Deanda v. Koenig

• Decision Date: 27 August 2021
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-01029 WBS KJN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: SANTINO ZECHRIAH DEANDA, Petitioner, v. C. KOENIG, Warden, Respondent.

SANTINO ZECHRIAH DEANDA, Petitioner, v. C. KOENIG, Warden, Respondent.

No. 2:18-cv-01029 WBS KJN

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 27, 2021

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2012 conviction for numerous sex offenses involving his stepdaughter and for child pornography. Petitioner was sentenced to 85 years-to-life plus 13 years in state prison. Petitioner claims the following: denial of his right to a speedy trial (ground 2); denial of the right to an impartial jury (ground 3); lack of confrontation by all witnesses (ground 4); not all favorable witnesses to the defense were presented (ground 5); ineffective assistance of counsel (ground 6); and denial of the right to counsel of choice (ground 7). After careful review of the record, this court concludes that the petition should be denied.

II. Procedural History

On April 26, 2012, a jury found petitioner guilty of four counts of oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or under (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288.7(b) [counts 5-8]), one count of sodomy with a child 10 years of age or under (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288.7(a) [count 10]), attempted sodomy with a child (Cal. Pen. § 664/288.7(a) [count 9]), lewd act with a child under 14 years of age (Cal. Pen. Code § 288(a) [count 4]), exhibiting lewd material to a minor (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288.2(a) [count 1]), causing a minor to pose/model for pornography (Cal. Pen. Code, § 311.4(c) [count 2]), and possession of obscene matter depicting a minor with intent to distribute (Cal. Pen. Code, § 311.1(a) [count 3]). (2 LD 2 at 31-34; 2 LD 8 at 39-43.)^[1] On June 1, 2012, petitioner was sentenced to 85 years-to-life plus a determinate consecutive term of 13 years in state prison. (1 LD 1; 2 LD 8 at 71-85.)

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on February 21, 2017. (1 LD 2; 2 LD 12.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court (1 LD 3), which was denied on April 26, 2017. (1 LD 4.)

On April 24, 2018, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (1 LD 5; 2 LD 14.) The following day, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. (ECF No. 1.)

On August 15, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied the habeas petition. (1 LD 6.)

In January 2019, respondent moved to dismiss the instant federal habeas petition as a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims. (ECF No. 9.) On June 7, 2019, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations, determining claims 1, 8 and 9 were unexhausted and should be dismissed, but that claims 2 through 7 could proceed as those claims had been exhausted in the state courts. (ECF No. 20 at 4-8.)

District Judge William J. Shubb issued an order adopting the findings and recommendations in full on July 22, 2019. (ECF No. 22.)

Thereafter, on August 12, 2019, respondent filed an answer to the exhausted claims (grounds 2-7). (ECF No. 25.) Petitioner did not file a traverse or reply to respondent's answer.

III. Facts

Petitioner was found guilty of ten sexual offenses involving sexual acts and child pornography involving his wife's ten-year-old daughter. Specific facts will be addressed as to each claim where necessary.

IV. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44-45 (2011)); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.^[2] Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its ‘independent review of the legal question,' is left with a ‘“firm conviction”' that the state court was ‘“erroneous”'”). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

If the state court's decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner's claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues raised”).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on petitioner's claims rejects some claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298 (2013) (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at...