DeBose v. Madden
| Decision Date | 23 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1132-MMA (WVG) |
| Parties | LOUIS LOVELL DEBOSE, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER OVERRULING PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS; ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; AND DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Louis Lovell DeBose ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge a prison administrative rules violation hearing, which resulted in the loss of a 90-day time credit. See Doc. No. 1 at 1, 13.1 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. See Doc. No. 6. The Magistrate Judge has issued a detailed and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation("R&R"), recommending that the Court grant Respondent's motion and dismiss the Petition without leave to amend. See Doc. No. 10 at 11. Petitioner filed a timely objection to the R&R. See Doc. No. 11. Respondent has not filed a reply. Upon due consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections, ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's R&R, GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the Petition without leave to amend, and DENIES Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability.
In August 2017, Petitioner was issued a rules violation report ("RVR") for using cardboard to obstruct the view into his cell, thus delaying prison staff's ability to conduct the inmate count. See Doc. No. 1 at 1; Doc. No. 6-5 at 36 45, 53, 55. As a result, Petitioner was found guilty of "Delaying a Peace Officer in the performance of Duties" and sanctioned a good-time credit loss of ninety days. See Doc. No. 1 at 13; Doc. No. 6-5 at 36. Petitioner asserts that the RVR hearing violated his constitutional rights because he was denied a requested witness, the ability to present documentary evidence, and an impartial decisionmaker. See Doc. No. 1 at 3, 13.
The Magistrate Judge issued an R&R on Respondent's motion to dismiss, in which he recommends the Court grant Respondent's motion and dismiss the Petition without leave to amend. See Doc. No. 10 at 11. The Magistrate Judge found that the Court lacks federal habeas corpus jurisdiction because Petitioner's success "would not necessarily lead to Petitioner's immediate or speedier release," which renders his claim outside the core of habeas corpus. See id. at 3, 6. Although his Petition could be construed as a § 1983 action, the Magistrate Judge found that the Court should not construe the action because there are no allegations against the named Respondent, and it is unclear who Petitioner seeks to hold responsible for the denial of his rights. See id. at 6. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge found that such a § 1983 action should be filed in the Central District of California because the state actors mentioned in the Petition do not appear to reside in this district and the events of the underlying disciplinary action occurred in theCentral District. See id. at 7. Regardless of these issues, the Magistrate Judge further found that the Petition is facially untimely, cannot be saved by statutory tolling, is not entitled to equitable tolling, and does not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 8-11.
Petitioner now objects to the Magistrate Judge's R&R. See Doc. No. 11.
The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where the parties object to a R&R, "[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). A district judge may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)); Wilkins v. Ramirez, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
Petitioner objects to five components of the Magistrate Judge's R&R. See Doc. No. 11. The Court addresses each objection in turn.
First, Petitioner takes issue with the background section of the R&R because it "renders an erred and abridged version" and makes "a fair judgment impossible." See id. at 2. The Court finds that Petitioner's various objections to the background section are insufficient to show that the Magistrate Judge came to an incorrect conclusion regarding the substance of Respondent's motion to dismiss. Indeed, the objection does not show how the Magistrate Judge was incorrect in finding that the Court lacks federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over this action or that the Petition is untimely. Thus, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's first objection.
Second, Petitioner argues that the legal standard used in the R&R is "misguided and erroneous." Doc. No. 11 at 4. Similar to the background section objection, Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the legal standard section rendered an erroneous recommendation regarding the Court's lack of jurisdiction over this action or the untimeliness of the Petition. Thus, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's second objection.
Third, Petitioner asserts that the Magistrate Judge was incorrect in finding "federal habeas jurisdiction does not attack the legality of the duration of Petitioner's confinement and must be brought in a separate civil rights action." Doc. No. 11 at 7. Similar to the rationale in Nettles v. Grounds, success on the merits of Petitioner's claims "would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release because the expungement of the challenged disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to a grant of parole." 830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (). The Magistrate Judge was correct. The disciplinary hearing could affect the Parole Board's future assessment on whether to grant parole, where the lost credits could affect the calculation of Petitioner's ultimate release date. However, the expungement of the disciplinary findings would not necessarily lead to an immediate or speedier release. As the Ninth Circuit in Nettles noted, "the presence of a disciplinary infraction does not compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of an infraction compel the grant of parole." Id. at 935. The Parole Board may deny parole "on the basis of any of the grounds presently available to it." Id. (quoting Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003)). As the Magistrate Judge noted, Petitioner may never be found eligible for parole based on other grounds. Petitioner's claims remain speculative and too attenuated and, thus, fall outside of "the core of habeas corpus" because they would "would not necessarily lead to his immediate or earlier release from confinement and he must instead bring his claim under § 1983." Id. (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.521, 535 n.13 (2011)). Thus, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's third objection.2 Because Petitioner's claim falls outside "the core of habeas corpus," this alone is sufficient to dismiss his claim. However, the Court proceeds to discuss Petitioner's objections to the Magistrate Judge's timeliness findings.
Fourth, Petitioner contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding statutory tolling principles would make the Petition untimely. See Doc. No. 11 at 11. In particular, Petitioner argues "interval tolling" makes his Petition timely. See id. (citing Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-94 (2006)).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") established a one-year statute of limitations period for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period applies to § 2254 habeas petitions that challenge prison disciplinary decisions. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). Under such challenges, the limitations period runs pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012); Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), "[t]he limitation period shall run from the latest of . . . (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). "As a general rule, the state agency's denial of an administrative appeal is the 'factual predicate' for such habeas claims." Mardesich, 668 F.3d at 1172. The limitations period is tolled when "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Here, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") issued its third level appeal decision regarding the RVR on February 15, 2018. See Doc. No. 6-5 at 57. Petitioner filed the initial state court petition in Riverside County Superior Court on January 23, 2019. See Doc. No. 6-5 at 70. Between the final CDCR appeal and the filing of the petition in Riverside County Superior Court, 342 days passed and left 23 days remining in the limitations period. The limitations period was subject to statutory tolling until the California Supreme Court denied his petition on March 11, 2020. See Doc. No. 6-11 at 2. Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition on June 10, 2020, which was 91 days after the California Supreme Court's denial. See Doc. No. 1 at 12. Taking the two time periods when the statute of limitations was running, 433 days passed.3 Therefore, after applying...
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