DeBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc.
| Citation | 536 S.E.2d 399,342 S.C. 254 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 3229.,3229. |
| Parties | Christina G. deBONDT, Appellant, v. CARLTON MOTORCARS, INC., and Mercedes-Benz, N.A., Respondents. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Frank L. Eppes, of Eppes & Plumblee, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Cecil H. Nelson, Jr., of Cecil H. Nelson, Jr., LLC, of Greenville; H. Simmons Tate, Jr., and James L. Ward, Jr., both of Sinkler & Boyd, of Columbia, for Respondents.
Christina deBondt brought this action against Carlton Motorcars, Inc. and Mercedes-Benz, N.A.1 as the result of a dispute she had with the defendants concerning her purchase of a 1998 Mercedes SLK 230 automobile. DeBondt appeals the grant of summary judgment to both defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The facts, in the light most favorable to deBondt, are as follows. On June 10, 1996, deBondt, a car collector, contracted to purchase the sixteenth 1998 model Mercedes SLK 230 received by Carlton, a Mercedes dealership. She tendered a $1,000 deposit on the $42,000 list price. The sales representative for Carlton informed deBondt that the first 1998 model SLK automobile was not expected to arrive until February 1997 and that it might take eighteen months for deBondt's car to arrive. The sales representative also informed deBondt that she would begin receiving special SLK promotional materials, created and distributed by Mercedes, in the "next few months."
The promotional materials were part of a "Keep in Touch" (KIT) marketing program developed by Mercedes to keep purchasers informed of the production schedule for their automobiles. Mercedes limited eligibility for the KIT program to the first 7,000 SLK owners, known as "SLK Charter Owners." Under the program, Mercedes mailed various packages to the customers quarterly. The particular package mailed depended on the production stage of the automobile. Each package contained a personalized letter from the SLK itself as well as technical and/or historical information about the SLK. According to deBondt, the promotional materials also included four personalized CDs, a key chain signifying membership in the exclusive "SLK Charter Members Group," a photograph of an SLK prototype, and a "family album" of previous Mercedes automobiles. Mercedes publicized the promotional materials as part of the sales package for the first 7,000 SLKs purchased.
The KIT program centered around a customer database managed by the dealer "with market team assistance." Managing the database involved entering the customer information into the database and confirming customer status. Mercedes then conducted the actual mailings to the customers based on the information entered into the database by the dealer. As part of the process, Mercedes sent the dealer a manuscript on a quarterly basis, indicating the mailing schedule for each of the customers listed in the dealer's database. This provided the dealer an opportunity to clarify any discrepancies and to check the status of each customer's order within the KIT program.
Under the KIT program, dealers had the option of placing two different types of SLK orders in the database, customer specific orders or stock orders. If the dealer entered customer information with the SLK order, the customer received the KIT materials from Mercedes. If, on the other hand, the dealer ordered the SLK under the dealer's name, the order was merely a stock order and no promotional materials were mailed. The dealer could change the status of a stock order by specifying a customer's name and changing the code for the order in the database. Similarly, the dealer could instruct Mercedes not to mail promotional materials to a particular customer listed in the database by name.
In February 1997, deBondt visited Carlton's showroom to select the accessories and colors for her new car. At that time, Carlton representatives told her she would begin receiving her KIT promotional materials'"in the near future." On March 12, 1997, Carlton sent deBondt a letter attempting to unilaterally cancel its contract with her. Carlton represented to deBondt that it had received no SLKs at that time. During subsequent discussions, however, Carlton's General Manager allegedly admitted that Carlton had already received four SLKs.
DeBondt submitted to Carlton a draft complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking specific performance and damages. On June 30, 1997, Carlton's attorney wrote to deBondt's attorney and confirmed that Carlton would "place Ms. deBondt back on the waiting list in the same position she occupied prior to this disagreement, including the reinstatement of delivery of all promotional materials related to the production and delivery of the SLK automobile with no time gaps and no incorrect personalization...." However, deBondt's attorney subsequently received a letter from Mercedes, dated August 26, 1997, indicating deBondt was not an SLK Charter Owner and therefore was not entitled to receive items provided to the Charter Owners.
On October 9, 1997, Carlton delivered an SLK to deBondt for the purchase price of $42,258.60. No promotional materials were ever delivered to deBondt.
DeBondt filed this action against Carlton and Mercedes on October 9, 1997, alleging four causes of action: (1) violations of the Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act; (2) fraud, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation; (3) specific performance; and (4) violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. She alleged that Carlton and Mercedes refused to supply her, as agreed, with the promotional materials signifying her status as an SLK Charter Owner. Further, deBondt alleged the limited production SLK automobiles with the appropriate promotional materials were being resold by non-Mercedes dealers for $55,000, approximately $13,000 more than the $42,000 list price of the vehicle.
Mercedes initially denied that deBondt was one of the first 7,000 purchasers of the SLK. However, Mercedes subsequently admitted during discovery that deBondt was in fact one of the first 7,000 purchasers. Nevertheless, in its answers to deBondt's requests to admit, Mercedes maintained deBondt was not eligible for the promotional materials because Carlton did not submit her name to Mercedes as the purchaser, but rather listed her purchase as a stock order, which prevented her from receiving the materials.
On July 29, 1998, Judge Joseph Watson granted summary judgment to Carlton, finding Carlton neither manufactured nor controlled the distribution of any of the SLK Charter Owners promotional materials. Judge Watson found that Carlton timely ordered the promotional materials from Mercedes, but Mercedes failed to deliver the materials. Judge Watson found deBondt's complaint was against Mercedes, not Carlton.
On October 7, 1998, Mercedes offered to settle the litigation by providing "a pristine set of all promotional materials received by Charter Owners of the SLK 230, complete with personalized letters addressed to Ms. deBondt and the attached affidavit confirming the authenticity of the materials, in return for a full and final release of all claims against Mercedes." DeBondt tentatively accepted the settlement by letter on October 19, 1998, but subsequently refused the offered materials because they were not in the condition promised. DeBondt claimed one of the containers for the materials was scratched, the letters contained numerous typographical errors and other inaccuracies, and a reply card was missing.
On November 20, 1998, Judge Henry Floyd granted summary judgment to Mercedes, concluding that deBondt's complaint raised no genuine issue as to any material fact. DeBondt appeals the orders granting summary judgment to the defendants.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), SCRCP; see also Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 487 S.E.2d 187 (1997). In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 492 S.E.2d 55 (1997).
In her first cause of action, deBondt alleges Carlton and Mercedes committed acts in violation of the Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (the "Dealers Act"), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 56-15-10 to -130 (1991 & Supp.1999). She argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Carlton and Mercedes on this claim.
The Dealers Act declares certain unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices to be unlawful. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-30(a) (1991). Any person injured by reason of a violation of the Act may sue for damages. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-110(1) (1991). It is a violation of the Dealers Act for any manufacturer or motor vehicle dealer "to engage in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties or to the public." S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-40(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
Although arbitrary conduct is not defined in the Dealers Act, our supreme court has defined it for purposes of the Act to include "acts which are unreasonable, capricious or nonrational; not done according to reason or judgment; depending on will alone." Taylor v. Nix, 307 S.C. 551, 555, 416 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1992). Furthermore, our supreme court has defined bad faith as:
The opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to deceive or mislead another, or a neglect or refusal to [fulfill] some duty or some...
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