Decker v. Decker, 33933

• Decision Date: 05 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 33933,33933
• Citation: 52 Wn.2d 456,326 P.2d 332
• Parties: Ira James DECKER, Respondent, v. Sunny Florence DECKER, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 456

52 Wn.2d 456

326 P.2d 332

Ira James DECKER, Respondent, v. Sunny Florence DECKER, Appellant.

No. 33933.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 5, 1958.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 18, 1958.

Wright & Wright, Seattle, for appellant.

Pemberton & Orloff, Bellingham, for respondent.

FINLEY, Justice.

This is a contempt proceeding by an ex-wife to compel her exhusband to comply with a provision of a divorce decree which required him to pay certain community debts incurred prior to the divorce.

The basic question presented is whether the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt (Art. I, § 17) bars the trial court from using contempt powers and imprisonment to enforce compliance with the aforementioned provision of the divorce decree.

The trial court emphasized the fact that the provision for payment of the community debts was a part of a property settlement, agreed upon orally by the parties. In his memorandum opinion, the trial judge relied upon dictum in Robinson v. Robinson, infra, for the proposition that property settlement agreements are not enforceable by contempt; he refused to grant the requested relief to the exwife. She has appealed.

The problem presented involves considerably more than the mere fact of noncompliance with a court order. It prompts considerations other than the matter of an affront to the dignity of the court--which in itself is serious enough. Society has a vital interest in marital disputes and their adjustment by the courts. The enforceability of provisions of divorce decrees as to support and custody, particularly, involves serious problems of public policy, which should not be resolved through the simple expedient of referring somewhat automatically to previous decisions of this or other courts. Precedents must be weighed and evaluated. They are not merely to be noted or tallied numerically, as noses, for or against a particular proposition.

We believe the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt relates to run-of-the-mill debtor-creditor relationships arising, to some extent, out of tort claim, but principally, out of matters basically contractual in nature. In such cases the judgment of the court is merely a declaration of an amount owing and is not an order to pay. Problems of domestic relations involving alimony, support payments, property settlements, together with court orders in connection therewith, do not normally fall into the debtor-creditor category. (But see In re Van Alstine, infra, and Corrigeux v. Corrigeux, infra, for cases in which debtor-creditor relationships were present in divorce actions.)

It has been clear in this state for over fifty years that arrearages in alimony and support payments do not constitute a debt within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. Art. I, § 17. Provisions as to support contained in a divorce decree simply make specific the husband's legal duty to support his wife or children. In re Cave infra; Haakenson v. Coldiron, 1937, 190 Wash. 627, 70 P.2d 294; Valaer v. Valaer, 1954, 45 Wash.2d 565, 277 P.2d 326. However, in cases wherein such provisions were not clearly spelled out or were not characterized as alimony or support, our decisions are in conflict.

At this point it is necessary to analyze briefly several significant decisions of this court which have bearing upon the problem at hand.

In State ex rel. Ditmar v. Ditmar, 1898, 19 Wash. 324, 53 P. 350, the divorce decree ordered the husband to pay off a mortgage on the homestead; the court awarded the wife a lien on the husband's separate property as her security. The husband refused to obey the provisions of the decree, and the wife commenced contempt proceedings against him. The trial court, after finding that the husband had the ability to pay, ordered him imprisoned until he paid off the mortgage. It appears from the court's opinion affirming the action of the trial court that the main contention the husband made on appeal was that the wife's exclusive remedy was to enforce her lien.

In re Van Alstine, 1899, 21 Wash. 194, 57 P. 348: The wife sued for divorce; the husband cross-complained for annulment and alleged that the wife and a co-conspirator had procured a large sum of money from him through fraud. In the decree granting an annulment to the husband, the court ordered the wife and co-conspirator to repay the money. When they did not comply with the court order, the husband sought to compel them to pay through contempt proceedings. On appeal, this court said that the divorce court had no jurisdiction to order the repayment of the money procured by fraud; that this was a debt within the constitutional provision, and contempt would not lie to enforce payment thereof.

In re Cave, 1901, infra, is the landmark case in which this court held that alimony is not a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision.

