Price v. Vincent
Decision Date | 19 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-524.,02-524. |
Citation | 538 U.S. 634 |
Parties | PRICE, WARDEN v. VINCENT. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
At respondent's trial on an open murder charge, defense counsel moved, at the close of the prosecution's case in chief and outside the jury's hearing, for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. The trial judge stated that second-degree murder was "`an appropriate charge,'" 292 F. 3d 506, 508, but agreed to hear the prosecutor's statement on first-degree murder the next morning. When the prosecution made the statement, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion the previous day, and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict, and noted that the jury had not been told of his statement. He subsequently submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted respondent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented respondent's prosecution for first-degree murder. Reversing in turn, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Respondent then notified the court of a docket sheet entry stating: "`1 open murder to 2nd degree murder,'" id., at 512. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to reconsider its decision. Respondent filed a federal habeas petition, and the Federal District Court granted the petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Respondent did not meet the statutory requirements for habeas relief. The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, and respondent is therefore entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" this Court's clearly established precedents. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The Sixth Circuit recited this standard but then forgot to apply it, reviewing the double jeopardy question de novo. This was error. A state-court decision is "contrary to" this Court's clearly established law if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at" a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 405-406. Here, the Michigan Supreme Court identified, and reaffirmed the principles articulated in, the applicable precedents of United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, and Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140. Nowhere did it apply a legal standard contrary to those set forth in this Court's cases, nor did it confront a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those in any case decided by this Court. The state court's decision therefore was not "contrary to" this Court's precedents. Nor was the state court's decision an "unreasonable application" of clearly established law. That court applied both Martin Linen and Smalis to conclude that the judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. In reaching this conclusion, in addition to reviewing the context and substance of the trial judge's comments at length, the court observed that there was no formal judgment or order entered on the record. While it noted that formal motions or rulings were not required to demonstrate finality as a matter of Michigan law, it cautioned that a judgment must bear sufficient indicia of finality and it concluded that sufficient indicia were not present here. This was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Indeed, numerous courts have refused to find double jeopardy violations under similar circumstances. Even if this Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise. Pp. 638-643.
292 F. 3d 506, reversed.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
Arthur A. Busch argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Janet A. Van Cleve, Assistant Attorney General, Donald A. Kuebler, John C. Schlinker, Dale A. DeGarmo, and Michael A. Tesner.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Sri Srinivasan, and Joel M. Gershowitz.
David A. Moran, by appointment of the Court, 537 U. S. 1186, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Randy E. Davidson.*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief to respondent Duyonn Andre Vincent after concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, barred his conviction for first-degree murder. Vincent v. Jones, 292 F. 3d 506 (2002). Because this decision exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we granted the petition for certiorari, 537 U. S. 1099 (2002), and now reverse.
In an altercation between two groups of youths in front of a high school in Flint, Michigan, Markeis Jones was shot and killed. Respondent was arrested in connection with the shooting and was charged with open murder. At the close of the prosecution's case in chief and outside the hearing of the jury, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The trial judge stated:
Before court adjourned, the prosecutor asked to make a brief statement regarding first-degree murder the following morning. Ibid. The trial judge agreed to hear it.
When the prosecution made the statement, however, defense counsel objected. The defense argued that the court had granted its motion for a directed verdict as to first-degree murder the previous day, and that further prosecution on that charge would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ibid. The judge responded, "`Oh, I granted a motion but I have not directed a verdict.'" Id., at 509. He noted that the jury had not been informed of his statements, and said that he would reserve a ruling on the matter. Subsequently, he decided to permit the charge of first-degree murder to be submitted to the jury. Ibid.
The jury convicted respondent of first-degree murder, and respondent appealed. Ibid. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial judge had directed a verdict on the charge and that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented respondent's prosecution for first-degree murder. People v. Vincent, 215 Mich. App. 458, 546 N. W. 2d 662 (1996). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It noted that "a judge's characterization of a ruling and the form of the ruling may not be controlling" for purposes of determining whether a ruling terminated jeopardy. People v. Vincent, 455 Mich. 110, 119, 565 N. W. 2d 629, 632 (1997) (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571, n. 9 (1977)). The State Supreme Court then reviewed the context and substance of the trial judge's comments, and concluded that the comments were not sufficiently final to constitute a judgment of acquittal terminating jeopardy. After the Michigan Supreme Court's decision, respondent discovered that the Clerk had made the following entry on the docket sheet: "" 292 F. 3d, at 512; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Respondent moved the State Supreme Court to reconsider its judgment in light of this statement. The motion was denied without opinion. Judgt. order reported at 456 Mich. 1201, 568 N. W. 2d 670 (1997).
Respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. That court determined that respondent's prosecution for first-degree murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, and it granted his petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 292 F. 3d 506 (2002), and this petition ensued.
A habeas petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The double jeopardy claim in respondent's habeas petition arises out of the same set of facts upon which he based his direct appeal, and the State Supreme Court's holding that no double jeopardy violation occurred therefore constituted an adjudication of this claim on the merits. Thus, under § 2254(d), respondent is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
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