Decker v. Lackawanna & W. V. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 April 1909 |
| Docket Number | 10-1909 |
| Parties | Decker v. Lackawanna & Wyoming Valley Railroad Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued March 3, 1909
Appeal by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Lackawanna Co.-1906, No 851, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Harry P. Decker v Lackawanna & Wyoming Valley Railroad Company.
Trespass to recover damages for false arrest. Before Newcomb, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $ 191.80.
Error assigned among others was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.
Reversed.
W. J Torrey, of Welles & Torrey, for appellant. -- If a person merely communicates facts to the police and they act on their own responsibility, the defendant is not liable for false arrest: Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barbour, 253.
The conductor acted beyond the scope of his authority: Faust v. Ry. Co., 191 Pa. 420; McGilvray v. Ry. Co., 41 N.E. 116; Towanda Coal Co. v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418; Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Carper, 112 Ind. 26 (13 N.E. 122); Lezinsky v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 88 F. 437; Laffitt v. New Orleans City, etc., Ry. Co., 12 L. R. A. 337; Cunningham v. Seattle Electric Railroad & Power Co., 28 P. 745; Central Railroad Co. v. Brewer, 27 L. R. A. 63; Grayson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100 Mo.App. 60 (71 S.W. 730).
Edward W. Thayer, with him Charles E. Daniels, for appellee. -- Taken as a whole, this presents the case of a man telephoning to the police of a disturbance in his house and requesting the presence of an officer, and upon the appearance of the officer and a request for information pointing out the offender. If that is not participation in the arrest, it is difficult to understand how one can participate in an illegal arrest by an officer: Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539; Duggan v. R. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248; Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512.
The conductor was acting within the scope of his employment: McClung v. Dearborne, 134 Pa. 396; Duggan v. R. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248; McFarlan v. R. R. Co., 199 Pa. 408; Schimpf v. Harris, 185 Pa. 46; Gillingham v. R. R. Co., 14 L. A. R. 798; Palmeri v. R. R. Co., 16 L. R. A. 136.
Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Head and Beaver, JJ.
On May 8, 1906, the plaintiff purchased a ticket at Wilkes-Barre for Scranton and boarded a train of the defendant company for the latter place, which is the terminal of the road. It is alleged that after leaving Wilkes-Barre, the plaintiff and his companions were noisy, offensive and flourishing revolvers. This according to the witnesses of the defendant, though the plaintiff and his witnesses contradicted these averments. When the train arrived at Rocky Glen, which is about fifteen minutes' ride from Scranton, the conductor left the train and telephoned to Mr. Page, the dispatcher at Scranton, that he had a disorderly crowd aboard, that they were flourishing revolvers and that he wanted instructions what to do under the circumstances. The dispatcher told him to stop at Laurel Junction, a few hundred yards below the Scranton station, for instructions, when he arrived there. The conductor then boarded his train and proceded to Laurel Junction. In the meantime, Page, the dispatcher, telephoned to Mr. Murray, the trainmaster, who instructed Page to telephone the police to be on hand when the car arrived to prevent any disturbance there, but not to arrest the crowd for anything they had done on the train. Mr. Page caused notice of this fact to be given to the conductor at Laurel Junction. Mr. Page also called up the police station and requested the police to be present when the train arrived at Scranton. When the train drew into the Scranton station, the passengers all alighted and the trip was apparently over and the conductor started into the station to deliver his tickets, when he was met by a police officer who asked him where the men were who had caused the disturbance. He pointed out the crowd who were still at the station and had not yet reached the street. The officer then walked over to them and halted them. Under conflicting evidence, the jury found that the plaintiff was then arrested for disorderly conduct on the defendant's train and carrying concealed weapons. This was an arrest for something not happening in the presence of the police officer. The plaintiff, with his companions, were led into the waiting room of defendant's station by the police officers, where a controversy ensued and as a result the plaintiff and his companions were taken to the police station. The following morning the plaintiff was arraigned in the police court where he had a hearing and was duly convicted and fined for being drunk, disorderly and carrying concealed weapons. We understand it to be conceded that this conviction and sentence thereon had not been reversed at the time of the trial of this case. The plaintiff contended that he was not drunk and disorderly on the train nor at the station. This suit was brought to recover damages from the defendant corporation for a false arrest on the theory that it was brought about by the action of the conductor of the train. The learned court submitted the case to the jury in a fair and impartial charge, if the evidence warranted submitting it to them at all.
In our opinion, the pivotal questions for consideration are two, viz.: 1. Was there sufficient evidence in the case from which the conclusion can be reasonably drawn that the defendant's conductor actively participated in the arrest of the plaintiff? 2. If he did, was he at the time acting within the scope of his authority so as to bind the defendant corporation?
The assignments of error raise the questions, 1st, of the refusal of the court to give a binding instruction; 2d, refusal to enter judgment for the defendant on the point reserved, and 3d, refusal to enter judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto and in entering judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
A careful examination of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the learned court erred in permitting the jury to find that the defendant's conductor actively participated in or caused the arrest of the plaintiff. The evidence upon this question at most only shows that the conductor inquired from Rocky Glen of his superior officer for instructions as to what he should do about the disorderly crowd; that he was instructed to stop at Laurel Junction, which he did, and received instructions not to arrest the crowd for anything they had done on the train. It further appears clearly that the police were sent to the station at Scranton instructed not to arrest any of the crowd but to preserve order there. Taking the most favorable view of the evidence for the plaintiff, it only shows that the conductor pointed out the plaintiff and his companions on inquiry being made by the police, and we fail to find in the evidence anything indicating that the conductor aided, directed or participated in the arrest of the plaintiff. When the police officers asked him to designate the disorderly crowd it is difficult to see that he could have done any less than he did.
The plaintiff's declaration alleges that he was arrested at the instigation of and on information received from employees of the defendant company. We do not think the evidence sustains this averment and if we are right in this, then the court ought not to have submitted the case to the jury because the theory on which the plaintiff recovered was that the conductor instigated the arrest. The undisputed evidence shows that the conductor was instructed not to have the plaintiff arrested for...
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