Deats v. IUE-CWA
| Decision Date | 22 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-00576-TBR |
| Parties | GWEN DEATS Plaintiff v. IUE-CWA, THE INDUSTRIAL DIVISION OF THE COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant General Electric Company and Defendant IUE-CWA, Local 83761's respective Motions for Summary Judgment.1 (Docket Nos. 50 & 51, respectively.) Plaintiff Gwen Deats has responded in opposition, (Docket No. 52,) and Defendant GE has replied, (Docket No. 73). Defendant IUE-CWA, Local 83761 has not replied, and the time to do so has now passed. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT the Defendants' respective Motions for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gwen Deats began working for Defendant General Electric Company (GE) at its Appliance Park location in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2005. At all times pertinent, GE had entered into and was operating under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the IUE-CWA, the Industrial Division of the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, acting for itself and on behalf of the Local 83761 (the "Union"). In November 2010, GE terminated Deats' employment for an alleged violation of GE company policy. GE indicated its decision to terminate Deats was based on a surveillance video that purported to show Deats damaging the vehicle of another GE employee, Gary Lowe, by "keying" Lowe's vehicle as he walked by it in the GE parking lot.
Deats and Lowe did not get along. In or around October 2010, Deats received reports that someone had posted derogatory graffiti about him in one of GE's restrooms. Deats testified in his deposition that he suspected "Lowe might have been the one behind it." (Docket No. 50-2, at 15.) On October 26, Deats clocked out around 10:40 a.m. and entered the GE parking lot. What happened in the parking lot remains a matter of contention among the parties. A security camera recorded Deats as he walked through the parking lot. Defendants contend that the video shows Deats taking a "zigzagging" and "haphazard" path, appearing to go purposefully out of his way to walk past Lowe's vehicle, and then extending his arm toward Lowe's vehicle as he walked past. Deats does not dispute that it is he in the recording; however, he maintains that he did not damage the vehicle. According to Deats, the video's image is so indistinct that it does not show anything other than him walking through the parking lot and thus could not have established a reliable basis for his termination. Deats further insists that there is noevidence showing that Lowe's vehicle is actually depicted in the video or that he knew which vehicle was Lowe's or where Lowe's vehicle was parked.
Several days after the video was recorded, Lowe reported to Mark Marzano, an operations manager at GE, that Lowe's vehicle had been keyed. GE then initiated an investigation, which included reviewing the parking lot security footage. Based on this investigation, GE believed Deats was responsible for keying Lowe's vehicle. A meeting was held in which Deats, the Union's chief steward, and several GE managers viewed the video. Thereafter, the video was again reviewed by GE management and Deats, along with the Union's president, Jerry Carney. As a result of its investigation, GE terminated Deats.
On November 23, 2010, the Union initiated a grievance proceeding to challenge and reverse Deats' termination. GE denied that grievance, maintaining that Deats' termination was proper. The Union initiated the second step of the grievance process on December 8, 2010. At this step, Carney became involved and met with GE management on Deats' behalf. GE again denied Deats' grievance, relying on the results of its investigation. The Union then initiated the third step of the grievance process, which required the Union's parent entity to negotiate directly with members of GE's management team. GE denied Deats' grievance again at this third step. Upon completing each of these steps, the Union had three possible options: (1) request arbitration pursuant to the CBA, (2) put Deats' grievance up for strike notice, or (3) do nothing. The Union's negotiating committee, which was comprised of Carney and the Union's chief stewards, held a meeting on February 14, 2011, to decide whether to arbitrate. The committee decided not to arbitrate Deats' termination and instead put his grievance up for strike notice. Deats then filed suit in October 2011.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of her position; she must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for her. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Mere speculation will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Still, "[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
DISCUSSION
Deats asserts a "hybrid" claim under Section 301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, against GE and the Union. To recover on a Section 301 claim, Deats must prove both (1) that GE's actions violated the terms of the CBA, and (2) that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Summers v. Keebler Co., 133 F. App'x 249, 251 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983)). "The 'interdependency' of a union employee's claims against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation is well-established in this Circuit." Husen v. Dow Chem. Co., 2006 WL 901210, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2009) (quoting Millner v. DTE Energy Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960-61 (E.D. Mich. 2003)). "[I]f the first claim anchored in the employer's alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement fails, then the breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union must necessarily fail with it." White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1990); cf. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi Transp. Serv., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 214, 220 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (), aff'd 929 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1991).
GE and the Union separately move for summary judgment on Deats' respective claims against them.
Deats claims that GE breached the terms of the CBA by terminating him without "just cause" as required by that agreement. GE maintains that it had an honest belief that Deats damaged another employee's property. GE further asserts that it did not breach theterms of the CBA and argues that Deats has failed to come forward with substantive evidence to support that allegation.
GE's Rules of Conduct provide that "defacing or deliberately damaging . . . the property of others" is considered a "serious offense," which "will result in time-off and if considered serious enough in the judgment of management, could result in discharge on the first offense." (Docket No. 50-8.) GE informed Deats of its decision to terminate him by letter dated November 16, 2010. (Docket No. 50-10.) In that letter, GE stated that its decision was based on investigation regarding Deats' violation of these rules, "specifically acts of defacing and damaging the property of others." (Docket No. 50-10, at 2.)
The Sixth Circuit has adopted an "honest belief" rule with regard to an employer's proffered basis for an adverse employment action. Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001); Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2001). Under that rule, as long as an employer has an honest belief in its proffered reason for terminating an employee, "the employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect." Majewski, 274 F.3d at 1117 (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 808 (6th Cir. 1998)). "An employer has an honest belief in its reason for discharging an employee where the employer reasonably relied 'on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.'" Id. (citing Smith, 155 F.3d at 807). In Smith v. Chrysler Corp., the Sixth Circuit elaborated on the question whether "reasonable reliance" was present:
In deciding whether an employer reasonably relied on the...
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