte, Indiana.
A Wyoming Highway Patrol Officer executed a search warrant on the truck and discovered a slide hammer and a modified screwdriver, tools commonly used in the theft of vehicles. The officer also found other incriminating items including: numerous titles for other vehicles, all in the name of Jay Dean (again no designation of Jr. or Sr.); a VIN plate, name plates, and number plates for a Saab motor vehicle; and several roset rivets, specialized fasteners used to affix VIN plates to vehicles.
Investigation of the titles found in the impounded truck led authorities to a 1982 Ford van which had been transferred from Jay Dean to Clyde Young, a man from Casper, Wyoming. Mr. Young reported purchasing the van from appellant and his son for $5,500. Upon inspection, investigators determined the van was not a 1982 Ford van, but rather a 1988 Ford van which had been stolen one year earlier from a Ford dealership in Fort Collins, Colorado. The van's VIN's had been altered to convert the van into a 1982 Ford van.
On October 25, 1990, a fire destroyed the garage where appellant and his son purportedly stored and repaired vehicles. After the fire was extinguished the garage was inspected, and the charred remains of a 1986 van were discovered. The van was identified as one stolen from a Ford dealership in LaPorte, Indiana.
On November 13, 1990, a criminal complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for appellant's arrest. Appellant first appeared in Wyoming court on July 29, 1991; it is not clear from the record what caused the delay between the issuance of the warrant and appellant's first appearance--it appears appellant was living in Arizona at the time the warrant issued, and that caused the delay. On August 20, 1991, a preliminary hearing was held, after which appellant was bound over to district court. Appellant was arraigned on August 30, 1991, and he entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.
On March 4, 1992, appellant filed a motion in limine requesting exclusion of evidence including certain hearsay testimony and appellant's 1983 conviction in federal court for alteration of vehicle identification numbers. Appellant also filed two motions to suppress on March 4, 1992. The motions sought suppression of evidence seized in the searches of the Ford truck and the burned building and property.
The record contains no ruling on appellant's motions in limine and motions to suppress, but appellant renewed his objections at trial. The district court overruled appellant's objections and admitted the evidence seized in the searches of the Ford truck and the burned building and property. The district court also overruled appellant's objections to introduction of prior bad acts evidence, although without articulating a basis for its ruling or specifying the particular purpose for which the evidence was being admitted.
Appellant's trial began on March 9, 1992, and on March 13, 1992, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of all four counts charged. He was sentenced to serve not less than six nor more than ten years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
We address first the issue whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.--Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
appellant's 1983 federal conviction for alteration of vehicle identification numbers. Appellant contends that the evidence referring to his prior conviction was inadmissible under Wyo.R.Evid. 404(b), which reads in pertinent part:
We recently commented upon the rationale for restricting evidence of other crimes or "bad acts," and when that rationale demands exclusion of such evidence. We noted,
[i]ts intent is to avoid a demand that an accused defend acts of misconduct other than those charged in the indictment or information and to avoid potential confusion by members of the jury in addressing the issues of the case. The rule demands convictions are to be founded in those facts relevant to the crime or crimes charged. If the thrust of evidence of prior bad acts is only to demonstrate the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes, the evidence should be excluded.
Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 108 (Wyo.1992).
We afford great deference to the trial court's determination of admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. As long as a legitimate basis exists for the trial judge's ruling, we will not find an abuse of discretion. Wehr, 841 P.2d at 108; Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848, 851 (Wyo.1990). However, this discretion is not without limits. This court has adopted a five-part test to determine admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. The factors we consider are
1. The extent to which the prosecution plainly, clearly, and convincingly can prove the other similar crimes;
2. The remoteness in time of those crimes from the charged offense;
3. The extent to which the evidence of other crimes is introduced for a purpose sanctioned by W.R.E. 404(b);
4. The extent to which the element of the charged offense, that the evidence is introduced to prove, is actually at issue;
5. The extent to which the prosecution has a substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the other crimes.
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