Decamp v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., Civil 3703

• Decision Date: 01 May 1936
• Docket Number: Civil 3703
• Parties: O. B. DECAMP. Appellant, v. CENTRAL ARIZONA LIGHT & POWER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

57 P.2d 311

47 Ariz. 517

O. B. DECAMP. Appellant, v. CENTRAL ARIZONA LIGHT & POWER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee

Civil No. 3703

Supreme Court of Arizona

May 1, 1936

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Dave W. Ling, Judge. Order affirmed.

Mr. L C. McNabb and Messrs. Cox & Moore, for Appellant.

Messrs Armstrong, Kramer, Morrison & Roche, and Messrs. Struckmeyer & Jennings, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, C.J.

On the 3d of March, 1934, O. B. DeCamp, hereinafter called plaintiff, filed an action for damages for libel against Central Arizona Light & Power Company, a corporation hereinafter called defendant. The case was tried to a jury on November 20, 1934, and a verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of $35,000. Judgment on the verdict was duly rendered on December 5, 1934. On December 13th defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was quite voluminous, but did not file at the same time a statement of the precise legal points relied upon in said motion, nor serve any copy of such statement upon opposing counsel, as required by subsection 5 of rule IV of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Court. On December 18th, plaintiff moved that the court make an order to the effect that defendant had waived its motion for a new trial by reason of its failure to observe the rule as above referred to. While this motion was being argued to the court and before a ruling had been made thereon, counsel for the defendant moved that the court suspend the operation of subsection 5, supra, and permit defendant to file a statement thereunder. The court thereupon made an order suspending the rule, but did not, in such order, state any reasons therefor. Thereafter, and on the 21st of December, defendant did file a statement of legal points. On December 27th the plaintiff moved to strike the statement on the ground that it was not filed until after the expiration of ten days from the date of the judgment. This motion was denied by the court. On January 3, 1935, the hearing on the motion for new trial came up and plaintiff again objected to the court entertaining it, on the ground that subsection 5, supra, had not been complied with. The objection was overruled and, after argument, the motion for new trial was taken under advisement until July 9, 1935, at which time it was granted. The reasons for granting the motion do not appear in the record. Notice of appeal from the order granting the new trial was immediately given, and the matter is before us on the question of whether, under the circumstances above set forth, the court erred in granting it.

It is apparent that the question turns upon the construction and effect of the Uniform Rules for the Superior Courts, adopted by this court and effective as of May 5, 1932. The particular portions of these rules which are before us for consideration are as follows:

"(5) When any demurrer, motion or similar pleading shall be filed, the party so presenting it sahll at the same time file a statement of the precise legal point or points he relies upon, a copy of which statement must be served on opposing counsel in the usual manner. A brief in support of such statement may be filed and served in the same manner, and in such case the latter shall have ten days from the date of service to file an answering brief, which must be served in the same manner as the original, and a reply may be filed in like manner in five days after the answering brief has been filed, and the matter shall then be deemed submitted, unless the court shall require oral arguments thereon. A failure to file such statement will be considered by the court as a formal waiver of the demurrer, motion or other objection raised, and an order to that effect will be entered in the minutes. The statement filed will be deemed to raise all points covered by the pleadings to which it refers, and all matters not contained in such statement will be considered as waived." (Rule IV.)

"In specific instances justifying the same, any Superior Court may suspend the operation of any of these rules when harm or injustice would otherwise result. But in such case the gact of the suspension with the reason therefor shall be entered on the minutes of the Superior Court, and such suspension shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court for an abuse of discretion." (Rule X.)

In determining this appeal, it is necessary that we consider first the authority of this court to make rules both for its own guidance and for that of the inferior courts of the state. It is held almost universally that, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory reason tothe contrary, all courts have the inherent right to make rules for the regulation of their own practice and for the conduct of their business. Fullerton v. United States Bank, 1 Pet. 604, 7 L.Ed. 280; In re Boyd's Estate, 25 Cal. 511; 15 C.J. 901, and cases cited. This power is judicial and not legislative in its nature, as a general superintendence over this subject seems to be properly within the judicial province, and has always been so considered. Wayman v. Sothard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253. It, however, is not absolute but subject to limitations based on reasonableness and conformity to constitutional and statutory provisions. The legislaure, in this filed as well as in all other legislative matters, has the supreme authority, except in so far as any rules made by it may unreasonably limit or hamper the courts in the performance of the duties imposed upon them by the Constitution, or violate the provisions of article 3 of our Constitution, which reads as follows:

"The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others."

The legislature of Arizona in 1901 specifically gave this court the rule making power and this has been carried forward in each code until the one of $1928, where it appears as section 3652 thereof in the following language:

"Rules of practice. The supreme court may make and adopt rules of practice for said court and for the superior courts. The clerk of the court shall print and distribute such rules andthe expense shall be paid out of the appropriation for the supreme court."

Pursuant to this statute, this court adopted the Uniform Rules for the superior courts of the state which included, among other things, the provisions above quoted. These rules, therefore, have the same force and effect as statutes so far as they are applicable to any case. But there is always this limitation thereto. In so far as there is a constitutional statute in regard to practice which provides for a certain method of procedure, that statute prevails over a rule made by the court which is in conflict therewith.And if there be any rule which is susceptible of two interpretations, one in harmony with the statute and the other in conflict therewith, this court will always give to it the former construction.

Notwithstanding the fact that it has given the general rule making power to this court, the legislature from time to time adopted certain rules of procedure on points where it was of the opinion...