Dean v. Superior Court (Lever)
Decision Date | 24 March 1998 |
Docket Number | No. G023111,G023111 |
Citation | 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 70,62 Cal.App.4th 638 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2165, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2970 John F. DEAN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent; Rosalyn LEVER et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
Petitioner, a candidate for local office, seeks extraordinary writ relief mandating the Registrar of Voters delete part of an opponent's candidate statement as an impermissible personal attack on petitioner. We issue relief and conclude the superior court erred in not ordering the deletion.
Darrell Opp seeks to unseat the incumbent petitioner, John Dean, as county superintendent of schools in the upcoming June 1998 election. Opp submitted a candidate statement to the Registrar of Voters which began with the following three paragraphs commenting on petitioner: 1
Dean challenged Opp's candidate statement by seeking a writ of mandate in the superior court pursuant to Elections Code section 13313. 2 That section authorizes the court to mandate amendment or deletion of material in the voter's pamphlet which is "false, misleading, or inconsistent with the requirements of this chapter;...."
Dean sought relief on two grounds: (1) deletion of the first three paragraphs (quoted above) "because they consist entirely of material that is not permitted to be included in a candidate's statement" and (2) deletion of four false and misleading sentences in the second and third paragraphs of the statement. The trial court denied the request to delete the first three paragraphs in their entirety, but did direct amendments to the second and third paragraphs. 3 The only issue presented here is whether the lower court erred in refusing to delete the first three paragraphs in their entirety.
Section 13307 delineates the contents of a candidate's statement for local office, as well as the procedures for inclusion of such a statement in the voter's pamphlet. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
"[T]he interpretation and applicability of a statute is a question of law." (City of Petaluma v. County of Sonoma (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1244, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 617.) In reviewing petitioner's claim, we are guided by well settled rules of statutory interpretation. The most fundamental of these rules is that where the statute is clear, the "plain meaning" rule applies. The Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. (Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.) "If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature...." (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.)
The language of section 13307 is unambiguous. "The statement may include the name, age and occupation of the candidate and a brief description ... of the candidate's education and qualifications...." As noted by the Supreme Court in Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975, 4 (4 Cal.4th at p. 489, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975, emphasis in original.)
Opp argues Clark is distinguishable because section 13308, which governs judicial elections, contains specific limitations prohibiting comments on another candidate's qualifications, character or activities. Clark first found the implied intent to limit the statement from the same words used in the statute we review here. The additional language specific to judicial elections demonstrates additional express intent. But express intent is unnecessary here under the maxim expressio unius...
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