Debbie S. v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-1963-AJB |
| Parties | DEBBIE S., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, [1] Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiff Debbie S. brought this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act.[3] For the reasons set forth below, the Court REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner AND REMANDS the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on December 14, 2016, alleging disability commencing on December 12, 2016. [Record (hereinafter “R”) 124, 246-52]. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. [R116-36]. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [R149-52]. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 5, 2019, [R80-115], at which Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to December 7 2017, [R86]. The ALJ issued a decision on April 9, 2019 denying Plaintiff's application on the ground that she had not been under a “disability” at any time from the amended onset date through the date of the decision. [R66, 72]. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on March 16, 2020, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [R1-9].
Plaintiff then filed an action in this Court on May 7, 2020, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. 1]. The answer and transcript were filed on October 7, 2020. [Docs. 12, 13]. On May 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 24]; on June 2, 2021, the Commissioner filed a response in support of the decision, [Doc. 25]; and on June 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of her petition for review of the Commissioner's decision, [Doc. 27].[4] The matter is now before the Court upon the administrative record, the parties' pleadings, and the parties' briefs, [5] and it is accordingly ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, psychological, or physiological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)-(3).
The burden of proof in a Social Security disability case is divided between the claimant and the Commissioner. The claimant bears the primary burden of establishing the existence of a “disability” and therefore entitlement to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether the claimant has met the burden of proving disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999), superseded by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000), [6] on other grounds as stated in Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2018). The claimant must prove at step one that he is not undertaking substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must prove that he is suffering from a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his ability to perform basic work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At step three, if the impairment meets one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 (Listing of Impairments), the claimant will be considered disabled without consideration of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At step four, if the claimant is unable to prove the existence of a listed impairment, he must prove that his impairment prevents performance of past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At step five, the regulations direct the Commissioner to consider the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform other work besides past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The Commissioner must produce evidence that there is other work available in the national economy that the claimant has the capacity to perform. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2. To be considered disabled, the claimant must prove an inability to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists. Id.
If at any step in the sequence a claimant can be found disabled or not disabled, the sequential evaluation ceases and further inquiry ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Despite the shifting of burdens at step five, the overall burden rests on the claimant to prove that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278 n.2; Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute on other grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5), as recognized in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991).
A limited scope of judicial review applies to a denial of Social Security benefits by the Commissioner. Judicial review of the administrative decision addresses three questions: (1) whether the proper legal standards were applied; (2) whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings of fact; and (3) whether the findings of fact resolved the crucial issues. Washington v. Astrue, 558 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1296 (N.D.Ga. 2008); Fields v. Harris, 498 F.Supp. 478, 488 (N.D.Ga. 1980). This Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and the Commissioner applies the proper legal standards, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
“Substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it must be enough to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1180; Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [the Court] must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary of the ALJ's findings, the ALJ decision will not be overturned where “there is substantially supportive evidence” of the ALJ's decision. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). In contrast, review of the ALJ's application of legal principles is plenary. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995); Walker, 826 F.2d at 999.
Also, a “court must consider evidence not submitted to the [ALJ] but considered by the Appeals Council when that court reviews the Commissioner's final decision.” Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007). In reviewing this additional evidence, the court must evaluate whether this “new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Id. at 1262. This means that the court must “determine whether the Appeals Council correctly decided that the ‘[ALJ's] action, findings, or conclusion is [not] contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record.' ” Id. at 1266-67 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)).
Plaintiff was born in 1960 and was fifty-eight years old on the date of the ALJ's decision. [R62, 84, 116, 246, 285]. She had a bachelor's degree and had worked as a volunteer coordinator, recreational leader, customer-service representative, and social-services aide. [R84, 87-90, 107-09, 290, 356]. Plaintiff alleged that she was disabled due to knee and back disorders, hypertension, high blood pressure, pain, and sleep disorders. [R289, 296, 323].
In the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that in March 2018 she underwent a trial for a stimulus implant in her back because of a degenerative spine and that in June 2018 she had surgery to permanently implant a spinal-cord stimulator.[8] [R91]. She...
To continue reading
Request your trial