State ex rel. Ridenour v. Superior Court, 1933, 174 Wash. 152, 24 P.2d 418, 419: The parties had agreed to a written property settlement, which the divorce decree incorporated by reference. The settlement provided for monthly payments to the wife for specified periods of time, on specified conditions relating to her permanent employment. In its decision, this court cast doubt on the possibility of enforcing through contempt proceedings property settlement provisions contained in a divorce decree. Specifically, the reasoning of the court was that the incorporation of an agreed property settlement, by reference, was not a sufficient adjudication of alimony so that contempt would lie to enforce it. But the opinion contained the following statement: 'To be enforceable by contempt proceedings, there must be a definite and unconditional order to pay alimony as such.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In State ex rel. Lang v. Superior Court, 1934, 176 Wash. 472, 30 P.2d 237, the parties had agreed to a property settlement which the court had adopted and incorporated by attaching it to the decree. The settlement provided that the husband should make monthly payments of $50 to the wife until the sum of $1200 had been paid; thereafter, the payments should continue until either an additional $800 dollars had been paid or until the wife remarried, whichever occurred first. The trial court found that this provision had been treated by the parties and the divorce court as a property settlement. Because of that finding, we said, on appeal, that there was no reason to construe the settlement provision. The language quoted above from the Ridenour case was emphasized, and the court held that a property settlement was not enforceable by contempt.

State ex rel. Foster v. Superior Court, 1937, 193 Wash. 99, 74 P.2d 479: The divorce decree set out a division of the parties' property and provided that the husband should make semi-annual payments of $1,000 to the wife for three years. On appeal, this court concluded as a matter of law that the payment provisions were a part of the property settlement and held that contempt would not lie to enforce payment, citing Ridenour, supra, and Lang, supra, as authority.

In Davis v. Davis, 1942, 15 Wash.2d 297, 130 P.2d 355, 358, the divorce decree had ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney fees, amounting to $175. On appeal, the court said:

'We are of the opinion that the reason for allowing the court to bring to its aid contempt proceedings to enforce its decree directing the payment of alimony is equally applicable to a decree directing the payment of attorney's fees and suit money.'

The 'alimony as such' language of the Ridenour case, supra, was strictly limited; and the Davis opinion, supra, emphasized that in a normal debt situation a judgment merely determines an amount owing, but that in a divorce action the court has authority to order a party to pay.

Corrigeux v. Corrigeux, 1950, 37 Wash.2d 403, 224 P.2d 343: The divorce decree provided that the husband should make payments of $42 per month to the wife until the sum of $1,516 had been paid. Though this has the earmarks of a support provision, the court found that the actual basis for the provision had been a loan from the wife to the husband. The divorce decree was, therefore, merely a determination of an amount owing--a normal debt situation--and contempt did not lie to enforce payment.

State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 1950, 36 Wash.2d 868, 220 P.2d 1081, 1084: The divorce court inserted in the prayer of the complaint and in the court order a provision requiring the husband to make monthly payments of $50 to the wife until $2,000 had been paid. The husband did not appear in the divorce action, and no notice of the amended complaint was given to him. On appeal, the court held that the lack of notice deprived the husband of an opportunity to be heard on the question presented by the amended complaint, and that this amounted to a lack of due process; accordingly, such provision of the decree was not enforceable by contempt. But, in reaching its decision, the majority opinion specifically disavowed the 'alimony as such' language of the Ridenour case, supra, saying 'It is sufficient if the fair import of the language clearly indicates the court intended the award was for alimony or maintenance.'

There was a vigorous dissent to the holding that the lack of additional notice deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter an order on the amended complaint. Inherent in the dissent is the understanding that divorce actions involve more than the property interests of the parties; that the public is manifestly involved through its interest in the proper support of the wife and children; that the parties by their pleadings cannot deprive the court of its statutory power and duty to protect the public through awarding alimony, if, in the trial court's sound discretion, the situation warrants such award.

In Robinson v. Robinson, 1950, 37 Wash.2d 511, 225 P.2d 411, 413, the divorce decree provided that all property of the...