Deas v. Mel's Taxi LLC
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 08-00534 HG-LEK |
| Parties | LYNN DEAS, Plaintiff, v. MEL'S TAXI, LLC, a Hawaii corporation; ALEXANDER KAPELA, individually and DOES 1 to 10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
(DOCS. 66 & 71)
Plaintiff Lynn Deas suffers from myasthenia gravis and muscular dystrophy, requiring her to use a wheelchair. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Alexander Kapela, a taxicab driver, discriminated against her by refusing to transport her pursuant to Hawaiian Revised Statute § 347-13. She additionally claims that Defendant Kapela negligently disabled her motorized wheelchair while removing it from the taxicab causing emotional distress and limited ambulatory capability.
Defendants Kapela and Mel's Taxi, LLC, both move for partial summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's counts. Both Defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On December 18, 2009, this Court denied Defendant Alexander Kapela's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant Mel's Taxi, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Plaintiff Lynn Deas leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 53.)
On January 25, 2010, Plaintiff filled the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 55.)
On August 18, 2010, Defendant Mel's Taxi, LLC, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 66), and a Separate and Concise Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support, (Doc. 68). On the same date, Defendant Alexander Kapela also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 71), and a Separate and Concise Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support, (Doc. 73).
On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed Oppositions, (Docs. 79 & 81), and two Separate and Concise Statements of Undisputed Facts in Support, (Docs. 80 & 82).
On September 21, 2010, Defendants filed Replies. (Docs. 84 & 86.)
On October 5, 2010, this matter came on for hearing and the Court ruled from the bench. This Order memorializes the Court's October 5, 2010 ruling.
The following is undisputed by the parties:
Plaintiff Lynn Deas suffers from myasthenia gravis and muscular dystrophy, requiring her to use a wheelchair. (Plaintiff's Concise Statement, Declaration of Lynn Deas ("Deas Decl.") at 1 10 (Doc. 82).) On November 27, 2006, Plaintiff arrived at Kona International Airport with her husband Rich Kasprowicz and friend Judith Schulman. (First Amended Complaint at 1 8 (Doc. 55).) Defendant Alexander Kapela, a taxicab driver, was first in the airport taxicab rotation when the dispatcher called for a taxicab to transport the group to their hotel. (Defendants' Concise Statements, Declaration of Alexander Kapela ("Kapela Decl.") at 11 5-6 (Docs. 68 & 73); Plaintiff's Concise Statement, Exhibit 1, Telephonic Deposition of Lynn Davis Deas ("Deas Depo.")at pp. 32-33 (Doc. 82).) Defendant Kapela initially offered to provide transportation to Plaintiff. Airport security and Plaintiff's husband placed Plaintiff's motorized wheelchair into Defendant's taxicab trunk. (Kapela Depo. at p. 18 (Docs. 68 & 73); First Amended Complaint at 1 10).) The loading process took several minutes as airport security attempted to retrieve a rope to secure the wheelchair into the trunk. (Kapela Depo. at p. 22 ln. 5-25 (Docs. 68 & 73); Deas Depo. at p. 43 ln. 10-25 (Doc. 82).)
The remaining events are in dispute. Plaintiff asserts that her motorized wheelchair fit in the taxicab trunk. (Deas Decl. at ¶ 14 (Doc. 82).) According to Plaintiff, at some point during the loading process, Defendant Kapela "lost his temper" and refused to transport her and her wheelchair. (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 12 (Doc. 55).) She alleges that Defendant Kapela removed the wheelchair from the trunk in a manner that rendered it inoperable and ordered her to exit the taxicab. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff submitted an airport security report that suggests Defendant attempted to drive away from the airport but was apprehended by airport security. (Plaintiff's Concise Statement, Declaration of H. Shan Wirt, Exhibit 2, Airport Security Incident Report (Doc. 82).) Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work as a professional bridge instructor and competitor for seven months because she was unable to use her motorized wheelchair. (Deas Decl. at 11 30, 36-45 (Doc. 82).) She states that during the seven month period, as a result of using her manual wheelchair, she lost mobility, lost independence, and developed serious depression. (Id. at 11 3034, 46-47.)
Defendants claim that Plaintiff's motorized wheelchair did not safely fit within Defendant Kapela's taxicab trunk. (Kapela Decl. At ¶ 8 (Docs. 68 & 73).) According to Defendant Kapela, he offered to give Plaintiff and her party a ride, but refused to transport the wheelchair. (Id. at 1 11.) Defendant Kapela stated he told Plaintiff the wheelchair would not fit in the trunk before Plaintiff attempted to load the wheelchair. (Id. at ¶ 7.) He contends that Plaintiff and her husband, Rich Kasprowicz, ignored his admonition and enlisted the help of airport security to secure the wheelchair into the trunk. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) Defendants claim that Mr. Kasprowicz attempted to force the wheelchair into the taxicab trunk and damaged it. (Kapela Depo. at p. 18 (Docs. 68 & 73).) Defendant Kapela testified that during the loading process, Mr. Kasprowicz became irritated with him and began scolding him for not having a rope. (Id.) According to Defendant Kapela, he suggested Plaintiff call a different transportation service that could accommodate the motorized wheelchair, but Plaintiff refused. (Id. at p. 25.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To deny summary judgment, there must be sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996).
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 8 09 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the opponent will have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need not produce any evidence at all on matters for which it does not have the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That burden is met simply by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant's case. Id.
If the moving party meets its burden, then the opposing party may not defeat a motion for summary judgment in the absence of probative evidence tending to support its legal theory. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 282 (9th Cir. 1979). The opposing party must present admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Nidds, 113 F.3d at 916 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
The court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1989).
Opposition evidence may consist of declarations, admissions, evidence obtained through discovery, and matters judicially noticed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party cannot, however, stand on its pleadings or simply assert that it will be able to discredit the movant's evidence at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. The opposing party cannot rest on mere allegations or denials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor can the opposing party rest on conclusory statements. National Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).
In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Lynn Deas brings two causes of action against Defendants Mel's Taxi, LLC ("Mel's Taxi") and Alexander Kapela. Plaintiff alleges discrimination because of her disability in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes § 347-13 ("Discrimination Statute"), (Count 1), and negligence (Count 2).
Defendants move for partial summary judgement on both counts.1 Defendant Kapela's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is identical to Defendant Mel's Taxi's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the exception of a single paragraph explaining the employee-employer relationship between the defendants. Both motions are addressed herein as "Motions for Partial Summary Judgment" and are disposed of by this order.
Defendants argue: (1) Plaintiff has not sufficiently established subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiff did not suffer discrimination as prohibited under Hawaiian Revised Statute § 347-13; (3) Hawaii Revised Statute § 431:10C-306 abolishes Defendants' tort liability; (4) Plaintiff's injuries from using a non-motorized wheelchair were not foreseeable; and (5) Defendant's conduct does not warrant punitive damages.
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction in a civil action when there is complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and the...
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