DeBruce v. State, 6 Div. 189
Decision Date | 14 August 1984 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 189 |
Citation | 461 So.2d 889 |
Parties | Charlotte Grant DeBRUCE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Stephen G. Mahon of Boudreaux, Davis & Mahon, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Charlotte Grant DeBruce was indicted and convicted for theft of property in the second degree. Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-8-4. She was sentenced as an habitual offender to ten years' imprisonment. Four issues are raised on appeal.
DeBruce contends that there was no competent evidence of the value of the property taken. This is a shoplifting case involving the theft of a silver cup from Rich's Department Store in Birmingham. The State's evidence shows that Jimmy Lee Terry placed the cup inside his coat. As Terry and DeBruce walked away from the silver department, Terry placed the cup in DeBruce's purse. The pair went to the jewelry department where Terry removed various items of jewelry and placed them in his pocket. When Terry was confronted by store security agents, DeBruce walked away. Store Detective Diane Brookins observed DeBruce remove the cup from her purse, place it on a "riser" or display shelf, and exit the store. Brookins recovered the cup, which bore a sticker identifying the cup as the property of Rich's and listing the purchase price.
At trial, the State's only witnesses as to the value of the cup were Ms. Brookins and another store detective, Dorothy Godfrey. Neither witness had any personal knowledge of the value of the cup except what was reflected on the price sticker. Over a general objection and one of "improper predicate", Ms. Godfrey stated her "judgment as to the value of this cup based on the price tag." Ms. Brookins was never asked her opinion as to the value of the cup but testified to what the price sticker "said as to value." She also stated that because of the fluctuating price of silver, "(w)e go up and down with mark-ups and mark-downs on a daily basis."
We find that the trial judge erred in allowing Store Detective Godfrey to testify about the value of the cup, that the price sticker was substantial evidence on which the jury could reasonably rely in determining the market value of the stolen cup, and that the error in the testimony of the store detective was harmless. These findings involve issues of first impression in Alabama.
Our finding that Store Detective Godfrey was not qualified to testify to her opinion concerning the value of the cup is based on the undisputed fact that her knowledge of that value was based solely on the price tag.
The only predicate necessary for the receipt of opinion testimony of value is that the witness has had an opportunity to form a correct opinion of the value of the stolen property. State v. Johnson, 268 Ala. 11, 13, 104 So.2d 915 (1958); Tice v. State, 386 So.2d 1180, 1186 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Tice, 386 So.2d 1187 (Ala.1980); Alabama Code 1975, § 12-21-114. For purposes of offenses involving theft, "value" is defined as "(t)he market value of the property at the time and place of the criminal act." Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-8-1(14).
State v. White, 37 Conn.Supp. 796, 437 A.2d 145, 149 (1981). Store security officers are not qualified to testify as to the value of stolen merchandise where their knowledge is based solely on the price ticket. State v. Coleman, 19 Wash.App. 549, 576 P.2d 925, 927 (1978).
Although Godfrey's opinion of the value of the stolen cup should not have been admitted, the price sticker on the cup was competent evidence of value. Here, the only objections to the admission of the price sticker were a mere "objection" and that "(a)nybody could have put that tag on there."
At the outset, we recognize that there is authority that price tags constitute inadmissible hearsay unless properly qualified as a business record exception. Codding, supra; Coleman, supra. However, our research reveals that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that, in a shoplifting case, a price tag constitutes competent evidence of the value of stolen property. In Lacy v. State, 432 So.2d 1205, 1206 (Miss.1983), the Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected the majority opinion in Coleman, supra, and held that where the price tags were attached to the garments when the theft occurred, where there was no sale in the store which would reduce their displayed value, and where the garments came from two public display racks where "high-value" men's items were kept, the price tags were not inadmissible on the grounds they constituted hearsay. Price tags are competent evidence of the value of stolen goods in a shoplifting prosecution. Calbert v. State, 670 P.2d 576 (Nev.1983); Lauder v. State, 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610 (1963). "Where a defendant is charged with shoplifting, uncontradicted evidence that merchandise was displayed for regular sale at a market retail price may constitute circumstantial evidence on the value of an item." State v. Tunnell, 99 N.M. 450, 659 P.2d 902 (1982), reversed on other grounds, 99 N.M. 446, 659 P.2d 898, 904 (1983); City of Albuquerque v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 704, 604 P.2d 842, 843 (1979). "In a shoplifting case, evidence that merchandise is offered for sale at a marked price is sufficient circumstantial evidence of value, where totally uncontradicted, to support a conviction grounded upon the marked price of its value." State v. Harris, 641 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tenn.Cr.App.1980); Norris v. State, 475 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn.Cr.App.1972).
Like the Supreme Court of Mississippi, we adopt the rejection of the majority opinion in Coleman, supra, and follow the decision of the Superior Court of Connecticut in State v. White, 37 Conn.Supp. 796, 437 A.2d 145, 148 (1981):
We adopt the reasoning in White, Lacy, and Norris and hold that in a shoplifting case, a price tag attached to the stolen property at the time of the theft is sufficient circumstantial evidence of value, where totally uncontradicted, to support a conviction grounded upon the marked price of its value.
Our finding that the price tags are not inadmissible hearsay squares with the general rule that inscriptions or labels placed on packages for the purpose of indicating their contents are competent evidence, strong or weak according to the attendant circumstances, of their actual contents. Kennedy v. State, 182 Ala. 10, 62 So. 49 (1913); Cusimano v. State, 27 Ala.App. 407, 409, 173 So. 490 (1937); ...
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