Dearborn v. Washington Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 30 December 1895
• Citation: 13 Wash. 345,42 P. 1107
• Parties: DEARBORN ET AL. v. WASHINGTON SAV. BANK. WATSON ET AL. v. SHEAFE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

42 P. 1107

13 Wash. 345

DEARBORN ET AL. v. WASHINGTON SAV. BANK.

WATSON ET AL. v. SHEAFE.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 30, 1895

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. Osborn, Judge.

Action by W. W. Dearborn and others against the Washington Savings Bank to procure appointment of a receiver for said bank. C M. Sheafe was appointed receiver, and T. P. Watson and others petitioned to have a deposit in such bank declared a special deposit. From an order granting the petition, the receiver appeals. Reversed.

Clise &amp King, for appellant.

Donworth & Howe, for respondents.

HOYT C.J.

Substantially the only question of fact involved in the decision of this cause was as to the nature of a deposit made by the respondent T. P. Watson in the Washington Savings Bank, of which the appellant is now the receiver. The trial court found that this deposit was a special one, and that the title to the money deposited never passed to the bank; that it held it in trust for said Watson, for certain purposes. If there is evidence to sustain this finding, certain important questions of law as to the tracing of trust funds must be decided. If the evidence does not sustain such finding, and if, notwithstanding it, it is here determined that the deposit was a general one, so that the title to the money passed to the bank, it will not be necessary to decide any of the disputed questions of law, for the reason that it is conceded that if such was the nature of the deposit the judgment must be reversed, and the petition denied. It is with reluctance that this court interferes with a finding of fact by a trial court, but, even in an action at law, such a finding will not be allowed to stand if the testimony is overwhelming upon the other side; and in a case of equitable cognizance, like the one under consideration, such finding must be set aside if the preponderance of evidence is clearly against it.

It is not possible in this opinion to go at any length into the proofs upon which we have come to a conclusion as to the nature of this deposit. We must be satisfied with stating such conclusion, and briefly referring to some of the evidence which has induced it. Substantially the only testimony tending to show that the money, when deposited, was received by the bank as a special deposit, was that of the respondent Watson, and upon such testimony the finding of the superior court must have been founded; for, while it is true that certain other statements and circumstances were relied upon, they were none of them of such a character that they could not have consistently existed if the deposit had been a general one. To meet this proof there was little positive testimony. The president of the bank, with whom the business was transacted, was unable to state the circumstances connected with such deposit; and if there had not appeared in the proofs certain papers which had been delivered by the bank to said respondent, and others signed by him and delivered to it, his testimony would not be...